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Sistorioiilljr, temre la land with Its M«0Olai%»d pyoH«M has Immi a 
of social intsrsst. ^  Within the agricultural sector of the eoonos|jr» 
sereral aejisures have been designed to alleTlate land texture problems. 
fhese measures hsv* heen n&inly concerned with prosoting fee^six^le owner­
ship of lands and ia^troTiag credit and leasing arran^iaents. Still, 
probleat seta to persist. AB»BS the persleteat pre'bleBt «re l^e ii^aete 
of temre arraneeaents tgjon the use and productirlties of resources in 
2 
agricultiire. fhls area of prohleas has not "been entirely neglected la 
agricultural eoonoaios researoh; Imt little osspirioal analysis of the 
effiote of tenore amkBgeaeats ea pyoduetloa effioieafl^ hat teea eoq^leted. 
The es^lrical studies have been mostly descriptive in eharaoter.' 
Aa exanination of the literature oa land teaore, howerer, eofigeete 
that aore inforaation about the effects of teoore t^on agrieultural 
the eoaeii^t of "tenure |a land" ssans the relations tetweea aaa, and 
between man and the public, giving rii^ts to the use and control of IwUL. 
Sui rights to laai. aee and ecmtrol aiqr be dietrUmted through different 
feme of X«a& owaeriihlp tm& leatiag, aortga|^aie throat rig^e 
reterred the ttn.te. Qae laetltatloas ef owaertldp, tcaeaesr* eredlt aad 
taxatloa are therefore iatesral parts of the land texaxre syetea. 
^he tera "tenore arrangement" eabraees the specific condition under 
iftiioh rights to the use or oocxqpanoy of land are held. 
^See for eaudtple, M. M. Kelso. A oriti<{ae of land teaare research. 
Jour. Land and Pub. Utility leea. 10J390-HO2. IOT. 193^1 Halner Schlekele. 
feaare prohXeat and reteau^ aeeds in the Middle Vest, jotor. Vara Icon. 
X9sX12<»X27> Xf37t J'eeepb Aekatnaa. Status aai. iq^i««ieaX of reteav^ 
la fara taaVM^'. ^wtr. fara Scon. 23:277^. feh. X9HXs Max M. Thaipe. 
A REI^prndlBaX of fara tenure reeeareh. land Sooa. 2^:23^. SOY. X9H8. 
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•ffieiaaejr asd lapon toeis^ is d«alra,bl«.^ ^ Serth Oanlr&l B^losal 
fanora lateaveSx CoMtlttaa and tiM Dixitad Stataa Sapartnaal of Agriealtara, 
xaoog&islas tha lii^3>ta2>oa of tazmra amraagaaaiita is tha a^riealttural 
aeonoogr a:Bd %h» aaad for fcurthar aTidaafias fgmrA to tba *z«latlva 
•fflcieney of alternatlr* tenure arraAgeBente", h&Te Initiated a etudy vitk 
the intents to dataralaei (1) the is^aeta of various tenare arrangenats 
rasoturea allaoatloB, (2) tha attrilmtaa of tantara arraxMgaaasIs that 
«»iiltltiita oltstaeXas to Istprovad rasourea uaa and (5) raaadlal na^oda far 
ainiaiisi&g tha ehataalas ehsarrad. Thia atody ia tmdartalMDi idth tha h^s 
of hriagiag late foaas SOM of tha aaalytlaal prehlaaa lEnrelvad aad 
proTldiBe a fnoM of z>afaranea for soaa of tha aaplrlaal stmdiaa partalttlag 
to tha alloe&tiafi affielaaey of tamira arranigsaa&ts. 
X^portaaoa of faxnira Amagitmnia la lesmirea Allaeatlea 
Praswuibly, tha apparaat laadaffoaoy of asqEtlZ'ieal larastlgatioas late 
tha affaets of tamura oa rasooroa allooatloa has haaa doa to tha eoaplaxltlas 
of tha Aaarioaa tamura systaa aad also to ths BMUCQT sabtla ways ia tdiieh tha 
pattaras of vasottrM ori^lxatlea eaa ha affaotad hy tamra arraa^aMats. 
^ affaots of taaora arraafiMiaats oa prodoetloa affleiWBM^ nay ha advarsaj 
aavar^lass, tamra arraaKaaaats 83>paar to ha partioiaXarly aaoaaaaxy siUL 
Saportaat ia a saeiaty «hara private property is aa aeeaptad iastitatloa. 
^or a raeaat st&taaaat oa spaelfie iwaaaroh aaeds ia laad taaara aaai 
Xatarragioaal Lasd Tassira ]tosaaroh Coandttaa. i^priealttaaral laitd taaara, 
aeopa ai^ aateorat raappraiaal, Ghiea^, Xll., fama foioadatioa. 195S>* 
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Arra&fi»at&«« hare grotm from the 4i«trlbtttloa of ri^U la laa& 
^•tWMia as nicll &• froa th« distrl'butloa of eoalrol OTtr nea* 
laad ntoisireos yo^rod to oea^loto production proeosMt, fh* eontxol oTtr 
agrlsoltmral s«foure«« nay 1a« ao^^rod (or traaaferrod) oithar throtii^ 
onaftrthip, loaaiag, or 'borroidsg; aad taaare arraagoaeatt aato it poaailalo 
for paella to pool rasoureas for aahaaoiag prodaetioa. 
Saeh ra soarea eoatrilmtor &s vail &a oooiatsr at larga is tharafora 
affaetad V tb» iastitatioaal arraagaBwats stnrroaadiag ovaorriiip* loasiag, 
aad Iborrowiae, Xaad ovaars, Imidiag agsneias, tsaaats and taziag bedias 
ara affactad to aem axtaat.^ Xa tura, eoasaaars my 'N tatiaatoly affacted 
throat the kinds, aaoaats aad prioas of goods aad serriees prodoead as 
iafltuiaeed "by ^ types of tesnra arraaeeaeats aadar whicih prodaotioa 
daoisioas laics plaee. 
Xllastrativs of ths ia^ziaaee of 'taaare aad the ralae of prodaotioa" 
ara data for the 17aited States froa the 1$^ agriealttund eaasfoysi thesa 
data rersal tlaat aore thaa oaa-haXf of the aeriealtaral oal^t Cipfoss sales) 
2 froa eoamsreial faras mm prodooed oa farms fally or portly reated. 
^refere, if leasiag arraageaeats hate adverse effects prodaotioa 
^ereaatages ealealated froa the U. S. Sept. Agr. AgrieoXttural 
statistios, 1$^, Washiafifcoa, D. C.. U. S. Ctevt. Priat. Off. 195^. p. ^T, 
)dtov that for the Waited States la 1§53» agpproxiaately ^ per oimt of fam 
<^erator8* predtu>tioa expanses wsat to laaiUords as nst reat« 2 per seat 
neat to far» aarlga^s iaterest, aad H per eeat to fara real estate taoESs. 
(lo data are aTaiXa3»le oa the aet iaeoae of teaaats.) 
$. Sept. Ooa. aad tJ. S. Sept. Agr. laxn teaaret a gn^ie saiRBax3r» 
1950. Washiagfeoa, ». 0., U. S. Oort. Priafe. Off. 1952. p. 
I 
% 
effieiesejr tbea it i» reasonable to stsqppoae i^t a aubatantial portion of 
a^eultural prodnetlon eould 1m obtained at lotfor "eoata*. Siallarlj, if 
tenure arrancffiaeata otber ^uui leaaing, do haetre aoae audterae effeota alaOt 
it aeana that the "eoata" of acrioultural prodtuttioa oould be reduoed 
farther. Social welfare wold be inoreaaed aeoordinglsr. 
It should then be in aooiet^'a intereat to usderatand the behavior of 
reaouroe eooitributera tmder different typea of tenure arraa^Bonta^ and to 
be able to e:iqplain and predict the pattema of reaouroe two xeaulting fro* 
their deeiaioaa. fhe general ^atioaa to be answered era tb«ae: n^t 
tTp09 of tenure an^«geaeata ad-rersely affeot effieiea<^{ aad on the 
poaitiire aide, idiat are the typea that further effioieaf^ fo i&at extent 
doea eaoh type of tenure arrani^aaat iapede ^ attaiasnat of eptianiB 
reaouroe alloeatioaY iaawera to theae qoeations are a»fea8as7 ia derelopiag 
a valid baaia for Biaiviaia^ the adverae effaota by e^andiag thoee typea of 
arran^aeata that would ia^rore effioieaojr (reaouroe allooatioa). 
Hature of Gurreat feoure^aouroe Allooatioa Probleni 
%uigr of the ourrent problima ia eoonoaioa aay be defined ia teraa of 
deriatioaa of aetual aituatioaa froa oae or aore of the oonditioaa 
(criteria) eet forth by eeoaoide priaeiplea for optiana (effioieat) reaouroe 
alio Cat ion. Allegedly, tenure arraafoneata as shown later oaa account for 
at least a part of the deviatioaa from optima (resource uae) that aay be 
preaeat withia aa agrioultural fira. But it haa been well observed that 
. the nature of detlatioaa froa optiaaa (reaouroe allocatloa) are 
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(pits* and. not iBoMdiatalT- elkTioiu froa a flnroerjr oxaaiaatioa of 
AMrieaa fanui oporatiag tuidor difforo&t tjiMio of tosoro arraagoaont*.*^ 
Costtofaoatly oao tot of pro^loao is to dotoraiM part of tho 
dOTlatioai froa tbo epttma ooaditioao oaa %• attriVatod to i^baraotoriotlea 
of tho toaor* sFotoa. At tut aoaoat tlvi aaffKitadaa of tin doriatioiui 
COBoratod Tajr tisraro arraagoBBato aro nalcaoiia. laovlodgo oa tho oxtoat to 
idiiiek toaturo arraagoaoatg faollitato or ia^odo optlaaa a&Joa^att it tlai. 
larX7 Xa^iag. HovoTor, ai^lo oltwa haro 'booa giroa ^ prorious oi^irlcal 
o'btorvatioas Iftiat thoro aro potolblo toareot for laoffiolMioi** arislag f^roa 
toimro arraagoaoatt. Xt has Itooa ditoo-nrod, for oxas^lo, tliat eorroat fara 
roatal praotleoo ia lAto Midnoot aro aot ia asoord vith aba praotioot that 
2 
wold ooaotitato aa optlmun on the haaia of thoory. In oth«r wrdt, 
iaooatiTOO aro proooat oa roatod farao to oaaao doriatioas trw tlM opti»a 
ooaditioao for prodnotion. Other otadioo fooad that thero are dlfforoaooo 
ia tbo vajr roooureoo aro utod ligr faraoro oporatiag tuidor dlffozwt atthodo 
of roatal pagraaat.^ Whllo thoao atudloo did aot took to "aoasoro* tlMi 
Cblo Jotoiea. Botouroo allooatioa aador tharo eoatraota. jToor. 
fol, Sooa. 50tliU. ji^r. 19S^. 
Virgil l. fttrlbart. fara roatal praotloot aaA pro^loao ia tlio ifi&iNiit. 
Sa. Agr. Sacp. Sta. So*. Bal. 19^. (Vo. Ooat. Bog. l«8d foaaro B*a. 
Goa. S^. Coat. 5og. ml. 50.) 
'^B^oroaM 1* aado to folloviag otadioat Xarl 0. Soadjr aad Sari V. 
Ibir^rg. BolatimaiOiip of erop«>ahar« end loaaiag iTatMw to faxaiag 
offioioaey. la. Agr. Xstp. Sta. Boa. »ta. 1952t Villiaa S. fofaaaalat. 
Yara roatal olsotaoloa to land iqprofoaoata aad aaggaatoA aolutloaa. Un-
]P«£bliated fhJi, flwoia. iaaa, Xova, Iowa Stato Oollog* lilMfaxy. 1955l 
ifarria V. Ki»ttie*. A atodjr of dooiaioa ahariag, toaaro aaaortaia^ aad tli* 
atolM of fara oator:^rioo ooibiaatioaa aador loaaiag ajatoaa la Miaaoaota. 
fit.!), fbaaia. Miaaoaitolia, tfalToroity of Niaaoaeta Xiilftnrjr. 
1995t Alria 0. B|^rt. A atadjr of roaoavoo aao oa emp->8havo aad lirootoek-
•fe«re roatod faraa ia Coatral Eaataolqr. Tlqpa'bliabad M.S. fhoaia. laxiaglea, 
Kastatiqr, ttaitoraitjr of Eoataelqr Ziit>m3r. 199!$* 
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derlatle&s froa arising froa tsimra rslatloaiiblps, ^ajr proTi&a 
soa» efidaaes thai t!isr« are dlTsrgsneas tetvMa tbs aotn&l and tb» Idial 
la resoarea erfi^xatlea ea ranttd faras. 
Bat thaoratleally, taaors laaffleiaaolas ars sot a foaetloa of Isaslag 
arrasgSBsats aloaa-^iMur-oporators as wll aagr mtim daoisioas idthla a 
toBitra sjrstea that aotlratas d^arturos fxoa optima resoareo us«.^ iShOit 
soareos of iaoffleiftaoiat shoold* of eoarso, 1M oxpootad to differ froa 
those oa folly reated faras. for iastaaoe, laeffioieaeies are eaeeadered 
partly 1>y eapital ratioaiag or fiaeed aad regressiire taaces, iaterests ead 
MBortisatloa rates aader ovaer-eperatorship. Xa the ease of teaaB<7 
however, additional iaeffieleaeles are introdttced "by "is^jerfeetions" in 
leasiag skrrangeaents saeh as the asthods of sharing cost end retaras or 
Halted plannlag horisoas. 
ipart froa dleeoveriag deTlatioBs froa optiaoa eoaditloas uliieh eaa 
he attrihated to temre, solatloas to redaoe the deviatioas (iiq>rOTe 
effieleaey) are ooatiageat tQ>oa isolation of the effeete of speeifie types 
2 
of teaore armoigeaeats. Tet, there sgppear to he doahts aad ooafasioa sJ^t 
tlm wey la i^ieh eertaia types of teaare arraagcaeats affset effleieaiBy la 
the agrieultaral eeoaoay. Bouhts are east, for exaaple, t^a the net 
effects of *tes«re aaoertaiaty** siaee dlffereat propositioas regardiag 
^O.f. latenegioaal X«nd Teaure BeeearcAi Coaaittee, elt., p. 9»10. 
^ferred to as i^eeifie types of tenore arraagtaeate are, for 
instwoee, teras of aaortisatioa or tax psgraeats, the teras ased for 
sharing eosts aad retaras on reated farms, or length of leases. 
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Its effects ess TMI adraacsd.^ HowSTsr, tbsorstioal sxplanations 
(l^ppethesss) i^rsssat siers predietioas aboat s^pirieal rslatlo&sliips. 
Ixwofsr fts it is possibls th«s« hjrpothssss am Isft to oqpiriealljr 
2 Torifiod slaoo tbsy my bo invalid in roality. 
An attoiqpt to isolate tho offoots of difforont tj^os of tonttro 
arzanfioswnts appoars to be oraoial to the solution of the basio problem 
of deviations frcm tho "optiaa* in resouroe allooation. But, tho oapirioal 
detondU^tion of offoots poses a fundamental analytioal problem n&ioh is 
one of the concerns of this study. In essence, the difficulties faoed in 
the analysis of oapirioal data oa tenure are those of ideatifioation aad 
moMmromnt.^ In tho first plaoo, the eztoat of deviations from speoifiod 
^Althou^ woch has been said in favor of "certainty of tenure expec­
tations" as means for gaiainc offioient roseuroe tuie, this fsestioa oaa be 
viewed from different angles. For instance, iMle tenure uncertainty 
(iaseeurity) may load to iaoffioient resouroe use it masr ol*o oao to 
mala more o«uti<ms doolsioas aad to work more dilii^ntly. On tibe other hand, 
the oortainty (oeeurity) of ^e "debt-froo** owaors (for exea^lo) may load to 
lethargy and laadLty, fbas, it is presumably diffioult to mtim prediotioao 
oa a ooi^lez reality with its attendant mugarios ia iadividual behavior, 
re^trdiag the ultimate offoots of either Mrtalaty or uaoertaiaty of temure. 
In a p^^atioa of farm operators tho offoots may differ aooording to tho 
attitudes of the individuals «&d mit booauso of tenure per so. 
defined theories, thoa^ meaningful, do not always lend thwasolvos to 
oiqtirieal tests. With existing data it is diffioult aa& may be ii^oosiblo 
to determine the validity of theorems in tenure economies. However, this 
does not preclude attemptr to have them verified or refuted. 
^Iheso diffioult ies are not uai<|ue to tenure problras slsoe finding 
appropriate aaalytioal tools eoatiaoes to be a foadamoatal problem la the 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  e o o a o m i o  s r e l a t i o n s :  i t  h a s  b e e o i  n o t e d  t h a t  " . . .  
cosaparative efficiency of sizes of firms are diffioult to make and that 
eonsidorable asftigs^ty attaches to almost all existing measures." Oeorge 
Stigler. fhe theory of prioe. Hev. ed. S^ev Tork. !!he Maemillaa Go. 
19^. p. l¥v. fhe analysis of teimre effioieaoy then beoomes more ooq?l«t. 
On the one hand, there are isAffioienoies inherent ia oertain types of 
leasing arrangements. On the other hand, loasiag faoilltates operatioas 
larger than owner-operat0rship, so efficiency in resouroe use can be affected 
in a diffsreat vay. 
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optliBQtt een&itloa* should Ito dotttralnod or approxiaated. Torthor, IOm 
0ff»et§ of fls>*olfie tfxraro axv«iie»Miit« voeh at mithodt of thariag eottt 
aad/or prodtustt, and tho offtott of tht tenore ttatiut of fam optra^ort 
on iih» or^aalsatioA of roteunttt aotd to 1m ttolattd aad ottioattd. 
SotorBlaation of cautt aad offoot rolatloathipt within toanm tjrttta 
thta hat at oa« of its prtrtfiaitittt tht cthoieo of apprepriatt aaalytieal 
sodtlt. 
Spteifio ProhltBM Zartttigatod ia thit Study 
Aa im^airy lato tta»x« arraafltaoatt, at thi;ir afftet tffioioat rtto^et 
tuie oould eoTtr a vatt torritoiy. fhit ttat«ntat holdt trot for a eoqprt-
htxwiTt th«or«tieal aaalytit aad, aort so, for tht ea^irieal eouaitrpart of 
tho thitory. Htaet, the apteifie prohltat dtllaited f»f thit ttudjr iavolTt 
the offtett of the ttmxre statut of fam operators tipoa jresotirce organi­
zation within the fira.^ "These effects are exaaiaed ex post tuxder owner-
operator ship, part-ownership aad tenancy for one production year. Of the 
tenancy group, only the sub-classes of livestock-share and crc^-ehare-cash 
(at Itatt types) art dtalt with specifically. 
Theoretically the patterns of resource allocation under these tenure 
classes should he different aad should not correspond with the optiaa. 
Thus, parts of the basic probleos of resource allocation on farms «ay stea 
from the texrore status of the operator. Zn terms of efficiency, the basic 
^Probleas of interfaea rttouret allocation as affected by tenure are 
not ignored but are not within the scope of this study. 
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pvellea iAfiatd la oa« of two wgrt: (1) for a gSann lovti of 
ratoureo uae %[&« aoioeiattd Taltut of prodaetloa !• aot Wiag aaxlnistds 
or eoavorooly, (2) for a eivoa loi«X of prodaotloa tb» attooiatod oo«t« 
are aot l»elag aiaisised. More epeeifieal3j, prol^leai ia reeeoree 
alloeatioa estlet if it it kaowa or there are roMoae to iMiliete that tiiere 
are dep«rtare« of aetaal reeoaree orsaaini.tiea froa axgr oae of the three 
aeeeeaarjr (optinos) ooadltloae for effieieat prodaetioa of the firai.^ Sbie 
iareeti®a.tion ie noftly eoaoeraed with departaree fxoa two of the eoaditieae: 
Cl) the "optima" (foaatities of reeoaroee ead heooe optiana IOTOI of pre> 
daetioa» sad (2) the 'optiana* resouroe ooahiimtiea for givea lOTOle of 
2 prodaotioa. Iheee ^tiaaa eoaditioae a^p]^ to all firns aad ihould eerre 
a« %ht "aonM" (or etandarde) for OTalaatiae the degree to i&ieh asri* 
eoltaral firae allocate reeoaroee effieieatly, regardleee of the teaare 
elasc la tdiieh they are placed.^ 
the aajor aaalytiGal prohlea ia this etady ia oae of deteetiag 
detlatioaa froa %e optiaaa ooaditioaa. ^roxlmitieaa of the optiana 
Hheee eoaditioae are reetated ia the followiag ehspter. 
^0 attea^t la mde to eatiaate departarea froa optlMua eoahiaatioa of 
eaterprlMa. I^Tpotheaee tested are Halted to aa exteat hgr the andllaible 
data. 
h>» extra«»aaricet valuea attached to onmeriOiip aajr however he ia 
eoafltot with aa effioieaejr ohjjeotive oa aeas ower-operated faraa. Alao, 
iadiridaal prefereaoee for "leiaare iaatead of work" may laterfere vith the 
attainaeat of efficiency aa defined la this study. But the goal of ef­
ficiency la Ratified for aaalytieal puxpoaea oa ^e gxwmds that (l) 
people usually pzefer "m>re Hither thaa leaa" ead (2) It leafla itaelf aa 
a useful ^eratloaal aora. 
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eeadltloai (aerai) and •xistlng (aetoal) sil^iatlen Iweow eritleal 
•leswatfl of tl« protiloB. are eritioal ia the aoaoo that if ao 
dOTlatioat of actual roaoareo uso froa the •optiaa" are detected, thea 
either ae econoalc probleos arising froa temire exist la reality, or the 
aaalytieal asdola wiod are laappropriato for rovoaliag thsn. Aasnaiag 
that doviationa are foaad, ^ oagaittsfiLoa of tiio dovlatioas for oaeh taoaro 
t^jrpa should ho laAleatiTO of separate i^rohlM sltuat leas'* siaeo the eaaM« 
for iaeffieieaelos «ithia a teaore elass conoeiYably differ. 
Bat ao attempt is aade la this study to ideatlfy or iwlate the effects 
of intra-tenare class sourees of inefficiencies such as tenare-associated 
zutioaiag of espital. i^perfeetloas ia leasing arraai^Boats or other aore 
speeifie teaare<i>orieated ohstaoles to effioieaey. Only the hroad elassee 
of teaare are exasiaed. fhe variations of teaare arraagsawnts vithia ea«h 
elass are reeognlsed, Imt eaanot he treated ia a atody of this soope. 
oMltieat the kind of reaedial action aeoessasy to sdalsdse iaeffioieaoies, 
idiHe iaportant, eaanot he aaalyaed here this eta^ represeate aa 
attes^t to obtain farther clues as to "what is the situation?" regarding 
the efj^ts of ths seleoted tenure classes oa reeouree use. Xt Is not 
"prohlea sol-odai^ ia the preoise neaaiag of the tera. 
OhjeotlYOs of ths Xaveetigatioa 
la Tie* of an apparent need for procedures by whidh the magnitudes of 
reeouree aalalloeatiea aisgr he estiaated, soae atteatloa is hereafter 
eoaeeairated oa analytloal asthods for om^arative analysis of effietAa^ 
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as aff*6t«d th« taaur* status of far» operators, fbls study is 
thsrefore partly asthodologleal. As a rssult, ths gsaeral ottjsetivos 
guiding ttie study becose twofold: (l) to further explore sisgls eqnatioa 
Bodsls as Maas for sstiaatiug and eonpariag offieiaBflgr ia rssotres vm 
withia fams i^sratsd uader differsat tsirars olassifieatieas! aad eoa-
joiatly» (2) to g^tin further iasii^ts into relatioashipa hetveeu the 
temre status ef fam operators and the use and product irities of reaourees 
employed in lova aad Illinois, the area from i&ieh data were obtained. 
More qpeeifieally aa attei^t is Bade to diseorer the relative effieieiMies 
of the seleeted tenure classes in (a) the use ef gross resource serriees 
aad (h) the use of the resouree categories —- laad, lahor aad ciQjital 
servlees. 
Analytical Procedore 
procedure used is eo^^risad of tvo Major phasess (l) a gsneral 
theoretical analysis extracting some of the salient features of the tenure 
system is first outliaed and (2) an eapirioal laTestSgatioa is Wkde into 
^e i|>eeifie prohlea» delixited for this study. 
First: ia ti^e theoretical part of the study aa effwt is aade to 
pi^seat a fraaework vithia whitfti the allocatire effieieacy of temore 
arraa^Mfits swy he aaa3yEed. fha fraaevork is dereloped primarily for 
the purposes of (a) hriagiag current prohlems of teanre in resonree 
alloeatloa l»to a lOiarper perspectiTO, and (h) suggestiag the types of 
l^Tpotheses i^ich aeed to he tested, fhe theoretical analysis is treated 
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la th» •ooMo&iae ohiqptor am a ttam of roforoaoo, wbilo tb> 
tmagiiaXae elusptoro aro dovotod to %h0 o^E>ixleal aasljoli. 
Sooon&t th« w^irloal part of tho «1m<Sy ooaoitto of an analytit of 
tte toaaro aad loaoo tjrpoo, littod provloatly, ai aoaat ttunra^ 
agxionltaral offloloaoy maj "b* aoblOTod. fho inoro iqportaat aopoet ef 
^ isroftlgatioa lo ewfteoraod with ootiutSag tho dogroo to ulileh oaOh 
tosoro or loato ^ypo adbloTOs tho 'optiM* ia rotoaroo allooatioa. Xbo 
aaalytl* dlffort froa proTloas itadlot la at loaot tvo roqpooto: flrtt, 
%i0 a priori assuBptloa tbat tho ovaor-^orator elaoo of tomro ropnooatfl 
a "•taadfOFd*' agaiaat i&lidi tho porferaaiieoo of othor oXtfoot of toaaro aaj 
W e^ral«od» io rolaxod. ISto thoorotioal o'bJjootiTos of "optiaa" ia tho 
aaoaats aad ocwibiaatioa of roooaroot aro usod to aoaauro tho dogroo to 
vbioii offioioaCQT !• aoMo-vod rogardlooo of tho toaaro otatao of tho tarn 
^rator. Sooood, provioao rooonroo prodaotiTitT- otadioo haro oo^parod 
fMilitatliwly oaljr tbo lorols of aargiaal rotarat of oacth roooaroo «il& 
their rogpoetivo "priooo* i afid iaforoaooa, ooaoluaioaa with roi^od to 
roooaroo ittlallooatioaa aro draim. fhia atudy farther attoq^a to oatiaato 
^ oxWat of aalallooation, ia tonm of dariatioaa froa ^tiaoa roooaroo 
owri^iaatioaa for givoa loToXa of prodaotioa. Logieallgr, tho toaaro ^aaa 
with tiM aaalloat daTiatioa froa optiana roooaroo uao, ahoald ho aoooptod 
as oporatiag noro offioioatly. 
fho aaalxtioal Mdol uaod for ootiaatiag tho dogroo of offootivoaaaa 
(la toma of offioioaoy) of tho roapootivo toaaro oXaaaoa root hoarilj -^poa 
oia^o oitiaatiag o^tioaa dorivod throagh rogroaaioa aaalyaia. Statiatioal 
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"pi^^tios ftraetleiui" are fitted to oross-eeetioa data oVtaiaed froa a 
stratified-raadea eanple of fanu in Iowa aai northern XlliaeiB. froa 
%(om of the fonotions derived, the relationships bettieen gross returns and 
iwsonree serriees "need vcp* are estiaated. trcm other fanetionsi, aarginal 
returns are estiaated and analysed for ea^ resoaree eategor7 hjr tenure and 
leaee types, lexl, ajiproxiaations are aad« on the extent of deviations 
froa the optiaon resource eoaliination for ea<^ tesare elass eonsidered. 
Oonooaitantly, the types of adjustments that ifould he nMMssazy to iii^ro've 
resouree organization are also suggested, finally the falue of the aaa» 
lytieal m^del and data used are assessed. 
fBBOSEflOAl A1U1.TSXS Of raHUHB^BSSIlilE!} XSSmOXBSOXBS 
JS ISSOOBGl USB 
SooaoBie lofilo for i^praitiae allooatlv* offloioa^ liaa iMoa appllod 
to ^ iattltotloat of land omorthlp and tonauqri Imt tho iq^lieatioa tins 
far ai^aro to l»o partial aad porbapo frai^ntarjr. To font a mltablo 
fraaawork withia wMch toaaro arrangemanti majr )>a aaaljrxod, an attaint is 
aaia to tiring togathiar aoaa of tho noro rolovant prc^aitiona i^ieh havo 
OTolvod in ooasoction with toanra eoonoales. Suoh a frafltawork is daralopad 
to aid in pointing lap sons of the mora onioial rariahlas in tho toanra 
sfstoa and their foaotional relationships aad ia forafolating hjrpotheses to 
he tested oaQiiriealljr. She effects of tenore arraaganeats will he aaaljrsad 
eoncaptually, SBheeq[aaat to a restateiMat of the oriterla for prodaetioa 
effieieaey of the fini» reriewed as aa aaaljrtieal point of d^arture. 
Criteria for Prodaotion SffieiencQr of the fim 
Wanting the usual assaiiptions that fSM agrieultural fim operates 
ander perfeot ooo^etition aad seelu to maadUiise net returns froa ia-
vestaeats, the three hasic oriteria to guide deoisioas shout resouroe use 
aaj he restated as follows:^ 
1. Xztead the serrioes of a resotiree to the point lAere the Talue of 
^See J. E. Eieks. Value and Capital. 2nd ad. Saw fork, Oxford 
tfai-fersity !*ress. 1953. 6h. 7* l^t Saae Oarlsoa. A pare theory of 
prodaotioa. Xioadoa, P. S. Eiag a;^ Soa 2itd. 1939} leaaeth Bouldiag. 
Booaoaio aaaljrsis. SOT. ed. Hew Tork, Staler aad Sea Ltd. 19^. Ch. 31* 
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mrgXoel predaet la aqaal to the prlee of the resource serrloe. 
2. Substitute resource sesrlces until the mtio of ttte T&lue of the 
marginal product of each pair of resources is proportional to the 
respeotl-ve resource prices. 
3. Allocate the serrices of a resource hetneea coopetitive products 
so that the Talues of each aarglaal pro^t are etpial. 
When thoM three criteria are Mt the flra is said to he la static 
(Intra tei^poral) efEdlihritm.^ fhat is, it would he liQKissihle to iacrease 
net returas "by reallocatlag the productive serrices M^loyed aaoag the 
different products. However, to closer approach reality, tioe heceses an 
addltioaal variable, fo iatroduce tine iato the static aodel, Hicks treats 
phsrsically the saas resource services used at dlffereat iates (productioa 
intervals) as "different" services «ad the SBM products turned out at 
different dates as "different" products, farther, to fit the iiiterteaporal 
allooatloa prehlea the static prices of resources and products are replaced 
2 
"bgr discounted prices. She production plan Tleldiag the waaeiwtta present 
Talus is ax^lSTed if declsioas are guided tqr the three criteria stated for 
static efoillhriuB as adjusted for tiae. 
%leks, cit., p. S&SJ, lists 3 "st^illty" conditions nhich «uit 
hold to precis a stable c<|iillihriua and deteralaate solution. In fact, 
these 3 eoadltioas aay he reduced to 1, aad eoTered a haslc assuB^tioai 
i.j».« the aarglaal productlTlty of each resource is a aonotonicalljr 
ITe^reaslag function of the anouat of resources enployed. 
^icks, OT.cit., p. 197* a resources aad a products (in ^e 
static i^del at il5w t » 0), aad a plaaniag period exteadiag OTor 7 
iaterralsi the naaber of products aad resources eaterlag eatr^preaeurial 
calculatioas hee<»Be af aad aV, req»ectlTel7, with a siailar aaaher of 
discounted prices. 
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flM first oriterioa is iW8&iB£fa.l only ia spseial oases, I.e., ^r« 
the qnBaatities of tlui prodaotire services heing varied are aot limited. It 
sets the n^ianot to nhieh prodnetive serviMs shettld l>e carried, and yields 
the eptiaeuB tmmt of a product end resource (holdiag other products aad 
resources constant), fhe second criterioa establishes the least<-cost 
cottbinatioa of productive services at asQr level of production, lAiile the 
third criterion establishes the EUBtxiaua value of produotioa i^oB a given 
stock of resources. Xiogieally, i^n these internal conditions of eqai. 
lihriuB are satisfied the hasic econoaio theo:reB of eq[aiaarginalit3r for 
allocating resources optinalljr between alternative protects (enterprises) 
is also satisfied.^ 
Although the above aodel may, seesiingly, iapose liaitations in its 
application to short-run decisions, no serious violence is done Imv in 
^More precisely: given (1) the production functions (technical 
relations coanectlag products, y^^, and productive services, x^){ (2) 
sabstitute resources, • l-n{ with prices p^j (3) competitive products, 
y- « 1.-BJ and (H) derived aarginal productivity ftmctions, IMP. „ X y^x^, opTvnm 
aaounts of products and resources employed la producing each product is 
achieved ifs 
MMMMMMMW* B mmmrnmrnmrntmitm K « , ^  M mmmmmmmHrnmrnim ^ 
^ \ \ 
' • /  
for all B products (y^^). 
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Tiew of tli« parpoi® for iMeh the rsTlsv weui la*«nd«d.^ Shat 1«, to 
proTlfto A first a^proxisation asd gsnsral eeatsxt vithia vliieli propositions 
relating to tlM effeets of teimre arrangensnts -o^on prodnetien effieieac^ 
Begr be develoiied. 
Possible Soturees of fara Tenure Sffeots on ProdffiBtion 
Bffleienejr 
If femer tmeertaintles were associated vlth agrieulttiral produetion, 
and if all costs and rettims of tbs fara firm were ineltont en an indlTldaal 
(tlie fara operator) nbo liad assuranoe of control over the farm assets for 
optiaeuB plasning period8» extension of the pure theory of the fira to 
agrlenlttire Mmld be less qoestionable. Ordinarily^ depending to a degree 
t^on the tenare status of the fara operator, the deelsion-asklng eavlron-
mnt of the agrleultural fira is eharaeterized by one or a eoablnation of 
the folioving eleaentst (1) tenare assoeiated rationing of capital fsnds 
due to uncertainties, (2) intraflm disassociations of costs and returns 
and (3) Halted planning horimns and unoertaialy of teonre expectations, 
fhe discussion to follov will be geared to these eleaiats vhich appear to 
be the basic sources of inefficlenoies of the tenure systea. An effect 
is Bade to show the ways in vAiioh aohiSTeaent of the optlnua coadltlons 
^Sinee all productive eervlces are assuned to be variable, the efotl* 
llbriua obtained is that for the long ran; and therefore Is applicable to 
qpecial eases, visually a fira finds Itself with a given sto^ of at least 
one resource that influences decisions aade in the short ran. However, 
idiile a resource aay be aoaentarily fixed, in form aad <|aantity, the 
services of the resource can be treated as variable. Moreover, in short 
run analysis the first eipilibrlua criterion becoaes falte applicable. 
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(sq^ill'brliui erttarla) aay 1m iaQ>ed«d er faoilitated tkroo^ diffare&t 
typaa of armigaM&l* and under different tenore statue of farm operators. 
geaare assoeiaUd rationing of cigltal 
Capital rationing si^oses that there are reetriotions imposed «^n 
the arounts of funds used within the firm, where greater quantities eould 
he profitahljr ei^lojred. Kationing is not peoaliar to aaor fora of tenore 
%B.t its natuz« and seterity differ aeoording to the tenare status of fam 
operators, fhe rationing najr he due to exogenous forees (outside the fim) 
or endogenous forces (within the fira). 
Ixogenoue esipital rationing. Sxogenous ratioaisg iaplies that the 
restrictions iaposed upon the use of funds (resources) are caused hy the 
policies of lenders. Tunds, at the disposal of one indiTidoal, to he 
allocated between the acquisition of land resourcee and other necessary 
assets for fant operations are usually United, farming operations^ 
howSTsr, Kay he expanded (or initiated) throu^ horrowiag. But credit 
institutions are reluctant to lend more than a United aaount to a single 
faraer, heeause sue& agencies desire to avert rislcs. Little regard is given 
hy lenders to the potential productivity of ftmds in alternative uses. 
Instead, loans are extended on the basis of equity of the borrower. 
fanrars with the hi^ier equity (and better capital position) are nost 
likely to be less deficient in capital but more qualified for extension 
of credit under customary lending policies. As a result, fUnds nay be 
channeled to farms «liere the potential productivity of coital is lower, 
and away from farms where ciqpital is more '^needed" (higher marginal prodaot 
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of ei^ltal). 
fbA effoets of this typo of ratioaiag oa ownor-oper&ted faras Bay 1»o 
as follows i prior inrsstBeats ia laad rssotaress (plus dsaaads for ths 
housslxold) foreo a rostrictioa oa the aaotmt of other aeeded capital assets. 
^r«fore« either ^e esMmat of laad resources or other es^ital itess Bay 
he iaade<|uat« for giTea lahor resources (operator and fasily). She possible 
results, ia terms of resource productivities, are low aargiaal products for 
lahor.^ lowerer, relatively low productivities for all resources aay he 
expected if the farm unit operated is one of low quality lands. IcoaoBie 
units of the better ({uality lands req[uire greater initial outlays. Henoe, 
inperfections in the capital market readers it difficult to acqcciire an 
adeq^te gtuoatity aM quality of physical assets. Touag owner-operators, 
especially those having insufficient equity, are faced wi^ tiie prohlen of 
2 
afi^iriag sore econoaic fan units. 
Althou^ the tenancy system has disadvantages, the effects of 
How lahor productivity aaong owner aerators Bay, however, he traced 
to two possibilities: (1) small amounts of capital and/or land ia the case 
of the yotmger grocip of owners; and (2) the low "^aality" of the labor used 
on farms operated by the older age grec^. 
2 Some owner-operators do have eooxiomic farm units, but partly through 
"historical accident". Iforeover, if capital aAcomnlation proipresses with 
age, older owners will find theBMl'ras ia a better capital position with 
iB^roved access to credit, fhe effects of exo^nous capital rationing 
should then be less severe. Xn ^e analysis of tenure «ad resource 
allocation, age of the operator creeps in as en additional factor to be 
considered. Different resource organizations can be expected on farms 
operated different age groups, not only because of different "work 
preferences", but also because of differences in capital availabili^. 
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oxo^aous ratloaiag of eapltal !}« ainlailzed throu^ th« joint eontri-
Vutions of landlord and tonant to tho total fara assots. Chi tko avorago 
the stock of capital and the aaotint of land used under tenant operators 
aajr then he sore in line with the optiaeB qiaantitiee required than t&ey 
wuld he under ounerooperators haTiog Made land inTestaentSi As sufigested 
earlier, with liaited fnndsi under ownejvcqperatorship the aacrant of land 
^ other Capital assets ax*e ordinarily restricted. These restrictions 
are eirouarented more readily through renting. The aaeunt idilch would he 
used for land purohasing a tenant is used for acquiring other capital 
iteas,^ 
Ho presupposition is aade that rented faras are always adeijaately 
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eqpipQf>ed with cs3>ital. With creditors requiring ''inettanoe" (collaterals 
and desire for low riidc dehters) the tenant logically c^ he placed in an 
inferior position in teras of access to credit. Because of low "landed" 
Sdantlts puts it in this way: 
l>Ksed with the necessity of sfl^pleaenting his own liaited 
assets with outside fands a faraer has two altematiTes--he 
may rent or he aay borrow, These two are direct substitutes 
i^n the use of fara land and the capital oi^rtunities fixed 
to fara land are heing purchased nhile aachineryt livestoolc, 
fertiliser, seed and the serrices of It^r are net as a rule 
renti&le. TTnder existing institutional facilities, a fanMr 
is allowed to rent a Toluae of capital (in the fera of laiUl 
and huildiUigs} largsr than he is peraitted to horxow. fhe 
saaller the total assets the faraer owns the greater the 
relative difference between the sanouat of capital that is 
rentable and the aaount that is horrowahle. 
T, W. Schults. Capital rationing, uncertainty and fara tenancy refora. 
Jour. Pol. Icon, kgijlj, June l^itO. 
lounger tenants in particular aay also have an insufficient aaount at 
their disposal and liaited access to credit. This is aost likely to he trae 
for pare erq9»ehare leases, since the tenants usually fall in the lower age 
group of tenants,. 
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asMts aad meeriai&ty in tlie alads of ereditort al»out th« «23>«ot«d 
duration of of tho tenant, diseriainatoiy credit teme maj 
emeoe to aake terrowlag appear pn)hihitive, that la if oredit faoilitiea 
are Bade araila^le at all. It is ooneeiTaJDle that a tenant oay he villing 
la eoBe instaaees to aake aajor inTeetaeats hat heoaaee he doee net have 
title to the land no oredit will he aade availahle in the ahsenoe of tine 
laMlord** partieipatioa. Asoordinsly, heoatuie of the uaaal preaeaee of 
the landlord ia the farming operations tinder li-veetoek-share leases the 
effeets of exoftnoas ratloaiag shotild he lees severe oa eai^ faras. 
Badogeaeae eapital ratloaing. Badogextotui ratioaias refers to ^ 
reetrietioas placed vspon farther iarestaeats froa deoisioas aade wil^ia 
the fira. Sils is usaally a result of (l) imieertaiaty of e:i^etatioae 
ahout fattire net reyeaae and (2) the 'prinoiple of iacreasing rii^s"; that 
is, risks of losses of ovsMsd assets increase a* the ratio of horroved 
efaity to owned efoity increases.^ la the decision aakiag proeess, dtsi 
to allowances for uacertaiaty, iavestmeats will he netrioted to anoaats 
2 
^ort of that which voold he profitable with aaoertaiaties reduced. 
tinder owsBr-operatorship idth fall e^^ aad exegeaoas ratloaing of 
1 Mlchal laleoki. Sssays ia the theozy of ecoaoaic flaotuatlea*. 
losdoa, Seorge Allen and tFaida Ltd. 1939> P> J. Steiadl. Capital 
eaterprise aad riek. Oxford Ecoa. Papers ao. 7*23-27. Mar. 19^- See 
also, l^hert W. Sadd aad David L. Hadtoltfus. 9he scale of operatioaa ia 
agrieultu3^. Joor. rara. iZooa. May 19^2. 
2 Of course, endogenous restrictioas ia l^e use of capital aajr also 
arise froa cireunitances which are not tenure oriented. Such types of 
restrictions are doe to deaand for fonds needed la activities other thaa 
production aad arc act peculiar to azyr fora of tenure. 
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eapital z«l«xed, ratio&liig nay still 1>» present dae to endogenous forees. 
Bii^s of losses inorease vith expansion of outlegrs, henoe the returns trm 
greater outlays vill he diseounted heavily ligr a fanwr.^ Zn the ease of 
owner'-operators i^re all the risks assooiated with a larger scale of 
operations are home hy one proprietor, the restriotions should he aore 
severe. Zf the associated risks are spread over aore than one proprietor, 
however, as in the Oyase of partnerships or tenaney under share leases, it 
is reasonahle to ea^et larger outlays, ^e is^aets of endogenous 
rationing are thas redueed through partnerships and share leasing. 
%art froB greater risks due to uncertainties surronadiag larger scale 
of (^rations, there is a different eleaent of risk due to reduction of the 
pr^rtion of owned e^ity. As noted pxvriously, farming (q;)eratioas Bay he 
ej^aaded either throui^ borrowing or renting. Sut with borrowing, the 
"principle of increaeing risks' encotirages restrictions in the aaount idiic^ 
will he borrowed, even If lenders were willing to reduce efjuity re^ireoents. 
A farror is mwilllng to borrow so ouch as to risk wiping out the equity he 
oiAS. On the other hand, wl^ rentiag as an alternatire »eaae of gaining 
resource control, the contributions of landlord sad tenant to the total fans 
aesets oay be adequate enou|^ to avoid the restrictions that would arise if 
faads had to be borrowed. 
fl»B Increasing risk factor then suggests that the scale of production 
will be larger under renting than under a eingle proprietorship (the 
^Xt is assuBed that uncertainty aay be subjectively aeasured by the 
range or dispersion of possible outcoBes--gains and losses, fhis rangs 
increases with the scale of aeration and therefore InvestMnts. 
V 
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o%mer-^p«rftior). Proouriag rcsotiree scrrloes thro'ugh renting does not 
involve the ease thianiag out of equity as does proeoriag of resources 
throu^ ownership, further, the risks associated with larger outlays 
are epveeA under share leases. "Aooordingly, the uncertainties surrounding 
larger operations are less under renting than under owanriiddlp."^ ^refore, 
if disoounting iaereases witii uncertainty then the discounting of future 
returns should he less under tanancy than under owner^ip. Witib lighter 
discountiag one ai^t then predict that resources will he extended further 
2 to confom acre wi^ the c^tiaoa aaounts needed. 
Different classes of tenants are, however, suhjected to different 
aotivations «liioh will affect the extent to idiich resources are ei^loyed.^ 
Zn the ease of cadi tenants, rental payaent represents a fixed coasitaent. 
land will he extended until its discounted aarginal prodact is -eq^ to the 
rental i%te. The risks in faraing operatiUins fall solely on the tenant-
operator, iust as they fall on the owner^operater. 3ut, acquiring the 
haxl 0. Heady. Sconoaics of agricultural production and resource 
tute. Sew York, Prentice-Sbll, Zne. 195^. p. 5^. 
^fhe resources referred to are the haeio categories of fara real 
estate, capital and lahor service. Ho such iaQslications are intended at 
this point with reference to specific resources suc^ as fertiliser, «hi<& 
aay he on the <*peri|^ry of profitability". 
differences observed between classes of tenure in the aaount of land 
used aagr, however, be mare apparent t^ua real, tenure status is evidently 
a j^mction of land productivity which aay he negatively correlated with fam 
sise. fenant<>operated faras appear in geo^e^hic clusters and on the more 
productive lands. Owners aay tend to operate larger faras hut of lomr 
productivity, partly because of the initial investaent repaired to acquire 
the better lands. Lands of low productivi^ offer less attraction to 
tenants than do lands of hij^ productivity, particularly if the rents (cash 
per acre, or share of crop) are the eaae. 
2h 
•errie«t of land throui^  eash rental does not iarolTe fixed eoBBBltBHsats 
hjr the tenant extendiae orer a long period and henee riidcs as high as thegr 
would he with parehase oontraets haring exten&id periods of aaortisation. 
Also, owing to the fact that land resouress are contrilmted V the laadlerd» 
it ean be expected that the caiAx tenant wmld operate a aore adeq(aate 
aaonat of land (than would the average owner-operator), since he (the 
tenant) does not diTide his personal assets hetween the ac^eition of lend 
and other operating assets. Ihe "principle of increasing rides" that would 
liait the aaount of resources es^losred if fkmds were borrowed heMMs less 
effective. 
In addition to dampening of the restricti-re effects associated vith 
the "principle of increasing risks", under share leases the tmcertainties 
inherent in fans prices and yields are shared between tenants end landlords. 
Sharing of uncertainties miniaises the incentivee to restrict not only land 
hut ether co^leaentary resources. SxplLaaations for "large" faras under 
share contracts ai^t then he feond also in the sharing of uncertaintiee 
that increase witii the scale of faraing ^rations. It is prestused that 
ordinarily, the risks of losses on faras operated under ihare contracts 
are greater than the aaount to which either party to the lease would he 
willing to expose hiaself, singly. 
^fhe functioning of the tax systea acQr also create interacting forces 
hut which operate in a »>re subtle fashion. A "real estate tax", for 
ezai^le, if it is "regressive", that is, decreases with increases in the 
present aarket value of land (due to valuation Ibr tax aesessaent purposes), 
ox«ates an environaent to control a larger aaount of land. The "aarginal 
tax" is a decreaeing function of the value of (or aaount of land). Bowever, 
this incentive should affect the sices of all faras regardless of the tenure 
status of the operator, fhe idea is siaqply introduced here in order to 
recognise the poesihle effects of a tax structure. 
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fhi gvoviag prAteaet of part-owuri^ip it ai^ilo ovideaoo of thi zole 
ef teaasey in i&flueBeiite faxa ei^ aad eoale of operatioae. II it 
prepoted tliat this is doe, at least ia part, to the adaiaisatioa ef the 
forees of eapital ^atioaiag. la ^aeral, for a fara with a givea area 
»argiaal prodttfEt of the fiaal aere should aot reaain suhstaatially ahove 
reatal rates. If it does, the famer shoald fiad it profitable (aad vill 
do so, if there is the epportoail^) to reat additioaal land aad extend its 
use uatll the aargiaal value product (dieeooated) approxisates the reatal 
rate.^ Ihe e:^aasioa is iwre lUcel^ to oeeor throu^ leasia^, partly 
heeasise risks are shared aad partly beeause of the e^oity iMeh would he 
repaired if fosds had to be borrowed for purehaslag. 
Capital ratioaiag as dlseussed so far refers to tiie aaaaer la idiieh 
loag«nm deeisioas aad heaee l^e loag«>raa optiaa ia resoaroe use eaa be 
affeeted. It veald appear that tibie effeets oa ovBer««peratership weald 
be, oa the avesnifie, aere se-rere thaa they would be uader teaaaey. Uterefbre, 
to the exteat that there are SCOM eooaoales dae to larger seale of 
produstioa, la the seaee of lower per ualt oost of aashiaery or labor, for 
exaa^le, owier-^eperatership is la a less favorable positioa, i&lle the 
teaaaey if^stea wf facilitate adjustaeats ia that dlreotioa. 
latrafira dlsassoeiatloa ef costs aad returas 
lETader the assui^tioa that liaitatioaallty of Oc^ital or other 
^Xt is reeosaised that la reality expaasioa of fara size does aot ti^ 
plaee ia terns ef aa "a&ditioaaX aere* but ia lia|>y ehaa^s. 9his eettiae, 
however, does not affect the argiuaent. Instead of saall changes (1 aere), 
aere discrete cheats (10, 50, ^ aeree) eeoi be substituted tor aa 
i^proxiaatioa of the solutloa. 
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rcBOure«t it abteal, eptinn r«iot>re« um mgr itlll 1>0 ii^edsd if all 
co»t« and returns within the firm are not iaoi^tont on the fans operator. 
Therefor®, tmder leasing, shifts in the incidence of costs and retxums are 
poetiMe. Shat is, the returns eaeh participant receives aajr not he 
associated vith the costs hs (tenant or lta»ilov&) contrihates, and Tice 
Tsrsa, the Msts eaAh pay's oegr not he associated vith the retmms each 
reeelTes. As vill he ohserved, those possihilitles are a ftmction of the 
aethods of sharing returns and costs on tenant operated fame. 
Wsthods of shariM costs and returns. In essence» iaqperfeetions in 
nethods of sharing costs and returns is^ly that the returns receifed >jr a 
resource oontrihutor aajr not Ve funetionallsr related to the coets he con* 
trihutes. fhis ssigr occur vithin a given production interval (intratea^oral) 
or over several production intervals (intertea^ral). But from the 
definition of a first as a naziaizing unit, the intertes^ral aspects vill 
he discussed later since the fira changes its identity if the plaming 
agent changes. Zhis section deals vith iatrafira and »ot interfira 
disassociations. 
Itesediateljr iu point are eases i&ere share leasing agreeaente stipulate 
that the returns froa a product he ehar«d vithout appropriate shariag of the 
cost of the prodauBtive eerviees lAiich yield that product. If the tenant 
(or landlord) is reared to pear for all of the resouroe services, there 
ie incentive to restrict the use of that service to an aaouat less tiiaa 
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%hA% nbleh nould «>•% profitable for tlie fint.^ the propoeitioa i®pliee 
aot ealy to diffemat oepital serriees "bnat also Mi the terviee* of ttie 
2 hasaa ageat. It wtCLd he mre "profitable* to shift these serriees fnm 
the fira to alteraatiira liaes of iarestaeats (or leisure) siaee hoth the 
teaaat ai^ laadlord seek to vaxiBiae their owa positioas. 
Saeh alteraatives are eaooaraged under share leases. Oa the other 
haz^, there is less likelihood of liTestO(dc>share faraers to be so 
notiYated, slaee the eoaditioas ordiaarily are laore akia to partasrship 
a^eaeats. ^saalljr, all costs aad retaras are st^posedly shared pro-
< \ 
pox^ioaatelgr. Frohlems of course, arise doe to sohstaatial differeaoes 
ia the suhjeetive raluatioa of persoaal eoatributioas. la both eases (of 
er(^.idiare aad stock-share leases) if the parties related to the ooatrast 
are aot avare of the iater-persoaal discuisooiatioas of oosts end returas 
i^ieh msy be preseat, there seed not he ansr restrietioas la resource use, 
hut j^stead a traasfer of iaoom. That is, resources mgr be used optiaalljr 
at a g|.irea tiae althoaeh a3.1 of the rewards to each resoarce are aot 
received by the ooatrihutor of the resource. Uader cash reatal, there is 
ao possihilil^ of disassoclatioas of returas froa Tariahle costs siaee the 
teaaat receives all the output i^ch is uaiq^ly a fbactioa of the Tturiahle 
1 See ilfred Marshall. Priaciplee of ecoaowics. Sth ed. Iioadea, 
Mcittllaa Co. 19^7. p. Ibr a "proof" of the propositioa coasolti 
Balioer Shidwle. Iieases and faraiag efficieaojr. Jour. 7am Scoa. ;^tl9^. 
reb. ISkli Isafly, ££. cit., p. 5D7-599. 
®flie effect jfdtould heooM aore e^pareat if these serriees are to be 
purchased. Moreover, if "capital funds" az« •ieited as the "coB&aad" over 
resources (i.e., oae is able to porchase differeat forms aad quaatities of 
productive serriees) thea ao fortber q(^ificatiea is aecessar7. &e 
pz^ositioa has gsaeral applicability to all variable services. 
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MrriMi. Bttt dltaatooi&tiona may arit« If (l) tlM re&tal paysMtat is 
twXow the aargiaal prodtiot of the fans real estate, or if (2) tlui 
prodost of land ezeeeds the re&tal rate (plus a "risk preatoB"). Xn ^ 
first oase» l&ere would 1>e aa iaeoM traiutfer to the teaaat. Xa the latter 
ease there voeld he aa iaeoM traasi^r to the laadlord. 
fhe prohahility of iaeoae traasfers la|>lie8 that laadlords aay also 
reaot uafavori^Xy if reatal payseats (or laadlord returas), oiuih or share 
of products* are «ueh that the laadlord receives less thaa the aargiaal 
value products of tbe resources he eoatrihutes. Se vill ooatraot his 
eoatrihutioas (ia Iniildiags or other laad ia^roveaeats) if he receives ao 
direct reimrd froa them. He is not urged to provide or naiataia vueh iteas 
heyoad that tJbieh wcmld aake the fedra reasoaah^ attractive ia reotal 
auti^t. Xa idaiort, hoth teaaat aad landlord aeeMag to aaslaiae their 
individual eada idll reatriet the uae of reaourcea if they do aot receive 
all the returaa %Meh are foactioaalXy related to the reaourcea thc^ 
coatrihate iadiridually. lach coaaidera oaly tl»ae returaa accrue 
to hia aad these coats he ia required to ptgr. 
Methoda of ahariae produeta ia a aaltiple ^aterpriae fira. fhe 
" ^rohlem of disaaaociatioaa of ooata aad returaa aay alao arise ia 
the caae of part-owaerahip if returaa aad coata are aot shared optiaally 
hetiie«si laadlord aad teaaat. Particularly if capital is a liaitatioaal 
resource, the part-cwaer (ia the ease of share ooatracts) weald aaturally 
' he iacllMd to reatriet the uae of aach reaourcea to that part of the laad 
iMflh he onus, regardleaa of the poteatial productioa reapoaaea of 
refl^rarcea oa that part of the laad iddch ia reated. See Baad^, clt., 
p. Howard W. Ottoaoa. i^li^tioa of efficieaey to fara tmure 
arraageiaaBta. Jour, fara Scoa. »«e. 1955-
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pr«Mdiag ditoustioa atinawd tadltljr tliat th« flra pz^xuted a sinip.* 
coHSBodity. Honerar, on farms iA»re thora are two or mora entarpritaa, 
tamre arraBgamats o^triouBly 'baoona more eoaplax. CoaMiiraStly tliere 
ex« MTaral diffax«at altamatiTas for almriag prodnots fToi different 
enterpriaes, Imt iBperfeotlona In the liaaea for sharing nay reeolt la 
iu>n>C9ti«iai eoalblaatlea ef enterprises. 
If the produots of two or more enterprises are shared differently, 
there Is eeoaoale Induoeaent to allocate resources in favor of the enter­
prise (s) from idiich the largast return (valtia) is reeeived. She ralne 
of the aarginal produota of aaoh enterprise «etild he different and the 
value of predootien leae than the aaxlBRW possible with ^e eiven stoc9c 
of resonroes m^lojred.^ ^Is distortion presc^oses relative aarket prices 
to he th» IMex of oonsnner satlsfaetion and the eholee-eriterlon for 
optiaon allocation ef resooroes hetween alternative prodacts. But actually, 
diaproportlonata sharing of prodtteta say he an acoenntine device to adjast 
for diffsrenees in the contribatioas (of landlord end temtat) to total 
costs, and therefore, cannot always he talcen as prlaa facie evidezfioe of 
resource salallocatlon. fhis proposition on dhariag of products of 
necessity mat he tied to the idiaring of costs. Zf differentials in the 
id^aring of prodacte is ooBpensated for hy differentials ia the sharias of 
Consult Heady, TO. cit.. p. 602.>60U f^or a detailed discttssion and 
grt^E^cal proof ef thts hypothesis. 
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ascoclated costs, there need not "be any deriatlons froa eqaili'brin» 
« 
prodtustioa. f!be sigAlfloant pel&t, hovo-ver. Is that sharing of prodoets 
ia diffsroat proportions ersates a deeislon-aakine atao^phsre ia idiloh 
there might (hut need not) he departtires froa an optloua allocation of 
resoaroos hotwsea coapetitiTe enterprises. 
Limited plaaning horiseas and tmoertainty ef tsaare •i:p»etatida« 
She effects of both these phenomena on resource use are presusahly 
2 the same, and are particularly relerant to conservation decisions. The 
separation is made because of differences in the decision-^naking eariron^ 
»eat, not because of differences in motiration. With respect to limited 
planning horigons it is asscoMd that decisions are made for known periods 
(expected duratioa of occtgjancy) that fall short of optiatm planning 
periods. In the ease of uncertainty of tenure expectations, fear of 
dispossession of the fara assets or lack of interest appear to be the 
more crucial considerations. Under the formar, tenure say be said to be 
definitely United; \Aile under the latter, tenore nay be said to be 
Vor instance, if an enterprise is labor intensire and the landlord 
received §0 par cent of the resulting product without subscribing pro­
portionately to the labor services, it would be in the tenant's interest 
to contract the use of his labor in that product and eaqploy it elsei^re 
(divert it to leisure, or be satisfied with an excess labor capacity). To 
avoid fuieh a sitaatioa, a proportion of the produot greatsr than ^ per 
cent ai^t be offered to the tenant in lieu of the landlord's contribution 
to labor services. This ^estion is particularly relevant in cases i&ere 
labor heooms a lisitatioaal resource. 
S. T. Ciriaegr-Wantns?), Ho source conservation, econooios and 
policies. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press. 19^. 
p. 106.108, l€5. 
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inMeera or 
lAaifd plaiwimt h&riw&BM. Xdaltad plaimiBig hozisreBt eoaaot* ^a.t 
titc periods tor tSsX^ planaing Is mads is inads^to from tlui ristipoiBt 
of optiBOB iiitsrtsiQior&l alloeatioa of rosooreos. Optijmm iaissrtsaporaX 
aXloo&tion wemld 'bo oaeoiuraigsd if %hM pXaBaine hori seas aro idoatioal tdtii 
(^tlasoai pXaaaiag periods, fhat is, periods over Whiedi iarestmcats ia 
pemuoeat ia^roivaeats (or resoorees suoh as fertiliser) woald Be profita^^le 
for Hoth tlie plaaaSag a^eat aad sooiety. 
It hmM loaig tMoa reoogaised that iavestBsats of a darable or se8dl-> 
dazzle aature (f^ioalljr land i%roveBeats) iMeh jrield retturas over aa 
extended period, aagr 1>e adiwrsely affected andsr teaaaof. This is e^i^^ted 
t&er* the plaiming hori zona of the tenant fall short of optima plaaaiag 
periods, aad there are ao prorisioas for eoiq^asatioa of TOexhaasted 
ia|>roT«»iats t&sa the reatal ooatraet is dissolved. If tSie ret«ras fro* 
iavestawats aeorae after ooox^sasgr eeases, they r<^reseat heaefits to 
future oeot^aats aad oosts to the preseat. Prodoetioa deoisioas «re thea 
Bade to easare that retoras will aoorae before expiratioa of the ooatraet 
plaaaiag horisoa). fiherefore, all the possible retaraa aeoralag at 
future dates, heyoad the ei^qpiration of the lease (^tiasn plaaaiag periods) 
are diseeuated aad do aot eater iato eatrepreaeurial ealsalatioas. 
Aooordiaslr, iavestaeats will he reetrioted oa reated fazse. 
further, in the ahseaee of landlord cooperation, durable iavestneats 
(e.g., >uildi8^ aad tilia^;) Bsgr aot he uadertakea heeause of "speeifieity* 
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la UM. In Caie of reaoTal, possible rella^ShMat of usership would 
represent a sMrlfioe lAlch the tenant seeks to arert. At the saiae tiste, 
landlords are likewise reluctant to cooperate in aajor l^roTesents because 
they may he inappropriate for the incoming tenant. In other words, the 
landlord's saqpsetcd value of the returns from iaproTeaents to hia my be 
insufficient to Induce hia to Bake the necessary inrestscaiits. 
Restrictions in investment are not peculiar to tenants with planning 
horiions shorter than optlHoa planning periods, and with no assurance for 
adetjoate coB5>eiiBation. Operators of life estates may also have little or 
no personal economic interest to keep physical assets intact for the 
successors. The result may then be depletion of the fan assets (for 
present incoae), idxich will be a "cost", in teras of low productivity or 
rehabilitation of assets, to future occupants. 
ITaesrtalaly of teimrs expectations. As Indie&tsd bsfors, ths sffMts 
of temre uncertainty on intertes^ioral resource use are analogetus to the 
effects t^ere planning horizons are known but Halted. Consequently, the 
following discussion should asount to an extension of the effects ^st 
ladieated. 
Obligations to Bake fixed annual costs — interest, aaortization 
payiMsnts and taxes — mist be met by owner operators in order to maintain 
control of reeourees.^ Fear of foreelosare or dispossession creates an 
^Many ia^rtant propositions on the possible effects of tb« credit and 
tax eysten will not be pursued in this discussion. But, they must be 
recoil zed as ii^rtant In an analysis of the tenure system, for a dis­
cussion, see OlrliMsy-Wantrop, 0£. cit., Ch. 12, 13. 
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•iivixoamat, in the periods of prodaetioa iiasards or depressed 
prioes, that essovrages he&vy dlseoontiog of future retcams to aaxlalse 
eurreat inooses. Bsavt- diseoontiag aii^t eatuKi a dsfleotloa trcm tlie 
<^ti»UB p3redu0tioa plaa. It asgr sppear tMBpos^lly eiqpedieat to aiae soil 
resonroes to avert loss of <q[>eratiag assets.^ Orer tloe the produetioa 
response of land, as well as the proSuetivitT' of ooaqplenentary resowees 
will diminish. As a conoonitant result, resonroes May shifted. 
Inadvertently, to products not in line with eensasMri* "tise prefereaM*** 
fh&t is, heoause of the pressures for insediate IBSOBW, eaterprises yleldias 
q^ek tura->over8 (sueh as erops or hogs) are sahstituted i)or enterprises 
yielding nore distant and slower rates of retura (sooh as breeder oattle). 
13ie diBlnntioa ia resource prodoetivities over tise, aoeosQiaaied with 
distortioa of eaterprise eoabiaations, as a result of teaure uaoertaiat^r, 
aay also he eiii^eted la eases other thaa o«ner<-operater8. Tenants are 
siailarly suh^eted to iaseoure tenure hut of a different iqpeeies: those 
tenants having 8hort->tera or oral leases, not knowing if their leases will 
he renewed or teraiaated, will find it personally profitable to disiavest 
soil resources (8ahsti1m.tiag land or labor for oonsenraittoa *'ia|>uts^), 
although iavestnsat wotdLd be eeoiwBioal uader a mre definite e:[^eetatioa 
of ocev^anoy. Bowever, if both the landlord aad tine teaaat participate ia 
plasniag the fam operations there is no reason to expeet a nailed 
differeaee betweea a teiumt-operated fam and an owaer-opemited fwsen la 
Parsers ia the lew iaooae group should be particularly vulnerable to 
these effects by sMgaifying the iadueeaeat for resource depletion ca the 
already lower productive aad uaecoaoaic unit. Walter Wilcox. She ecoaosv' 
of small faras ia Wiscoasia. Jour, fara Scoa. 28:H€l-H^. May 1^46. 
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eoBserv&tlea dceicions. 
S«rt&la fta&lifleatloas ar« ateastaxy hara s short tarm laasas msjr 'ba 
Batlsfaate3i7 to tha partias nagBgad la laasa eoatraets to ava^a frletloas 
ia tlia azaemtioa of laasa agraaasats. Basouroa raad^stMats to priea 
cdaaages to »alataia or tiprova fam laeoM are possible oaly if SOBS tiae-
flexibility is allOMd la leasing ar:FaQgeBwats.^ Tarth«r, sbort-term 
leases ai^t also proTids Maas for periodie revlevs of the perfonMaees 
of teaaats, aad mtirate teaaats {yibo wish to eoatlxras ooeeqpaaey or 
aata^lisb a good redord) to aaxlBlze aot oaljr their ova eads but the 
iaterests of the fins as a g»iag eatitjr. 
S^fpo theses Direct lag tha Zafftiry 
X^plielt la the foregoiag theoretieal aaalysis are a host of bjrpotbeses 
about the effeets of teaore arraagSMats aad the teoore status ef fara 
<^eraters upoa resource alloeatioa vithia the firs, ^at is, prediotioas 
or tentative pf^j^sitioas are adTaaoed tdth respect to eapirieal relatioa-
ghlps or uakaova |||^aeaeaa oa nhioh little or no obserratioas hafe gret beea 
aade. Hovever, froa the stated ob^otiTSs of this studjr it should be 
apparent that the eiQiirical analysis will be ooaeeraed with only a saall 
part ef the prebleas of tenure ia resouroe allocation, 33Mrefore, aost of 
the ^ppotheses li^lieit ia the theoretical analTSis will aot be tested ia 
Hhsre are oases ia idiloh landlords reqtdre set patterns ef land use 
vltlumt being aware of the ei^neaio Is^licatioas. fhat is, using aa^rieet 
prices as the cholMMirlterloa ef allocating resouroes betveea enterprises 
to obtain the aaaclaaa i«lue froa produetloa. 
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stmdy. ittnatioB Is eonfined to h7pothss«s of aa laltial tjrp* only, 
lo %poth«8«s of ft ''dlagaostio" &atttr« i&ieli to spooifie roaioBs 
for th« oxistoBeo of thfl prottloas will Im tested. 
Vlth tke foregoing liaitations in taiad, the aajor Iqrpotheses direetiag 
the eaplrical phases of this inrestigation are posed in quite general terns 
as follows: 
1. Output-ii^t foaetioas relating the gross ralue of prodaetion to 
the gross value of resources "used vp* during a pro&aetion jear 
sa9 adjected fsy tesnre status; and they should differ T»et«e«n 
agrioultural firms aeeording to the status of the operations. 
It should he in:^rred that the test of this laypothssis imrolfes 
eoi^arison and analysis of aggregate relationships only. 
2. If resource organization is oonditioned hy ths tenure status of 
farm operators, there should he differences reflected in the 
patterns of marginal returns to the resources e^loyed. It should 
follow that there are di^erences in the departures of aargiaal 
returns froa the reqpectlTe i*priees" of resources, fhese ^prices" 
serve as liaite to i&.ich resources should he e:i9anded or 
contracted to aehieTe optiaaB production levels. Xn contrast to 
the first ligfpothesis (ahove), it is iaplied that an t^proxiaatioa 
of efficiency in the use of specific resource categories would he 
ohtained hy iib» teet of this hypothesis. But a closer approxi. 
aation to the test of efficiency is assumed hy stating a related 
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IqrpotlMBls: 
3. fhat toaore status ^soMtleally ia^sdss tha aeMsTSaeat of 
•ffielMey in rosouroo us«; hsaeo it ean te prodietod that thoro 
are wrrespending differences in the deriations of actual resooree 
ooBfljination within the fira, from the opt isms ooaliination of land 
lahor and oapital services at given levels of prodnetioa.. 
7r«B the theoretioal analsreis of farm texmre effeots on resouree xuf 
it should %e reeognlsed ^at the "broad texmre olasses, seleeted for this 
study, aii^t have inherent weakstesses for analytical pvsqposes. Within 
pofmlations of fara operators, there ean he aaxQr variations of tenure 
ar2«nge»eat8 and <dia3raoteristios that affeet produotion decisions. %iu 
ineffieieneies within eaeh of the tenure and lease types swy he eo^pensatinK 
or oosoealed. Hence the elassification is adopted as a aatter of eonventiott. 
However, it he stated as a central hypothesis that if produotion 
decisions are eonditioned to any significant extesit hy 13iese t«aure 
classes, as populations, then there should he differences hetween then in 
the patterns of resouroe use. 
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MSfBODS OF HrVSSfXdAfXOH ims AHAZ.TSZS 
£her« are tw» eoflOBoa approaehee to the analyeie of effioienoy in 
eeateB^orazy 8(grleult«ral eeeaoBice reeeareih.t (l) stndiee of tli» eeoaoidee 
of epeeifie fam fltuatio&s and (2) stodiee of gtatittleal popolatioaa of 
fame. Zt is aot implied that a study of farm popolatioxui is a dlreot 
alteraative to the analjrele of partleular fazne or Tide terea. Shey eerre 
different pnxpoMt and may he uodertaken Jointly as eoaplensats. Sttidies 
of partieular fam sitiiatio&s are sore appropriate to establish heaehsttrkt 
for Baking specific reoofiawndations; they do not prorid® general Infor­
mation—on averaise relationidiips or OB the status (|M—that aii^t he uwifol 
9M direotives ^ the fomolation of puhlio poli^. Zhe latter approach 
oulj is followed in this iavesticatioa. fhis is presuMd hgr the i^plioatiwn 
of regressioa analysis. It is assuaed that groins of fams classified hjr 
the eriterioa of the tenure status of the operator are different popu­
lations. fhe paraMters and relationships of eaeh population are taken 
to represent those for the aTera«e farm fira vithin eaeh gre^. 
Kind and Souree of Data TTsed for Testing :E(ir|>otheses 
That data used for testing hypotheses are obtained from a tvo-phase 
stratified-raodoB saa^le of fanas in Iowa and the northern two-thirds of 
Illinois. Beeords were ohtaiiMd fron farmers throng a series of 
foarterly personal iaterriews for the year 19^. ®»e saiqile was designed 
originally to estimate livestot^ ps^duetioa; it was not designed for a 
3« 
t«isuF« study p«r •«. Ho««T«r, iafbraatioa on tho tosmro itattui of 
roi^A&ontt MMI oht&inod. Zxei^t for soaw lisltatlons, miffieiont data 
woro also obtained on prodnotion and resovureos usod daring 195H to provldo 
iaforaatlon for dorlving eross-soetlonal "produetion fnmetions* and for 
•stimting otlMr toimrs ^sametoristios. Bo Infoxvatioa ms obtained on 
the division of resources between different enterprises, further, other 
data that would he useful, sueh as the oontrihutions nade ly landlords a»d 
tenants to "•arie&le* resonroes, wore not srailable. 
fhe first jSnRW of tho design doalt with obtaining a relatiroly large 
saa^ls of fazaers of all kinds and for each famer sons inforaation was 
obtainod on the Bsaiber of livestook (eattle and hogs) ea^etod to he sold, 
fhroni^ this inforaation, fams were gronpod into throe elassos (sisss) 
aioeordiag to the "sise of oai^eted sales" in toras of aaind. units.^ 
In the second phase of the design a raadoaized saiq^le of l/S of class 
1 fams, 1/k of class 2 farsui and l/l of class 3 farms was soleetod for the 
final panel of farasrs who wore interriewed for details on production 
actiTitios. As a result, the final panel of faraers interriewed in ^laso 
IX of the sas^le contained ^S, with the mtahers drawn froa oach class 
i^own helov (fable 1). 
Of 588 fara operators in the saiQ)le, 53^ rei^sded for all of the 
'^Ths noaber of faras identified in phase X of sai^le was 2SU0 and was 
distributed as follows; 
Class £:ii^eted sales in aniaal units Iraber of fams 
1 and uador 1»99X 
2 50 - 12Ji 685 
3 125 and OTor lg» 
»jtal 1355? 
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fottr foartarg (ia 2-95^). Therafora, only the l&ttar asa^r of aahadalaa 
wMi edited for adafoaejr ef aaawara to qoaatioaa la the aehedolea pertaiaiag 
to teanre aad prod^tloa. F&TBS of leaa than ^ ausrea ware dropped. Other 
aehadoles «ere exoltuied either "because of inooi^lete antvera or heeenaa of 
heiai; uaeloiaaified with rei^ot to a aiagXe teaore atataa. With theaa 
allBinatieas, only U32 sehadulaa were finally aalaeted aa ^ahla. fha 
fable 1. fwm operatora Intarriawed aad their diatrllmtioa 
hetwaen elaaaaa of fazn alae 
01aaa I'ariB else Stnber of farai 
(^ratora 




wlreraa repreaaated hy thla aaaiber of aebadulaa then eoiuiiata of fazM 30 
aOTea or aore aad the teaare typea Hated in ?ahle 2. 
It ati^t he ohaerred (Tahle 2) that altfaou# 20 per eent of the farm 
in the tmiverae are andar crop-ahare leaaea, oaJiy 27 ohaerratioaa are 
iaeladed in the aeii^le, aa eoa^red to 29 per eeat trnder llTeatoek^-ahare 
leaaea with 7^ ohaerratloaa. Ihla aeealag dlaerepaaey la a result of the 
aaa;>le that eoaeentrated oa the larger llTeatoek prodaoera. Zt saat alao 
he noted that with such Halted data on crop-share and owih leases (27 and 
Ho 
fcAle 2. fan operator* analjzed and tholr diitrilmtlen ia por eonl 
iMtMiea toasire aad loaso typof 









fotal U32 100 













^tal 198 100 
*fhos« p«re«at84P»e eaanet 'be obtaiaed dlreetljr froa the aaid»er of 
operator* ia&ieated. 'She peroeatate* are «ei|^ted aoeordiag to the 
tRuiber of o1>eerTatiea* la eaoh fara olaes (siae) faXllag vithia eal^ 
teaore aad leaae type, fht peroentage dletrilmtieas of olaeee* of faro* 
within owttor-operatorshlp and part-ownership, lireBtock-ehare and crop-
ehareoOash leaeiae are ehoim la fM»Ie 3> 
34 reBpe6tive37) these lease types are aot aaaH^rzed qpeelfleally.^ 
ixteordlag to Ikhle 3* ^^9 greatest aad saallest per eeat of "snail* 
sited farms are under owner-operatorshlp and llTestoolc-ehare lease, 
respeotlvelT-. la aldltlea. It is also aotloeahle that ths steepest 
It t«as ooasldered aore pltmslhle to hare a alalann of 30 degrees of 
freedoB for the regressloa aaaljrses. MoreoTer, ovlag to ^ stratlfioatloa 
of farms late 3 elasses, the aoaher of degrees of freedoa lost is 3 tlMs as 
aaajr as that idiltih woold he lest If the sas^le were co^letely raadon. 
Ul 
3> Sistriliation of of faxvs IB per eoat vlthla each 















Per ceack Per cent Per cent Per cent 
1 "snail" 7X 57 69 
2 "MditOI^ Hi 28 
3 "large" i U 
fotal 100 100 100 100 
gradiesit (poreo&tag*vita) froa "•nail" to "large" faras Is \uader owoer-
eperatorship a&d tibe lowest gradient tuader li-restoclc-share lease. !Ehese 
distritmtions refleot idiat should ordinarily 1>e expected t the sas^le is 
"minted" in favor of litresto^ prodneers—livestoek pro^tion is ths 
criterion of sise elassifieation. It is eridsnt that sisse classifioation 
is Bost probably not independent of tennre olassifioation in the nniverse 
r^resented 1^ the san^le.^ 
AneJytieal Models Xxplored aai Tests of B^jrpotheses 
Zn order to test the hypotheses stated preriously, the analytical 
When tlM tesore classes (Tahle 3) and fars sise are tested for 
independence^ an interaction chi-sqoare raloe of sigaificant at 
a prohi^ility level less than O.O5 per cent, is obtained. Bernard Ostle. 
Statistics in research, iaes, Xoica, Zova State College Press. 19^< 
p. 68«71» ^1. 
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t«ciluiifa«s us0d •n%ail 9ttlnfttion of (1) gross avoran^ oatpaWtx^t 
relationsMps ^ isanre and laaa* types, (2) aari^lual Talus produfits 
(rstoms) to rssooress and (3) "optinw" aresoore* eosliiBatieas and the 
d«Tiatioas of aetttal resouros liqmts froa the ealeulatad optimn ^(aa&titiss. 
Afitoally, average intrafam rslationi^lps ar« estimated frtm latsrfanB or 
erots-seetlon data. Oo&se^&tly, estlmatos oMalaed are sot ^ trcus 
eapirieal evoatezparts of the theoretleal eoneepts of i&trafivm relation-
diips mi resoureo narsinal product iritiest thsjr are reaseiiahle appreadU 
a&tio&s. It follow that estimates of resouree doviatlens fros the ^tlaa 
aim approxinatlons alno, fhe asaljrsis should reveal, hotierer, dlffsreaeos 
in. resource use if there is tuff icient hoaogeneitjr within and heterogeneity 
Itetiiieen the populatloas analysed. 
Turn types of ftmetloas are fitted to the data for each tenore and 
lease type ^ weleh1(«& least sqenarest (1) a slaple regression »odel, 
T w 4- |IX 4- c, ei^loyed for estleatiag and testlag for dlfferenees in 
aggrogate "ou^t^li^t* relationships end (2) a anltlple segrssslon aod«l 
lliwar In logarlthns, leg T « leg I'l lo£ ^ ^ * 
log c, thzwem^ i&l(^ aarginal returns to rssoorees and the optlann resource 
ooBthiaations are estlsated. Slnee the data fitted to those foiwtions are 
fi^iB a sai^le stnatlfled hy fam size (olasses 1, 2 and 3) «lth dlfftront 
sas^llng prc^rtlons qrsteBatloally applied to eaoh class* the fonctloas 
are derived throtigh vel^tlag of the noawnts for each class.^ 
^fhe weighting process used Is shoim In ilppendlx A. 
iBtlaatlea ef g3ro«» ayerage OQ,timt»ltt|ya% relatlenahlpt 
ladivldtial ragrassions ara fittad for aaoh taimra and lease type %o 
jrield the estimating e^joatioa: 
T « a 
idiere T « Oross prodnetioa ia dollar* 
X « Aggregate of resouree serrioes ia dollar* 
The eoa^sitieas of tite rariables T aad X are as follows i 
t refers to the sun of: livestook aad produets salts, hoM aaed 
lire stock: and product#, change ia livestock In-rantory and the valoB 
of erc^ produetioa for the year, loss li'restodk parehases duriag 
the year. 
X refers to estiaated total Talue of resouree serriees "used 
during year, fhis fl»aas the SQJB of; 3 eeat of laad valued 
at "aarkst ]^iee**, la^r -valued at jSHO.OO per week for operator aad 
hired, and ]ll30.00 per week for fanily labor, and the iretlue of otpitaX 
serriees shewn as X^ ia Typ« IX function helov. 
Ihe e^pAtioa is used to reireal differences hetweea tenure status ia aggre» 
gate relationships hetweea production (T) aad lE^t (X). She relative 
sices of the regressioa ooefficieat, b, ara takea to he roa^ iadieaturs 
of effieieat^, ia the seaae that it shows the aaouat of produet assoeiated 
with a unit inerease ia resouree services used up duriag the year.^ 
Also, soae notion of relative (coB^arative) efficiency is sou^t V 
eei[|>arlMa of predicted production, for each teanre class, froa given levels 
of iaveatBeat (resource services used latroduced is aa "index of 
A * A 
coBmarative efficieaey'* i (T / T ) 100 per cent, n&ere T deaotss the O BfliZ •8* 
^"Average net retura* ia per cent is estimated hy (h-l)lOO. 
uu 
Baxlwm pToduotioa olttaiaed froa the estlaatisg equation of the temtre elaet 
yielding the hii^et predieted value (of produetion), euid deaotee the 
predieted ralue of produetion of the other teaore elaeeee. Sridently thie 
index flfapfocea that the tenure or lease tjrpe that shows the latest level 
of produetion is, in relative terms, the a«st efficient with its effieieney 
ratio (ahove) heiag ofoal to 100 per eent.^ 
^ Bstiaatiea of Marginal returns to land, lahor and capital serviees 
Marginal retunui are obtained froa the estiaatiag afaation popularly 
2 knotm as the cross-seetion variant of the Oohh-Souglas foaetioa. ^ 
estioatiag equation derived for eaeh tenure aad lease tjrpe is as follows: 
;  -I  I  "21  *3 
where 7 • Gross production in dollars 
" land in dollars 
» Jiabor in weeks 
Xj * Capital serviees in dollars 
T refers to the aggregate value of production as ia the preeediag 
1 It should ha acted that origiaally the regrassioa aodel assasad a 
priori waa of the ^(uadratie form 7 > a <f 4- 4- c . After plotting 
the data, however, there waa no perceptible eurvilinearity portrayed by the 
acattar. fherefore, the linear regreasioa was fitted. But still, as vill 
be pointed cut later, thia nodal yielded results of rather little naaaiag. 
Hence its application waa aot exteitded. 
R. Soai^AS and 0. tf. Oobb. A theory of production, inericaa Scan. 
Bev. 9RPP1. li:12^.lS5. Kar. 193S; P. H. Douglas. Are there laws of 
production? AMriean Scon. Bev. 3-9^ • 
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fanetion. This aggrsgatlon was unaToidable sinos no infomation was 
aTailat»l« oa divisloa of the retoareei used hetweea eaterprlMs. 
Ideally, sep&rate ftuwtioas for «i«h aa^or eaterpriee are deeirahle 
to ohtaia nore eo^parahility of the relatioaehips aad eetinates wide. 
refers to the "market value** of Isad used (ii^t) as qootad hy the 
rei^oi^at-M^waer-«perater, part owner or tenaat. 
Xg refers to lahor measured ia weeks, Is a st» ofi operator*, 
hired aad family l^or aai 20 per eeat of the amouat paid for euetom 
work .00 efoal 1 weak). Ihe aggregatioa of these oategeries of 
lahor is presixBably aaother detraetiae feature alaee it implies 
homogeneity of the different lahor sezriees. 
Z, refers to aa estimate of capital serrioes (flows) iMeh is the »aat 
of 9 the meai^ values for seeds, fertiliser, lia*, laseetieldes, 
silage, hay aad eommerelal feeds, Teteriaary expenses, Imildlag 
repairs, 80 per eeat eustom work, eleotrioity, fosl a:^ maehiaery 
repairs aad 20 per eeat depreelatioa, 3 P*^ of lirestook purehMed 
during the year and 6 per cent of the beginning inventory of lirestook 
Uasuaxy, 1953l). 
ilthou^ the Cohh*-^Dou£lae function has heea employed exteasiyely ia 
resouree produotlTity studies, it has heea tised only to a minor exteat ia 
the aaalysis of tenure effieieaey speeifieally.^ Its frsfoeat usa^ is 
2 
aeeouated for )qr eertaia attributes of the foaetioa. First, the fti»»tioa 
allowv diminishiag returne to be observed without usiag as ata»y degrees of 
freedom as would be used iqi la guadratio ftmetioas. In effect, the fUaetion 
iaplioitly takes eare of possible iateraetioa between the iadependeat 
-««riable8. Seeoad, the foaotioa yields direetly the elastioitles of 
produetioa (expressed by the es^neats of the iadependeat variables) and 
^bert, loo. eit.; larl 0. Heady. }^ginal resouree productivi^ aad 
imiyatatioa of shares for a sample of rented farms. Jour. Bol. 5eoa. 63^ 
500-511. Bee. 1955. 
^eej Oexhard fiataer. A note oa the derivatioa of production 
feenotioas from farm records. Scoaometriea 12tSB-2!f. Jaa. l^M^; or 0. 
fiatner aad 0. H. Brow&le*^ Productioa fti^tioas derived from farm records. 
Jour, farm Scoa. 261567. Aag. 19^. 
•aaiblct eaior eooimtations of tho aarslaal rotom of oaeh rotouroo oatoeozsr. 
fhird, the fmustiott implU* tulMtitutability of rtaoureoa. Mt •ineo the 
•foatioA In i& deuhlo lo^itha it girti eoastaat prodaotioa olaatioitiee. 
SOSBO, the in^rodaot eoatoors are aeyaptotie to the resouree axes aad 
that need not he the ease ia aetual relatieaibips. 
Mai^iaal retoms to land, lahor aad oagpital serriees are estiaated 
froffl the haeie estiaatiag eqaations derived. That asaae the partial 
derivative of production with respect to eaeh resooroe ie taken, ffaas 
the sargiaal retora to resotiree stgr, is 
A A 
•  Oj j r -
fhese vstisates are n«de at the geoaetrie aeens of the variables..preda0tioa 
and resouree iaputs—siaee errors of libs estSaates get progressively laxgtr 
farther awiy froa the geoaetrie aeans. Siffereneee between ea estiaated 
aargiaal value pwdnet for each resouree (at ttie geoaetrie aeans) aad the 
respeetive resouree "priee" is used as a firet ai>proxiaatioa of existing 
ineffioieaei«Bi a difference between the "met" of a resouree and Mte 
value of its nurgiaal product is evidenee of iaefficienogr asd "the aagaituds 
of the difference is a clue to the ext<mt of inefficien<qr." 
George J. Stigler. The theory of price. Bev. ed. Hew Tork, Ihe 
l^teABillan Co. 1$^, p. fhe eoacept of 'oppertuaitjr eoet" (alternative 
eoet) is applied to aake the necessary ee^arieoas{ i.e., «be eost of a 
productive eerviM In a given UM is to the largest value of the 
aargiaal prodcust of that eerviee ia ite other ]^ssible uses. Maittedly, 
the oon<Mpt of ^portunity (or alternative) eost has an ail^itnury eleaeat 
bat serves as a useful tool in the analysis of resource allocation. 
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Oa# of Iqrpothoaos diroetiag thii laq^edxjr ii th&t difforoaeo* 
la rotoareo orgaaizatiea esasod "by tho toaaro otatai of fMW operators 
virald ^ rofloetod ia diffsroat pattoras of aargiaal rotaras to rosoaroos. 
fhoso difforoaoos ia aareiaal rstaras aay curlso from oao or a oeabiaatloa 
fs&la k, A0t distriVattoa of fa» operators vithia saeh toaort 
aad Xoass typo 
Vsnaro aod loaso typos 
iafcfftf^ls Onasr- Part. U<rssteek«> Ort^-slMkro* 
o*nars lihars roators wdk roatsrs 
Koribor of oporators ia por oaat 
aad OTor 





6.2 2. 6  0.0 
S.6 2.6 0.0 2.2 
9.9 H.2 l.H 3*9 
20.0 8.6 H.6 k,8 
W.3 16.2 KB 11.8 
1S.6 18.2 U.9 13.8 
10.8 ^.3 16.2 m.o 
5.H lH.9 la.o 15.5 
3.7 8.1 31.0 20.9 
3.»^ 0.3 15.1 13.5 
1.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
of reasons: (l) differeaees ia the <jaality of resoaree eagployed under each 
teaore and lease type, (2) differeaees ia resoaree Msibiaatioas aad (3) 
differeaees in prodaet eoahiaatioas. 
Xt is proposed that siaee the age distribution is aore aegatirely 
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fig. 1. Age distrlTjutiozis of farm operators tezmre 
and lease 
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«m»a* dper&toNhip ihouM ^ laftrlor to «» quality ©f ItAur na&BV *1» 
eth«r geovepe of (^rators aaalysod.^ fho ptok (aodal ••loo) of ^ a|^ 
distxltaitloa for part omori it vithln fSut 55 to 59 yoart ago iatorval. 
On %lm ot]tor bead, and ai oa^otod, tb» a^ dlstrilmtions of two Xoaao 
are B»ro pecitlvely akewed (greater proportiona of yonager eporators) 
tfith tbe peak* of tlii diitrilmtioa within the age Intervale of 30 3^ 
yeart. ?urther, with regard to part-ownera, the age distribution approaches 
"aoraal", 
Sa Tlew of Vb» dlfferentiale In age dlstrilraitionff tatveen temm 
groups, it is possible that differences in nargiaal rettims to labor oould 
iM affeeted by theae age differentlala, to the extent that age is nega-
tive3y oorrelated with labor foality and the greater proportion of ^e 
fara labor Is performed Iqr the operator hiaeeXf. la order to mtim eoae 
obeervation on the age faotor (and atteaipt to ainiiBlie its effeote) 
eatinatee of Bargiaal retunu are also aade for t«o age getmpu of owner-
curators fron estlmtiag eqfoatione derl-ved for eaeh age gre^ la&lrldaalljr, 
la addition to osttmates for oimers as a idwle. Ihe tvo age groves 
anai^sod are (1) those owners age nnder H5 years and (2) those owaers age 
over 5U years. The Igrpothesis is that the older age group should shov a 
i^giaal return to lahor lover than those returns for any other greiq;> 
anaSyted beoanee of inferiority of the labor need. It is reoognised ^t 
the differenee In the Barglnal returns to lebor (eonneeted vltt^ li^r 
^e foall^ of land nsQr aleo vary between tesDre types; however, in 
thie study land nnits are "etandardised" in tense of aarket valtte. But as 
indieated later, there are reasons to bellofe that the "ijaantity" of land 
aa M^orted (in terasa of dollars) is subjeot to errore. 
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foali^), tlMM fftsvapu, ea& !>• daaptiMd Ixjr cta^drior aanactMat 
lUa tlM ol&«r agft 
To d«t«et th* affects of rosoureo eoabln&tioa, tmdor llTOstoek-share 
aad erop-s^Mra-oaah loatlng tho ladi-rldnal rogiNiatlotte of tliaaa tvo loata 
2 tsfpoa as* poolod to olatain prodootion alastieltiaa eoMBoa to "botli gro^a. 
Tixt roaton for oMainii^ eoanoa production alaatieitiof is t2«t difforaaets 
ia ffiargiaal rotturai arisiag from rasouroa eombtaatioii oa& oaly "ba dalaotod 
if tha "prodaetiOA sorfaeos* (alastioitias) ara tha saaa. In o^or words, 
it is ass^mad that liTastoelo-shara aad erop*shara<i«aali roators hat* aiailar 
prod^tioa sarfaoss 'bxA aro oparatisoe at diffsraat points on 13»a Sana 
snrfaoo liae^aa ef different reaooroe ooai^iBatione. Beaoe aargiaal retnraa 
are different. 
Certain pro)>leBS of prodoet ooaHnatioa (or aggregation of prodoets) 
hoa i^neraX prolilea of aoltieolliaeari^ oagr also affeet the aargisal 
retnms to lahor aad thus ooafooad i^tever effaets that oeold stea froai 
lahor ^litjr. For eieai|>Xe, it is hjrpothasistd that if l^e ooeffieient of 
tariation of a resoaroe (indyspeadant TariaDXe} is aaaXl ia reXatioa to those 
of "both production (dependent yariable) aad another resource (independent 
variable) ^e resoaree with the eoBparativelj saaXX eoeffieieat of rari* 
ation shoald show as hariag XittXe or no effeet on prodaetioa rei^oase. 
Xts effeet wlXX he ahsorhed in the resource having the hi^er -rariatioa. 
With eross-seetion eas^Xing data ^e awmal of Xabor used as reported hy 
faxBwrs na^ he reXativeXy *oonstant"; tenee ite effeots oa prodiiotioa aajr 
he refXeetad ia soae other regressioa eoeffioieat. XnOior heecoMS the 
wMlBsr TariahXe. Seet KarX A. Vox aad Janee f. Gooaey, Jr. Sffeots of 
iatereorreXatioa mXtipXe oorreXation aad regressioa analysis. V, S. 
Sept. Agr., JigrieaXtaraX KaxlGetli^ Serrioe, lashiagtoa, B. 0., j^riX X95^. 
regressioas are pooXed hy arataiag the Boaents of -rariation and 
ooTariation ef the v&riahXas (oorreoted snas of squares and oross-preda^ts) 
for eaeh Xease type. 
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art also i&v«lvad.^ Bat aothiag Is dona in this study with ragard to thia 
&raa of fvohlaas haoansa naadad data wara not aTailabla. fhis ccoastion, 
howTsr, is partieolarly rala^rant if it ia troa that ijiqtarfaetiona in 
lasjiing ei^a non-i^timu orahination of antaypriaas. fha valua of 
prodaotion frc» a givan sto^ of rasotufoas is raduead aeoordin^^. Thoa 
affaets of produetion etmbination say ha raflaetad in tha aoaffieianta 
of tha astiaiatine afoations and thas in tha aavginal prodaetiTil^ 
aatiaatas.^ 
Otlu»r fasten that me^ eaoaa hlaaas in tha eoaffieianta of ^ 
aatiaatinfi afttations aad hanoa ia tha nargiaal rataxna mat alao ha 
recogniaed. Tor axaa^la^ tinlaaa aaaagaaaat la uniform hatwaaa taaara 
^paa ia tbi tiniTa2>8a, diffaraatlals ia aargiaal ratan» will aet ha 
aaiplaiaad eeiQ)lataly. Also, if aaaagaaaat hfl3>paaa to ha latareorralatad 
any othar raaeurea oatagoxy for any partieolar taaora giftriQ), ita 
affaets ara lUsaly to eaiua ovarMiatiBatiea of tha prodaotiTity of that 
raaourea to n&ieh it ia eonwlatad.^ Goaaaq^atly, raaalta ohtaiaad anst 
htor a dlaaaasioa, eoasolt Jamaa S. Plaxieo. ProhlaM of faotor-
prodaot aggragatioa ia Oohh^Ooiiglaa ralaa produetivity analyais. Joar. 
fans Icon. 3T«66^75. *«•. 19^. 
^Maygiaal vaturaa to a raaoarea eatagory asgr alao ha affaeted hy tlw 
a^gragatioa of msoa«ea eatagorioa. Zn ahort, prodaetioa alaatieitiaa ara 
%aatahla* ia tha saasa that if othar raaooreaa ara ragitrapaA» tha 
alaatieity of tirti "aajragyovqpad" rasoajrea my ha radnead or lasraasad. 
fharafora, diffaranoaa hatwaan taaora olassaa in aaxginal raturaa at «Ba 
latral of rasom>ea aggragation naad aot ha tha aaaa at anothar laval of 
aggragatioa. 
's„: Olaa Zi. iJohaaoa. Frohlama in studying raaourea prodnetlTitiaa 
and siaa of haaimas arising from aanagarial prooaaaaa. In Sari 0. Eaafty 
at. al. ada. Baaoaroa produetlTlty, rataias to seals aad far* size, 
p. lS-23. Anas, Iowa, Iowa Stata Collaga Praaa. 19^. 
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t»e int«rpr«ttd evaiioTuily. 
Eatlffiatioa of d»Tlatiott8 of aettud ra»oure« Immtt fyoa "aptiwai" wtotuw 
eoaibiBAllei» 
Preyiout roaource product irity studies (using the Gobb-4)oxigla« 
faction) have eoaeladed tbe analyeie "by draviag infereitoos about resoortM 
s^alloeatlon if dlvereeaoet iMtweea margiaal retorae aad tlie re^ettr* 
resooree "pxloee" are obeerred; aa sulfated Isafore thia proeadure ia 
need oaly aa a firat approxiaatioa ia a teat for iaaffieieaeiea. fha 
aaalyaia ia exteadad fortbar ia thia atuidly ia order to deteraiae lu»v far 
a»ay eiu^ teaore aad leaae type is rexwved (deriatieaa} from %h» optiann 
ia reaourea aXleeatioa. nie teaore or leaae type vith tbe asttlleat 
deviatioa ia terM of reduotioa ia the "tetal valtie of prodaetive aerrieea' 
(eoata) la aeeepted to he the ooat effleieat (or leaat iaeffleleat). 
y fhe optl«GB ia reaooree eoaibiaatioaa are eatimated at the geoBetrie 
aeaaa of prodoetioa. Ihe ohjeetive ia to aehlere ^e eoaditioa t^re the 
ratios of the oargiaal value product (from each resource) to the opportuaity 
eoat of the reti^Mtive resource are eq[aal. fhia eefoality of ratiea: 
WrP^ MWj 
^ ^ ^ . K 
ylelda the lowast poaalhle ooata for the givea level of prodtistioa aad 
reaoaree "prleea". la the e^tioa, the aobaoripta d, 1 aad e deaote laad, 
labor aM eapltal reapeetively, KfP repreaeata nargiaal value pn»daot 
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(rettira) and P r«pr««ent# the opportunity ooit.^ fh« Mvna^ttons aads on 
^porlmdt^ eotts in th« oaalyai* ar« a« itelXewit 6.0 par east for luad, 
I^HO.OO par iwak for l&'bor aad lyQ.O par eaat for ei^ital aarrieaa.^ 
tiaaio aatiMatisg afcuitiona usad for dalazviaiag Iba <9«inui 
eoaftin&tion of j^aooroaa ara the aaaa as those uaad for aatiaatiag marginal 
ratozna. Tharafora, anar 1>iaaaa to i&ieh tho SMrgiiieJ ratttXBS ara s«d»J*otad 
nilX aXso diatort tiia aatiaataa of tha davlatioBa froB ^ti»ai. fhat ia, 
^a rastiXta dapand tipea tha liasie aatiaatiag afaatloaa tuiad. 
fha aztaat of dariations ara ohtaisMd and axpraaaad aa raaourea 
axeasaea an&/or dafieita ia a]»aoXuta taraa and la tana of par eaat tvem 
the optiKSB q^umtitiaa aaadad. Also, tha totaX vaXna of pr^xkotita 
sartrieaa (fC) at aetuaX raaourea ij^ta, 1* e«%8r*d with the 
•aXM aaaooiatad with tha ealeaXatad "optimn* raaoarea li^ts 
fha diffaraaoa, SO • • D ia the atreraiee redafitiea ia 
eosta (or average deTiatioas trm aiaiana eosta). Shea the effioiei«7' 
index heeoaaa {B/'^)XOO per eeat redtiotioa ia eoets. Beaee, the tesare 
oXaas vitli the aaaXXest redoctioa ia eoata is said to he eXoaar to the 
1 It should he apparent that the solution is analogous to a citing the 
aargiaaX rates ef sahstitatloa of resoaroes with the iaverse of their 
price ratios, fha exeeptioas are: phjrsieaX prodaotioa is r<^Xaeed here 
iQr vaXae ef produetioa axA asttkaX resooree prieea ara r^Xaeed hy oppor-
taaii^ eoata. 
2 ia. aviiitrarjr risk preaitw of X.^ per eeat ia added to tlu» aortgace 
rate ef iatereet of il-.S per eeat for Xaad, U.O per eeat ia added to the 
iaterest for ei^itaX of 6.0 per eaat aad ^.00 per week for Xahor ia aa 
estin.te ef the eeiag veekXy waes rate for fara Xahor ia X9^» for the 
tmiverse frms the data nere ohtaiaed. It mat he reeogaised that 
if differeat eats of prieea sve aeaaaed, the eaXoaXated eptiana reaooroe 
eeabiaatioas wlXX he differeat. 
5^  
eptinuB combination of resoforoat and thus operating tlie "sect offleioatly" 
foots of Signifieanoo 
UaAor tho asnoiptioB that tho ostiaatiog option* dorlvod wm 
iadopos&oat tho oooi^leionts (olaxtioitios) for hoth tho siaplo a&d the 
anXtiple regretsioa ao&el axe tested, in pairs, for difforenoes with the 
otatistie 
" ^ik 
lAere tho m&seripts ^ and k rii^rssont the teimre, lease types or other 
grotqps eoB^ared. fhe related statistio, s. ^ , is the standard error 
of the difforeaoe, The test for diffOroaees ia tho ostiaated 
aargiaal returas is oos^arahle to that for the regressloa oooffieioats, 
except that the valoss of tho regressloa ooeffieieats roplaiood 
the Bargiaal xetaras to eash resotiroe and the standard error of the 
2 differeaee la iwrgiaal retaras heooaes i. _ • 
*ij"®ik 
Two additional tests of significance used in this sttidy Bay he 
MBtloaed at ^Is polat; (l) la the aaalysis of sutrglaal retaras, the 
estiaated aargiaal retttra to each resource is oonpared with the op^ortaaity 
algehrade solutioa and ooapatatloaal prooodore for the optima 
resouree ooahiaatloas are showa la iftppeadix B. 
•ariaaee foraolae used la all oases ere givea la ippeadlx 0. 
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detli df that rtsooro* for •tatistioal dlffBroaoo, utiag tho Ball iQppetbAoio. 
using ^ nail lqrpotb»sit (2) th« iBMrgiaal rotanui at th« oaletilatod 
i^timB roteareo eoBftyiaatien are tostod for difforeaee* vith th« sBargiaal 
rotoras at the geoa»trie Mass, lie foraer test is used to eetahllidi eoBe 
eosfideaee in ttateaeatt mad* ahout departarea of marginal retara-
fl^pertaid^ eoft ratios, from aaity. If the differeaees are "aoa-
sigf^fieaat" it limits l&e infereaoes l^t eaa he dravn aboat rationing 
or exeeases of resourees vith the firm. latter test, on the other 
hand, is pres^d to he an s^jproxiittte test for deriatiena of aetaal 
resoaree iig^piuts from the ^paatities ealealated for the optimnm eomhiaation. 
Similarlgr, if the differeaees in marginal retoras are aoa sigaifieant at 
aeeeptahle prohahility levela, less eoafidenee eaa he placed, ia the 
ohservations re^ardiag the actaal exteat of deriations from optimum 
resoaree or^paiiation. 
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mimn nrxoxuDxss in ^KBMS OF OBOSS AVSSiiSB 
cxpmT'-xspuB musmmmBs 
QuidAd 157 th« first hypothtais, pr«Tiou»ly statsd, ««p&rat« {iaAi-
A 
ria«aX) •stlaattfiis •^tlon* of tbo for% t <• a 4- IdC, aaro torivod for 
•«eb tomre and laaso typ« a« a Man* of eoa^arini; Vh» eatpai-ii^t eoof* 
fioloats aaid t!i« y&luas of ostinatod productloa fre» glfn ItTala 
of raaoureo aorrieos. Attaapt is nado to Sutrodooa tha usa of a& "iadax 
of o^parativo •ffielojieyii iff iiiieh toaoro typat »ay ba eoi^arad la tarma 
of tlta degrae of affietlTaBoss to vhich sisUar tairala of rasoi^oa Mrrieaa 
asa mt ill sad. 
ffross Ararag® Output-Input Coaffioiaats by fiaxnura and Laaaa fypas 
Hhe regression coefficients obsarrad (for each tamra aad laaaa tjrpa) 
show the average response evoked in gross prod-uction by a unit change in 
the gross value of rasourea services coanitted to production. This 
naasure^the regression coefficient—is eoa^arad batvaaa tanare types on 
the premise that the tenure types with the larger values utilize resources 
sost affiel^ntly, la othar vorda, the larger output-input eeaffleiaats asa 
indicative of stiperior resource use. However, as will be pointed out 
presently, no conclusive evidence is obtained Iqr this aaalyaia. On the 
one hand aoat of the resulting differences obsarved are non-signifioant. 
On lha other hand, idiara significant differences axa observed the 
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fable 1^. BBgrvtsien eoaffieicnts and ralated oaaturat from ootimatlag 
•^^tto&t for groM ororaj^ oatpat-ii^t rolatiemilM^i ^ 
toaoro and loast 















eonstaat (a) -752 -9X2 -30 H,HX« -XH53 
Boi^ssion 
Moffioioat ("b) 
(or gross afsrago 
o«tp«t»ii^t eoof. 
fieieat) X.3055 1.3639 1.3695 X.2230 X.HMJX 
CorroXation « 
iadox (r ) 0.72 0.73 0.^ 0.65 0.73 
« *fho ••timatisg ofoatloa for owii*r..«^rator«, for «cai[^lo, ist 
T m -752 + I.3055X litoro 1)0th T aad X are in thousands of dollars, and 
R^ « 0.79. 
rolatioiuiMpt $ipp0ar to 1w tmatablo. 
Troa tlM rooulto (7a1»l« 5), a fov tanoapootod o^tiorrationt oas !>• mad* 
o& iaspootion of tho data: tho largoat rogroasioa (oatpiftt-iiiinit} eotf-
fioioat of 1.^1 is assoeiatod vith erc9-sl»M^*ea«h Xoasos a&d tbo 
snaXXost of X.S230 is assooiatod with XiYostocte-d&aro Xaasos. lowovar, 
on Iho %asis of eeonosio Xogio portai&iag to toxmro th« prsdietions eoaXd 
h&TS haen that livostock-share leases should to the oontraiy rOTSaX ths 
hi^r eooffioiosto-thoy ars ordiaariXy Xoss sal>4ootod to Xoasiag 
5« 
"laparfaotioni". Th»r«for«, a hl^«r return p«r unit chan^ of inrestBaut 
(resoureas) should ha axpaotsd. If th» "ii^rfaetieas" ars prsssnt and 
<^ratirs. Inm ^a ragrassloa eoaffieiant it is suggsstsd that tmdar 
li7«stoefe-shara leasing the "average net return" is approxlaately 22.0 
per eeut, (l*h)100, lAiereas under erop»share-eMh leasing the return is 
c^roxiaately ^.0 per eent, a -value that is intuitirely too high and out 
of proportion. But, part of tbs differenee prohahljr arises fron the lar^sr 
seale of operations under livesteek-share leasing. Xt eould he that these 
faras axe operating more in an area of "deereasiag returns". 
The absolute values of the oorresponding estiaates of the re^ssion 
<»effieieatc for otoers, part.^}«xier8 and full tenants (as a groft^) appear 
to he Bore plaasihle than those for tiie two lease types. Still, their 
relative Talues ean he ^stioned. It was antieipated, for example, iOxat 
part-owners would reveal a hi^r estiaate aainly heeause of the hTpothesie 
that thej are usualljr eo%rised of hotter aanagers. However, one likely 
reason for the saall differenees (in the estiaates) is tiie possibility of 
ineffieieneies within ea^ oanoelling out ea^ other. Aod, as would 
prohahljr he ea^oted, the uoeaplained variation in prodoetion is gs^ater 
under full tenancQr than the other tvo aajor foras of operatorihip—the 
eorrelation index is 63.0 per oent versus 79.0 per eent for owner* 
orators: theoretieally, full tenants constitute a aore heterogenous 
gro«i$ and should therefore vary aore, in teras of output*iiQ>ut relation* 
ships. 
'Baa Talues of t tor differenoes in regreesion eoeffieients (fahle 6) 
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fa3»la 6. of % for dlffi»r«iio«t iMtwita temm aad l«aM tTpes 
in rdgreciioB ooeffloionts aad oorMSpoadiag lav»l« of 
•l0dli«ane« 
ftBEort and tjrp* 
ooapartd 
Values of t for dlfftrencc 
t^raltui Sigalfieaat pro1>abllltr l«v«l 
0«B«r-^er&terg Tt. 
part ovaer* 0.79 
Own®r-op«rator» vs. 
fall t«aaat» O.^^l 
Part-owaors 
fall ttaaat* 0.60 
Z>iT»fte(^thar« raatart rs. 





shov that ths diffsroaess hetwssa the three aajor classes of operators— 
ovners, part-owasrs aad ftill teaaats—-are aoa-slgaifioaat at aooeptable 
prohabilitjr lerels. Oaly the differeaoe iMtveea the eoeffleleats for 
liT«stoelc<*share and erop-share-eash Is sigaifleaat at a prohahill^ lOTel 
of 5 to 10 per eeat. EowiTer, as soi^sted before, vhlle this differeace 
is sl^aifltteat, the relatloaships appear to he tustahle. Siat is, if 
prodaotioa estiaates are aade at levels of resoaroe input greater thaa 
j427,OH3 the estiaates for orop-ihar«-ca«h teaaats exceed those for liTSStock-
share. Oa the other haad, prodaetioa estiaates aade helov $^27,0^3 • 
mailer for orop-share^ash teaaats. fherefore the prediotioas aade from 
60 
the estim&tins equations r«T«al xmstable relationshipf»th«ro is no 
"eoaeiste&t" diffttrenee in tiie eetiaatee of prodaetioa twu the reg^eesion 
etqpatione. Ae siiggeeted before such relatioiiehipe eoiadd poeeibly arise 
froB differe&eee between the lease types in the aTerage siss of operations. 
Saeh a reason uenld suggest the used for stratifieation by an appropriate 
size eriterion. Chi other hand a stibetantial difference in erop-
limetoelc ooabination could also distort the relationships. 
^st of 6os$iaratiTe Sffieiencgr in the Use of dross Besouree Is^mt 
Sinee ^e relationi^ips revealed by the estisating eq^tione far 
li7eatoek»«hare and erep>share*oash tenants agipear to be unstable a test 
of eoB^arative (relative) efficient is not carried out for these lease 
types. Attention is confined to owner-operators« part-owners and fall 
tenants. %at is, in spite of non-significant differences in the regression 
(outpat-ix^t) ceefficients, significant differences in predicted prodnetien 
(by tenure types) at sinilar levels of resonrce use, are possible. The 
possibility exists to the extent that the regression constants (fable 5) 
are different and so influence the positions of the regression lines. 
With effici«Q«y basically defined as waxiaw prodoction froa a given 
stock (level) of resottrces or ainiana cost for a given level of production, 
the estiaated pr^uetion (T^) for each tenure type is ooa^ared ^th that 
* 
estimated for full tenant# (T_.«), at given levels of resource li^t. !n» 
estiaates of other teimre types are ooapared with that for fall tenants 
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fa^le 8. Igtinalad prodoetioa for soloetod raluts of rosoiupmi 
•errloo* for tltaroe tosoro typot nad %h» rolatod lad«x 





With rssoaroe serrloes Talaed at jll2.^6 
Owner-operators 15.575 91.1^ 
Part-ownsrs 16,1^5 
Toll teaaats 17.09T 100.0 
3 1 Mrtioe valued at #15^011 
OKBer-eperators l8.fT5 91.«® 
Part-ouaers 19.69« 95.3^ 
1^1 teaaats 20.665 100.0 
•Aa opproxlaato toat of the slgalfleanoo of tho li^x Is ndo as 
follovsi 
% m yl ,5 , idioro aad T are tlto esti^tMs of pTOdoolioa Sa tfh V O 
yr 5^0 
fgr teaaats aai the other teaore ^rpee, reqpeetlTeljr. (feaaate* prodaetioa 
(T«) Is assiuwd to he 100 per Mat). ^9 staadard error of the diffitreaoe 
is ahoim ia ippwsdix 0. 
^Sipiifieaatly dlffereat froa 100 per oeat at a prohahlll^ level of 
10 to 20 per oeat. 
Sicnifloaatlar dlffereat froa 100 per oeat at a prohahllity lerel of 
Ho to ^ per oeat. 
S;oa*si4pdfleaat at a prohahlllty level less thaa 50 per Mat. 
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SBallatt 8). OoasoqiMntly, owMr-^^rators thov tap to bo th« laaov 
offieiont: tlio offieione^ isdozoo boiag 91.I por eont asd 91,8 por coat at 
tho difforoat rosoajrao la othor wordt^ owwr^eporatoro aro 91.1 
por ooat aad 91*8 por ooat at offieioat at fall toaaatt at the roapoetlT* 
loTOla of rotouree luptt. Siailarl;^, part-owMra aro $k,k por eont aad 
S3*3 P«r ooat at offieioat at fall toaaatt; hut aro aot at iaofflcioat at 
ewB0r>«psratert. 
fhoto eonelutloat oa rolativo offieloasloa aro tVQ>orfieial: nhoa 
tottod, tho dtpartorot of tho offieioat i»&ox»a froa 100 por ooat of 
aoa-tigalfleaat at prohahility lOTtlt ordlaariljr rogardod om aoot^ptablo. 
fho oaljr ladox that might he aaeopted It that for ovaor-oporatort 91.I 
por eoat» tlaeo tho related t-raluo (fahle 8) it ti^ifloaat at a 
2 prohahllity level of 10 to 20 per ooat. 
Vith &oa«>tlgaifleaat difforoaoet la the ostinfttet and the i^pareat 
aattahle ehaz^etor of the relatioathipt the oxteatioa of thit aodel (tiiq^le 
regrettloa) It aot parttitd la thit ttudy. It it pretased that sore 
BMaaiagfal resoltt eoold have heea ohtaiaod vith lots oarofiaed data. She 
actual relatioaahipt eaa he iaterrcQsted or eoaoealed V (1) ^ hetero-
Seaelty of the area of aaalTtit, (2) aggregatioa of produotioa aad the 
•aluatioa of xetoaree torrlMt, (3) difference hetweea teaoro aad loate 
At a remlaler, thete iadezee are oaleulated at followt: (T • T,_)100. 
So, with retpeot to owaerooperatort, for exa8|)le, 91*1 per coat • 
(15.575 4 ihmnm. 
2 It Bight he noted, honerer, that there it nothing taered ahout algni-
fieaat prohahilitT' levels of 10 per ooat or lett. Aa iadlTl^teukl vith a 
*1^1^ ritk prefereaee* mii^t alto aeoopt the prohahillty of aa eveat 
oeenrriag 5I tiJMt rather thaa 10 tinet oat of 100. 
6^  
ia soale of operations aad (if) the "broaA elassifioation of tonore 
elaesos. 
For th« l&ttsr reason, fall tenants as a gtma^ are not analyzed 
fttrttaer in the saoeeedisg parts of this investigation dealing with the 
seeond and third l:grpotheses about resouree aar^i^LBal rettums end CQstiBRBB 
resooree eoaibiaations—the grot^ is too heterogeneous. Texy little useful 
information vould be obtained froa farther analysie of foil tenants as a 
elass. Xnstead, attention is directed toward the su1)-elasses of livestoek-
share and erc^shars'-eeush tenants. 
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BASIC SCKTASZOSS AHD BSSOOBCB XHFUfS tTSBS m SS7ZHASZ1Q KABSXKAZ. 
mmm ASD mufioss ?a)M "OP7III9M« BSSOOBOI COICIXASIOHS 
Estimates of aargiaal returns to land, labor and oa^it&l ssrrioss and 
ths Aviations of inputs of these resources from the quantities at the 
optianuB coal)inations are obtained fro» the hasic estisating equations (the 
CohTj-Douglas fcmction) derived for each tenure and lease type. Therefore 
the ralues obtained for marginal returns as well as the estlsated optineus 
resource (joantities (hence the deviations from these quantities) are 
dependent to a significant extent tipon the si see of the product ion 
elasticities (regression coefficients) used. In addition, the foregoing 
estimates (as made in this study) also depend xipon the mean values of the 
resources and production observed for each tenure class. Hence, a "brief 
examination of these paraaeters involved in testing the remaining aajor 
operational hypotheses will occiqpy the present chapter in order to form a 
background for Baking sxibsecjuent obserrations and for drawing inferences. 
Production Elasticities and Related Statistics 
the data in Table $ are associated with the estiaatlng eqoation, 
\ \ h 
T m Xg , where refers to land, Xg refers to labor and 
A 
refers to capital services. T denotes the estimated value of production. 
The production elasticities b^, bg and b^ for land, labor and capital 
services, respectively, represent the per cent change in the value of 
fatble $, Begressiea ctosfltaat, proioetioa slastieit.ds and eomil&tloa In&ex of 








Capital Sob of 




O«nsr>operators 1.7795 0.10^ 0.1109* o,«3«i l.osW^ 0.735 
Part-oimers 1.5206 0.^32 O.IU91 0.6719 1.06>I2 0.7«2 
Zdvestoeb-share 
renters 6.»^759 0.2315 o.i«J^5 0.5330 0.676 
07^.share-eadi 
renters 3.H166 0.2937 0.^72 o.H7«2 1.0191 Q.12t 
*fho ••tiaatiae •^foation for ownor-oporators, for oxaqplo, is 
i - 1.T795 j0.19^.vi^.ssn ^ 
t&oro Xj, Xg and r«f»r to land, la'bor and eapital sonrieoB, raapeetivoly. 
^ifforont frtm smro at ths probability lerol of 10 to 20 per cent. All other TaluBs are 
sisaifieaat at pre1»ftl>ilit7 levels of 10 per eent aM less. 
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preduetloa mseeiatcd with a one per eent ohaB£» in the recpeetire reeouree 
ii^ut holding ether things tmehanged. For exuiQ>le, the Um elastieii^, 
r<q[>rssents the per eent inerease in prodoetion asseeiated vith a one 
per eent inorease in the qptantity of land. 
i^art froa the general prohleme of intereorrelation of the independent 
•ariablee that affeet mltiple regression analysis* differenees hetveen 
tenore and leaee types mtssr ariiNi froa (l) the aj^pregation of prodoetion and 
resonree eategories and/or (2) the qoalitj of resouroes esgployed. Henee 
biases say he obtained in the estimates made froa the individoal regreesiens 
if these faetors are not eonsidared.^ 
Tb» aggregation of prodaotion in this studiy into a single oategory is» 
admittedly, undesirable, fhie is so beeaase enterprises are not eoi&ined 
in the asae pTOportions on all faraa. (hi theoretioal gronnds, different 
proportions are ea^eted between texmre aad lease types. Oonsefuently, 
differentials in prodnet prieee may affeet the size of elastioities 
2 
obtained, and henoe adrersely affeet the eoaparability of estimates. It 
is notieeable fable $ that the elastieities for owzusr-operators are not as 
oos|>arable as those obtaiaed for the other tennre aad lease types. As a 
^As aeatioaed prerionsly, the exAlusion of aanageaent as aa independent 
rariable aay also eanse biasest bat l&eae biases aay be eoasidered «ui 
aspects of the general probleas of intereorrelation, probleas of 
reaotirce quality or both. 
different fonetions for erops aad lirestodc would redtuee the biases 
that aay arise, but not eoa^letely sines the crop ooabination end livestecdc 
oombinations aay aluio differ between teaare ead lease types. Siat is, 
apart froa diffeipatials ia priee effects, the plqrsieal response of 
dlffereat prodtutts to siailar reaotirees are aot the atune. 
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aattor of oentrast, a 1 por ooat lacro&to in land rottilt* la a eliaago of 
e&Ijr O.lOSli' por eoat (la prodaetloa) for o«a«r-oporatort a* agaiaot 0.2937 
por eoat (^ator «}aaa doalilod} for orop-ihare-eaoh roators. With roapoet 
to Capital sorrioos tho relatiro ralfUls aro rovortod—tlw olaftloity of 
0.83il- for oimor-<^orator« i« roBarka]>l3r lars»r than that of 0.^782 
er^Mihare<i4iaib rtatoro.^ Oao Bil^t thoa laipoet that thoro as* aoro 
Ma«t», for oao or «ore roaaoas, ia tho olastloitlos o1)taiii8d for owaoxw 
oporatori. idoo It it aot tmlilooly that uaOor ovaor><q^rator«hlp 
aaaasMwat is Boro highly iatoroorrolatod with SOM olonoat included in 
capital torrioot aad so rostilts ia a oooffioiest for oa^ital lar^or %tma 
thoao for the other groope. IHirther, it ia eoaeeiTable that with a 
differeat level of a^gi^l^tioa the aet of elaatioitiea ohtaiaed nomld 
he differeat fron IdHoae ahona ia fable 9. 
SaHM^t for the effeeta of labor qioality, the eauaea for differea^ea ia 
the psvduetioa elaatieitiea ohtaiaed hare aot heea teated—-the foregoiiig 
explaaatioaa aa&TaiiBed are oalj teatatire. Vith regard to lahor, the 
relative aiaea of the elaatieitiea follow to aoae extmt a pattera of aee 
diatrihatioM, prerioualy ahowa la !Ra.hle U aad fig. 1. Where tiie age 
dlatrihutioa ia nore aegatively akeved (owoer^K^ratora} the lahor 
elaatieity (O.U@9) ia anall. Where the age diatribatioa ia nore poai* 
tiveljr atonwd the labor elaatieitiea are larger (0.1845 lireatoek-ahare 
reatere laA 0.^7^ for er<Q>>ahBre-oaBh reatera). fhia ia aot oeaerete 
erideaise of the effeota of labor foialitsr oa the elaatioitiea (or laibor 
him Dfoa of the elaatieitiea for owaer-^qseratora aad erop-ahare-oaah 
reatere are not aigaifieaatly different. 
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prod»siiTiti«t) si&e* otiMrratioaa sagr l)e eoBfiaiii&«d Iqr oth«r faetora. 
iBwvor, to ®ai& forthar iiuil||jhta» ounar-oparatora ar« divi^ad l&to 
t«e afli groegpa'-otl^aa tuadar U5 yaara aad thoaa ovar ^ yaara—»to obaarra If 
thara tof axgt diffaraatieda la the la1»or al&atleitiaa. fha prodaetloa 
al&atleitiaa a»& Mlated atatiatioa for tbaaa two ac* svotipa ara alMna la 
tha folloidag tabla. 
labia 10. lagroaaioa eoaataat, preduotloa alaatleity aad eervalatioa 









Oo^itai Stm of 
X«ad liabor aarTioea elMtieitiea 
(b^) (bg) (b^) (^b^) 
Oorralatioa 
Under ^5 yeara U.0200 0.0919*0.1719^ 0.7351* 0.991® 0.761 
Over ^ yaara 2.6T55 0.2239* 0.0171® 0.e950* 0.93^ 0.913 
*Slgalfie«atljr diffaraat firoa saro at probability larali laas t)iaa 1 
par eaat. 
Higaifieaatly difforaat froa aaro at pro'babili^ 3«v«l of 10 to 20 
par oaat. 
%oa algaifioaat. 
Aa aatioSpatad, it ia ol^aarraibla (Table 10) that tha labor alaatioity 
of 0.1719 for tha older aee of ovaer..operatera ia larger thaa that 
for operatora of O.OI7I. However^ it will be aa«i preaeatly that 
tha dlffaraaee of 0,15^8 is not rary highly aigaifioaat (ia a probability 
aaaaa). Therefore, aoae doubts nig^t be oaat on the validity of tha 
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eoseamiag tli* •ffcett of ag« and labor ^uditjr. I«Tortl»l«8t» 
tl)0 *Boa-sl£BtifieaBt'* dlfftroaoo do«« not doagr lb« posalbilily that th« 
Biarginal rotura to labor is a function of labor gio&lity. That it, th« 
labor alastleitjr b« alBllar in a probability sons*, but ths aargiaal 
rsturns diffsr. 
Signifieanes of D if for sacs« la Production Slastleitias 
Diffsrenos* in ths production slasticitiss for laM and oapltal 
ssrriess ar« hi^^bly signifleant, bat tiioss for labor arc net. ?arti«alar3jr, 
ths sfparsat diffsrtnes la ths labor slastieitlss for emaruopsrators sad 
erop-dMrs-oash rsntsrs is signifieaat ealy at a probsibility Isvsl of 20 
to 50 p*r esat (Xabls 11a). 1%on, too, ths diffarsaes obssrv«d in ths 
slastieitlss of ths two 84^" groops of oimsr-epsrators Is also sigalfloaat 
at a slailar Isvsl of probability (20 to 50 per esat). Eowavar, It eaa bs 
notad (frea ths t-TeCLuss in fablss 11a and lib) that i3a» slastieitlss for 
ths yrmm&tr o«isrM»psrators are probably nors sladlar to thoss of ths othsr 
tssttrs and Isass tj^pe* than the slastieitlss of owasr-opsrators as a smvp. 
fh&t Is, ths slfl^ifloaacs Isrsls for Via dlffsz«ness with owoar-epsrators, 
as a wiiole, are grsatsr than thoss for ths diffsrsacss with ownsr-.opsrators 
of ths youngsr age groiQ). 
Therefore, it would appear that If a£B is adjastsd for (a£e groups 
wlthia saeh taaars elass aads aors ooa^arable thaa la this study) ths 
analysis of rslatlTS sffleisnolss of tsnars elwisss would bs liq^roTad. 
It Is suggsstsd, la othsr words, that if ths saM a«s groups of dlffsrsat 
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fftbl* lift. T&loii* of t for dlfforoaeoi ia prodootion olastieitioo 
botwooa tonoro and la&to typos 
fesaro and loaoo typo 
eoi^«rod 
Taluo of t for difforonoo la 
prodootion olftotiotty 

















livootookoiOiaro roatoro 6.90* 0.27 
Part<-oiaMrt ir«. 
erop-iliare«oa«h roatoro 2.65^ 0.6^ 6.00* 
XdTOotoek^aharo . 
erop«sharo*oa«h roatoro 1.08^ O.H7 0.^ 
*Si|^fleant at a probability IOTOI loss than 0.1 por ooat. 
\i£aifieaat at a probability lov«l of 0.1 to 1 por ooat. 
^SigaifieaBt at a probability IOTOI of 1 to § p*r ooat. 
^igaifioant at a probability IOTOI of 20 to 3^ ooat. 
All other Taluos of t aro aoaF>AI|^fieaat at probability IOTOIB of 
30 por ooat and loss. 
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f&bl* Xl%. Tala«s of t for dlfforeneos la produetloB elatfeieitlos 
Iwtwiaii ovBor-oparatora, aica toidar ^ jraars^ and othar 
taimra and IOMO typaa 
Oparatorship gretqpa eonparad 
Talnai of t for diffaraneat in 
Land Labor Capital aerrleea 
Ow»lr•^}peratora^ ace tusder 
^5 Tt, a|^ over ^ yeara 1.70® 1.09* 0.U3 
Owner-^eratera: age «nder 
H5 va. part-«iRien 2.09^ O.IS O.U7 
Oteoer-^parators: ai^ -ander 
va. llveatoek-ahare 
rentera 1.99^ 0.12 1.50^ 
Owoer-operatorat a^ under 
U5 yeara ra. er^-ahare-
eaah rentera 2.67» 0.59 1.86® 
*Signifleant at a probability laval lata than 1 par oant. 
^Slgnlf leant at a prohahlllty latral of 1 to 5 par eant. 
^Slgnlfloant at a prohahlllty laval of 3 P*^ cant. 
^Slgnlfleaat at a psrahahlllty laval of 10 to 20 par oant. 
*Sl^lfloant at a prohabllity laral of 20 to 3^ per eant. 
Other Taltiaa are aon->aienlfleant at prohahlllty levels of 30 per cent 
or less. 
tenara elaaaea are eoiqpared rather than a oroaaoaeetien aanple of tenant 
elaaaei (dlaregardlBK the afls faetor) more uaefal Inforaatlon should he 
obtained, i^art from the poaslhle effeota of the qualltlea of Ic^r and 
BajiaeeBent, {further eonsldaratlon of "age effeota** la also Ijqgiortant to 
^be extent that the age of an <q>erator la not Independent of the e8|>ital 
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pesitlott of tho fis« aiad work proforoaeot. faotora aro aot poeullar 
to fora of teanro, tet vill affoct tho results if ttey are aot tatoa 
lato aeoouat. 
With the except ion. of livestook^share and crop-share--oash renters it 
ean 1m» ooneltided that each tszmre and lease type le operating oa a different 
"production serf ace", fhls stateaent is l>ased on the logle that if at leauit 
one elasticity differs the surfaees are different, ^erefore the prodoetion 
surfaces for li-restoe]B*share azid crop>share~eash mnters are assumd to he 
the sase since there is most liksly no difference (fiable 11a) hetveen the 
surfaeos of these lease types. Zhas the Inilvldual eetiaatlng equations 
aare pooled in tiie Maimer indicated before, to obtain a eoHBoa eet of 
elasticities (fable 12). 
As pret-iously indicated, dlfferenece between temmi typee In the 
patterns of nurgiaal returns due to differences in resource eoobiaatioas 
alll^t be cancelled differences in the sises of the production 
elasticities. 9o test, aore specifically, the effects of vosouree 
combination the basic estiaatiag a (Rations for each groxxp eostpared aust be 
siailar. Itomver, only the •lasticities froa the pooled regression are 
Bade Idontlcal la this analysis (fe^le 12). The intercepts (regression 
constants) differ for each lease type.^ It le to be noticed that the pro­
duction elasticities of the pooled regression are ahout the average of 
^resuaably a difference in intercepts could be due to product 
eoB^inatlon or asoiagemnt. fhe difference, henever, does not affect 
substantial!^ the **pattern" of resource aargiaal retumsj it does affect 









































































for %Tm iaiiTidttal rtgrevsioa (represented In T&^le 12). 
^e SKsre ia^^iortant o^tserration, however, ooneems tb« relatiTe values 
2 S for the eorrelation Indexes (B -It' ). Ihe variation in prodtietion nader 
livettoek-share aeeotmted for V the pooled recession is only 0.3 per eent 
less than that aoeonnted for the individual regression. Siailarljr, the 
variation under or«p«.share.>eash aooounted for the pooled reip«ssion is 
only 0.1 per eent less, therefore, the aneunt of oonfidenee one oan pla«e 
in the estiaates is not sidftstantially reduoed tiie pooling of ti^e 
individual re^wssiont. On the other hand, the standard errors of the 
estiaates (s^) are increased hy H.7 and 7.3 per eent for livestoelts-diare 
and erop-share.i«ash, respeetively.^ 
Seoaetrie Means of Irodoetion and Eesouree Xii^ts hy Ignore 
and Lease Hlfp** 
Estiaates of aarginal returns presented in the follovis« ehi^ter are 
aade at the geonetric aeans of production and resouroe inputs for eaeh 
tenure and lease type. J41anrise the deviations froa eptiana resource 
eoabinations are aade on the asauaption that these aean resouroe ij^ts 
represent tbs aetual (oheerved) average resouroe eo3ia>Jjiatien. 
Marginal retorzui depend not only upon the sizes of the production 
elasticities hut also upon the levels of resource ii^ts (resouroe ratios 
or eoabinations) at «hieh estiaates are aade. 0iven the produotion 
elasticities, the aarginal returns of lahor, for exaa^le, vill he 
^^is inerease is due in part to the extra (U) degxees of freedoa 
lost hy pooling the estismtes. 
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reXatiT«l7 hi^ If %h» Xaad/labor aad eapitsX/ltilb&r ratios are Oa 
tbe other haad the aargiaal retora to land aad o^pital vill l»e low-~their 
relative values heing depeadeat upoa the laad/eqpital ratio. Sowever, if 
the produetiea elastioities differ hetweea tezrere oX&sses the iafereaees, 
in terms of resource produetiTities, drawn from inter-class differences in 
resouree ratios aagr he sisleadSac.^ Ia offset, the level of OM resoureo 
iaimt affeets the aargiaal prodoetivitjr of other resouroes. Thea too the 
sargiaal prodaetivi^ of a resooroe is not oaljr depeadeat t^a the levels 
of tJM other reseuree isputs hut also depends iQ>oa their elsstieities. la 
esseaee, resouroe aargiaal preduoti-vity eetimates are iaterdepeadeat. 
Siffereaees ia reeouree ratios are therefore vezy roui^ iadiees of differ-
2 
eaees ia resouree orgaaisatioas. 
fhe resouree ratios (9ahle 13) are ia ^e aaia lixat oould he ea^oted. 
Xt is aotieeahle that, ezeept for part-owners with 82 weeks of ldM»r, the 
aeaa foaatities of lahor OB^loyed are quite eoa|)arahle. Sueh siailarities 
ax* fl^pareatljr due to the small variatioa hetweea farms, arisiag froA givea 
^paatities of aerators* aai faniljr X(dDor. (hi the other haad ^ elote 
^or exaapXe, part-owners have a Xaxtd/Xahor ratio of 1556.00 per week 
aad a ee^itaX/X^r ratio of ji^^OO per week that are hii^r thaa the oorre-
i^adiag values of jt<^.00 and jwS.OO for orop-shaj^e-oash reaters (fahXo X3){ 
jret, the aMKTgiaaX return to lahor of ^^.70 under part-owaeriMp is lower 
thaa that of ^.98 uader erop-share-cash leasing, fhis illustration is 
brought out in order to rseogaise that differs noes in resouree eomhiaatioas 
(resource-ratios} majr tN» eouaterhalaaoed V eoq^easatiag diffsreaees ia the 
hMie estiaatiag e^tioas. 
^Oa the other haad, evea if resouroe eoahiaatioas are the same, 
marginal returas %rlLl differ if the hasie estimatiag equatioas are dii.fereat. 
Margiaal returns will he the eame if, aad oaly if, the hasie estiaatiag 
ofoatioas are ideatieal mS. eaoh toaure aad lease t^?* on the average 
operating at the optima, using the same set of resouroe priees as the 
ohoioe oriterioa. 
Talkie 13 • CkJOBMtrie neaae of groee protaetloa aai resooree and reeonree ratios 
%9r tenure aad lease ^rpes and 'bj two a|[e gvaapn of oMier-operators 
Seoaetrie aeaM Seeouree ratios 
feaare aad lease type 
Prodofition 
w 













Owoer-operators 12.697 27,5^ 7« 6,230 352.0 80.0 
Part<-ovBsrs I6»U67 H5.5^ 83 7,«I6 556.0 95.0 5.S 
Li'vestoel&'iQiaM renters 22,936 n 9,566 596.0 1^.0 H.S 
Cr^-share-eash renters 15,105 Hi,906 n 6.517 ^.0 «6^o 6.H 
Owner-operators: efis ttnler 
1»5 17.n^ 27.551 91 «.7^ 303.0 97.0 3.1 
Owner-operators: a^ge over 
^ 10, m 25,9^ 72 5,1S8 360.0 72.0 5.0 
*fhe areas r^reseated 19^ tkese land values as« rva^lf follovs: IH3 aorea for o«aer~ 
operators, 226 afires for part-owners, ISO aeres for llTestoek-share renters, asd IMh aeres for crop-
share-cash renters. 
n 
coi^arisons aay raflaet a makzias* in th« way lalwjr tervieas ara mtaeurad; 
i.a., vith ragaxd to th« atttu^tioa of hoaogoaialj of labor aorvieaa 
a*ployad withla a faro. Henovor with thasa data, differaneas in raaotireo 
ratios should aaia!^ ravolva around tho diffaroneas ia tha foaatitios of 
laad and ei^ital sarvioas usad ia oo»hiaation vith la1»or. fha poasibla 
taBara«>eriaatod soureaa for diffaraaoas ia tha raaourea ratios ara those: 
(1)" lap® rf act ions" in ahare leasing arrangeaents, as non-optiaEox sharing 
of eosts ajsd rettmis, (2) esgpital rationing insofar as it ososas ra> 
striotions in tha faantities of land and/or ea|>ital serviees sn^loyed ia 
relatioa to lahor, axid (3) raatiag as a means of faeilitatiag adjustanats 
towai^ greater foantities of land and capital serriees tiader part* 
ovnership and tha two lease types iMiag aaalysed. On share>rented taxam 
the first and third sourees logically operate ia <^posite direetioast fhe 
first is restriotivs in the use of esgpital serriees; lAile the third 
enahles use of greater faaatities of capital serriees through the triiaring 
of uncertainties and the 4oint oontrihution of landlord and tenant to ths 
total farm assets. Belated to this point is the ohserration (fable 13) 
that owaer-operators sltov tha raallest ^[aantitiea of hoth land and capital 
serriees. 
As would iM) expected tlu» laad/lahor and laad/capital ratios of jt35^*0 
per weak and ^r dollar of capital aarricea, respectirely, uadar 
^Admittedly, the aggzvgation of cs^ital into a sin^^e produetire 
serrice tends to conceal differences between tenure groups in the use 
of specific cs^tital iteas as fertiliser, or inefficiencies In different 
phases of farm operations, ^t is, if cigpital aerrices are broken down 
into aiaehineiy, lirastock (iareststents) or operating capital, etc., o^r 
relationih^s could be rerealed. 
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owMr-eperaterililp a*« saallcr than those tmdar any othor gjroap of 
operators. Ihi* voold sui^st a greater latenslty of use of hoth labor 
ai^ ee^ital with refl|>eet to lan&. The reasoas for this sitoatloa are 
t 
tvofoMt (X) ow3er->operator8 have no fear of disaesoeiatieus of oosts and 
returns and ordiaarily would tend to push the use of resoarees to a farther 
extent thMi wmild operators under tri&are lease contracts{^ hut, (2) with 
capital rationing, the funds a^ailahle aajr he inadeq[uat« to ao^ire nore 
land under owisr-operatorship to he used with the given labor st^ljr. She 
first reason is oendueive to effioieney. She second is not. The latter 
iwy result in ezoess Ic^r in relation to the total stock of fam assets, 
land or capital. Tb» saallest capital/labor of ^80 per week for owner, 
operators would seem to bear out the forei^ing point. 
She data (fable 13) show further that both the aaount of land and the 
aaount of capital serrioes eiq^loyed under owner-operatordiip are less than 
those for ^e other i^ups of famors. In other words, under oieser-
operatorehlp the aaount of land used aagr have been restricted throu^ 
liaitation of funds, th«B the lew land/labor ratio need net he due to the 
incantIT® of ow^r-operators to extend the use of labor serrioes further 
than other groups. 
It seeas si^&ifieant to observe that the i^atest land/labor, «nd 
capital/labor ratios (of per week, and jfil2h.O per week, respectively) 
are associated with farms opeimted under livestook^dwre contracts. Again, 
^An exception is to be reeiQihasiseda renters under cash eontx^ts wetdbi 
be ea^ected to use labor and capital as iatensiveljr as owaer<^erators. 
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thes* ohMrrateloxui vettld eonflna the theories •orroiSBAiBg llveeteek chare 
leatei. la ^ firet plaoe, the effeets of capital ratieaiag are redoeed 
to a "nialmm*. loth laadlord and tenant eoatrilmte to ^ ttsf^isition of 
fara aetets. But, in addition, and in contrast to the uroal orop-share-
eatih eoatraots, the laadlord* e preeeaee la th# fazn opex^tloac siaiaisee 
the restrict ire effeete of exogenous rationing of capital that could he 
otherwiee adversely effeetlTe. Zn teme of laad/eapltal ecnd^iaatlon, the 
valiae of ^.8 per dollar of capital serrleee le also reattxtoihle. Whea 
eei^tared to oimer-eperator' • Talae of |iH.U per dollar, there 1« prohahly 
ao dlfferenee la these ratios. Zt is iss>lied that hoth grofups are eqoallr 
lateaslTS la tihs use of esi)ltal serrloes per talt of laad. Oils asstuBSs 
that i&e laad yalues reported Iqr ovaer->operaton are eoi|>amhle vlth those 
reported hy tenants; tmt that aeed not he the ease, fhere should he x 
teodeaoy for tenants to "aaderralas" the laad th^ operate. 
A oos^arisoa of the laad/es|>ltal ratio of per dollar for 
share-eash tenants aad that of ^.8 per dollar for llYVSte^E-share tenaate 
would sui^st that there is lees os^ital restrietloa uadsr li-restoekoshars 
leasiag. Other thlaes heiag e^(aal, this ohserratioa would possibly Tsriiy 
the ^i^thesis adraneed that the noa-optiana sharing of eosts and returns 
uader erop-share-eash leaslag eauses restrlotioas la the use of oi^ltal 
serrises. In the ease of livestook-share faztts all the eosts of "farl^ls 
capital" are usttally shared aad la the sans proportion-.50 per eeBt«~as the 
Sharing of produets. 
fhe oause for a laad/lahor ratio of per weeJt for erop»i^xe> 
SI 
Cash reat«rc MMilleT tliaB tlial of ^3%*^ wi«k for ll'WstoelD-than 
r»nt«rs &e«B not, how»T«r, eolnsids vlth «h&t !• suggested theoxy. 
Qie intensity of la2>or ^uld 1)0 less if tlie oosts of labor tfre mt Oharod 
proportie&&lie]jr lAih prodaotlon or if ao eoiiwBsateiT aAJ«stneats ste 
proTi&sd for Iqr the sliariag of ol^er oosts. X& other vordSt if tiie share 
teaaAt is aot rewarded for the full nargiaal •alue prodtnet (throtii^ 
sharing of produetioa) of his lahor he is inoliaed to restriot its iis^li-
oation.^ 
She seeming eontradiotion of the foregoing ohserration with thao* 
retical expeotatioas is negated when the land/labor ratios are transforaed 
(fros dollars per week) to aer«s per week, fhe land/labor ratio of 2.H 
aeres per week (fahle IH) for oroposhare-oash is on the eontrazy slig|cl3jr 
greater than that of 2.3 aeres per week for liT«8teok>share renters, fhls 
dlffereaee is, intuitively, negligible | heaoe, it aii^t then he inferred 
that on the average there are really no differeiMses between these leaM 
^^s in lai^labor ooBhiaatioa. 
In snaoaazy, tlLS differenoes observed between tasore sad lease types 
in resowee ratios are largely as would be expected. Vlth lower land/ 
labor and ee^ital/lahor ratio for owner-operators Ukat «argln«l prodaaotiTlty 
of li^r Qan he espeoted to he low, and those returns to land and oapital 
however, ^ diffexwnoes observed eoold well he 4ba» to differmees in 
the pattern of prodaotlon that night (hut need aot) he faaotioaally related, 
to the leasiag axrasge»tnts. It oould also he arg^d that th» assas^tioa 
of hoBogeneity of lahor servioes distort these eon^arlso^t bat it ean ha 
farther observed that errors of this kind are the saoe within each tenure 
olass. 
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IH. l«ad«Xa3>or aM laai-eagsltttl ratios ia t«x«* of aiSrof 
V toaare aad loaso tjrpot 
BASom^ ratios 
fesare aad Xoaso typos Laad l^ad 
laEor e^al 
(ao/nk) (•»]$) 
OwBor-oporatora 1,8 0.023 
Part-ovaar* 2.8 0.02$ 
livosto^c-ahara reatora 2.3 O.OI9 
Crep>8baro-ii>eaah roators Z,% 0.028 
hi|^ rolativa to tltat of lalior. lowor laad/oi^ital ratio would aameaat a 
lowsr aargiaal prodaotlvity of eajiital ia nlatioa to tliat of laad{ liat, 
roaenroo prodaetiTitiaa fiaally dopoad tQ>ea tba relatlre ralsiea of the 
elaatieitiea of produotioit. Ia addition, the auurgiaal produeti-rity of 
lahor for liT«atoelE>share reatora la esi^eeted to he hig^r thaa thoM for 
aJ7 other gro^ partly heoauae of the hi^r laad/lahor aad oi^ital/labor 
ratios. GoarertKily, the aargiaal productivity of laad aad oagpiital should 
he relatively low. But aiaee theae eatiaatea alao depend ^a the effeeta 
of the laad/os^ital ratio, the ooeffioieata of all the reaooreea, aad the 
ooaataat of the basic eatlaatiag equatioa, it will he aeea by the exaal-
aatioa of aargiaal returaa, la ^ aeotioa that oaly tha mtrgiaal retura 
to capital ia relatively lov. that for labor la the hi|M«t of all the 
groi^a. 
«3 
nsxriomoiss OBSSSVU) MMOS. fss FISMSS M MMVSS 
msQmcL sEfoiss 
Oltwt to isMffieitot Mfouree use aoni o^taliwd froa •saadiiatloa of 
aarfiiaal retumt to tach nsoureo, and eoa|)an«oM of tbOM wgtBsX 
rettirns with ths opportxmity costs of the respeotiTe resonroes. Tirst, 
If the ratios of the aarglnal retxim to the "price" of eaeh resource are 
not e^jual for a firm there is evidence of inefficleaojr. fhe lzie<{aall^ 
tra^ieests that production could he ohtained at lower costs If resources are 
suhstituted in favor of that (those) idiich show the highest ratio (ratios). 
Second, if the ratios of aarglnal returns to the resource pj-ioes are 
different froa unity, then It is indloative that soae resource is llai-
tatlonal and could 'be profitahly extended in use. These two clues to 
Inefficient resource UM are predloated the redpeetlve optiaw 
conditions of (l) cost alnlaication for given levels of production and 
(2) aaartaoa net returns froa given quantities of resources coaaltted to 
production. 
!Ihe second condition with *Mch this section of the analysis is 
prlaarily concerned sets the linits to which resources should he extended 
(or contracted) to obtain optlaaa production levels. However, with the 
•pismommn. of increasing or constant returns to the scale of operation 
there are not deterainate optlaaa ^(uantlties of resources if all resources 
ar« the a&alysia to follow iaoBodiatolsr on the 
ieTi&tio&« i^ii opti«» lerelt of production (or optianaa aaeuBtt of all 
resoureee) it lari^ljr of a qaalitatlire eharaeter. 
Zterela of Maxfiaal Batama to Beaouroea 1)7 Tenure aod l«aae fJirpoa 
Marginal retoraa (or ottrgiaal Talue produeta} (fal>le 1^} nean the 
additional retuma per unit of iz^ut if one nore unit of the raaouree 
were afUled at the geoaetrie aeana. Under contejqiorary theoriea outlined 
preTioualy, different le-rala of aarginal retuma, between tonore aad lease 
tTpea, are predicted for theae fondamtntal reaMna: (1) "iq^r feet ions" 
in leaaing arraagaawats, in teraia of coat and product aharing that nd^t 
cause reatrictiona in the uae of aome resources, and (2) ratloidag of 
ce^ital, exigeadered hy tenure relationships that aii^t also cause 
differences ia the use of land and other oc3)ital assets, for these two 
reasons, differences in resource coal>inations (resource-ratios) are 
expected, and should cause ioaw difference in the patterns of jsarginal 
^xci^t f»r livesteck-ahare reaters, increasiag regime to scale is 
observed for all tenure classes. (!!%e sua of the elaaticitiea, fahle 9, 
ia greater than unit/.) Thua a calculated optima of production would he 
infinitely large. If conatant returns to scale preraila the solution also 
hecoKea iadeteralaate, fhua, there ia no optima level of productl4»a idth 
coastant or iaereaiiag returaa unleaa one or aore resource ia hold fixed 
in foaatli^. It awaaa that to obtain an (^tiooJi V TaZTing production 
levels, ^ wm of the ela«ticities of the resoorces varied mat he less 
than unitif. Bat, with a resource fixed in quantity and the use of other 
resources extimded (or contracted) the optiona solution ohtained would he 
aore analogous to that for ^ "short rm". 
Other raamas for exercising caution in finding optiaani levela of 
prodaetion are (1) estiaatea of production reaoved from ^ aeans are 
auhject to larger standard errors, aad (2) there is ^ possiMlity of 
extrapolatloa. 
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Table 15. Marginal return* to reiources at the geonetric aeans of 
pxodastiQB. aaA rosouree ii^ts tenore and loaM tn>** 
Marginal returae 








Owaer^operators 0.(^9 17.96 1.708 
Part-enaers 0.088 29.70 l,kU 
Lirestook-share renters 0.116 5^.79 1.278 
Crep-ahare-eash reatera 0.107 H8.98 1.108 
*The difference# In aeasuresient of the re sour oe categories my present 
a slight proltleii of tatozprvtatlon. Land la aeaeured la tarss of la* 
veetaents and oapltal Is aeasured In terms of resource serrices used tip 
(or "sank"). ISherafore, with respect to owner-operators, for instance, to 
Babe the estimates comparable, the marginal return is U.9 oeats per dollar 
of land lawitoMal (or H.9 per Mat), and 70.8 eaats par dollar of capital 
aerrioes (or 70.8 per cent). The extra dollar associated with the a&rgla&l 
return listed for capital serrices represents yihai has been used up In the 
production process, vdiereas land resources are left for future uses. 
retarat to rateuroea. 
But, as noted before, differences in narginal returns aay arise also 
froB differences between tenure types In the elaetioitles of production 
for fli&llar reaoareas aad not froa raaoarea eoabiaatloaa per te. 19iarefore, 
differences between tenure and lease types in aarginal returns due to 
differences in resource oooblnation cannot well bo isolated unless the 
basic estlBating eRations are siailar for each tenure and lease type. 
Nevertheless, a part of the analysis on marginal returns will proceed with 
SB 
Wm um of the iadiridual (different) egtlaating e(|aatlon> deriTed on the 
preaise that the diffexvat eXaitioities are pecmliar to the tmare elateee. 
Ifexl, coa attea|>t !• aade to iadleate the poeailile effeot* oa the aargiaal 
prodoBtlvit^ eetlaui,tee of differentiaXe ia age distrilmtioa. fiaalXjr, 
differenoee ia narginal returns that eould he attrilmted oore qpeeifioalljr 
to resouree oosfbiaations are analysed.. 
Marginal returas under owaer-operatorshlp 
She rather hi|^ aarginal return of 70.S per oent to OiE^ital serrieee 
under ouner-operatorship (Table I5) suggest that capital servicet is on the 
srerage the liaitiag resource for owner-operators. To increase net returns 
(iaprore the preMat resouz^ organisation), it maas that the use of 
Oi^ital eould he extended profitably uatil the aarginal return efuils (or 
^roai^es) the opportunity ooet (10 per oent) assuaed. At the saae tiae 
the produotiTity of both land and labor (that are now below their opportunity 
eosts of 6.0 per oent and f(lK).00 per tieek, respeetirely) wuld be increased 
by reaoring the liaitational effects of capital serriees. lovever, it flSMt 
be noted that the aargiaal return of per cent for land is not signi­
ficantly different froa the opportuaity cost of 6.0 per ceat; idiile the 
aargiaal return to labor is significantly belov .00 per week (fahle 16} 
fhe present pattern of rewmroe productirities then suggest tiiat 
^fbe significant different between the mtaglsuBl return to labor of 
017.96 and $(H0.00 per week is siq^sedly due ia part to the fact that the 
opportunity coet used (|jlMO.OO) is not uaiversally applicable to all age 
gro^e of owner-operators. Tor operators ia ^e elder age grois^, this cost 
should be less. Itoreover, it will be seen later that younger owners show 
to have a higher aargi^l return for labor that is not si^ficantly 
different froa 0^.00. 
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7a1»lc 16. lB«oare« aarglital r«ttum«»opporti!aity eoat ratios at th« 
gioastrie Maas of rssoureos t«a«m and loaso 
aad ralatod raltMs of t for tho difftroneos of tho ratios 
from tmltj 
leanre and lease type Land Ztabor Oi^ltal 
servlees 
Marginal ratora-opportimltjr eost ratios' 
Oiawr<-oparators 0.S2 0.H5 1.55 
Part-ovaers iM 1.29 
XlTestoek-sihare raatere 1.93 1.36 1.X6 
CrQp-ishaiw->og^ reatera l.T« 1.23 1.01 
Taluss of t for dlffaroaeas of tbo 
ratios froB valtjr 
Cuaer^operators 0.58 1.75^ 5.90^ 
Fart<^>ifnars oMr 2.0«® 
Liv««tock~Bhar8 reaters 2.69* 0.0^ I.OT* 
Orep-dxare^aiiL reatera 2.99^ 0.^ 0.06 
*To oMain t]b.«se ratios tlM "opportunll^ eosts" ar« jl0*06, 
p«r wsok aad jtl.XO for lazid, labor aad eapltal aorrleoa, roapaetlTO]^. 
^Slsalfleaat at a proVaMllty lovol lass thaa 1 par eaat. 
^Slgalflftaat at a prolbablll^ laval of 2 to § par e»at. 
Slgalfleaat at a proValtlllty laval of 3 to 10 par eaat. 
*Slgidfl()aat at a proliablllty laval of oaljr SX) to 30 p«r oaat. 
Gtkar val'oas of t ara noa-sl^&lfloaat at proVaVilltT' lavals of 50 
par eaat or less. 
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ownar-operated farae are in ezoeis of laJ>or and deficit In oe^ital serriees. 
Sis^rfleialljr, land a^^eare alto to he in ezoees, hut at noted, the 
nas^lnal return it not eignifioantly htlov 6.0 per eent«^ On the hatit of 
the aaR»ve ohterratione one ai^t oonoludo that oi^pital rationiae it sort 
operative in restricting the use of capital serriees rather than in 
rettrietins the ute of hoth land and capital terrioet. Zn ettenee, ttui 
findings t^port the hjrpothetli adTanoed in the theoretieal analjtit that 
prior ooBBitamtt to land purohatet fore* rettrietiont in the ut« of 
os^ital terrieet. ffaut, the aaount of ec^ital alloyed fallt short of that 
^ieh would he aott profitable for the aTesafe ovner-operator fara. 
Marginal returm under part-oimerthip 
Xilse o«n«r~<^erator8 the aarginal returna to lahor of 029.70 per 
for pasft-owaert (fable 13) are helov the (qE^rtunity oott of lahor. But it 
it alto notieed (fahle l6) that «bile for o«ner<-operator* lahor return 
wat tignifioantljr different froa jfUo.OO per week, that la xiet the eate for 
part<»oimera—-the difftrenee it noa-signifleant. Hevertheletti the hli^r 
aarglnal retumt to land of 8.8 per cent, and to esqpital strvioet of Ul.S 
per eent, relative to the lower aarglaal return for lahor aogseat that the 
ute of hoth l<smd and/or oapital eoiuld he extended profitably. In other 
I^t aea-algalfieant difftrtaoe, hotiever, doea not l^ply that tht uto 
of laffli It not aifaifieaatly different frm eptiana for tiw preteat level 
of produetioa; the optima eoaditloa recjairet that, ia order to alaialtt 
eotta, the xmtlot of the aarglaal returat to tbs e:^ ortuait7 eottt of e^ 
retouroet he efoal. fherefort, the aarglnal returat need not he ofoal to 
the cost per unit of the retouroes, especially if iaereasiag or constant 
returat to teale are preteat. 
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mxiM, th«r« it exMBs l&bor modor the obsorrod or^^imtioa of roooxtroo*, 
d^fieit la laad ax^ etqaltal sorrleea. To absorb tlio oxsoss labor 
(l2uir«as« its marginal rotuxn ai^ lowsr its eost per ttait of pxvduoticm) 
ths use of eitl^r laM or capital mist be e:]Q)ai3ded. 
fhe "laad^-eost" ratio (7a3)le l6} for part-owMrs iadioates that aotual 
Barglaal return to land is U6.0 per cent above Hie c^portaaitT' eost of laad; 
Itut tlie efl$ital*>eost ratio iadioates that the aarigiaal return to eapital is 
ottljr 2$,0 per eeat abore the opportunity eost of eapital serriees. 
^refore, land appears to be the sore liaitatioaal of the two resouirees 
that are defieit. fhat is* froa the etanf^iat of aaking readjtutaeats, 
e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  u s e  o f  l a n d  a i g ^ t  h e  g l T e a  p r i o r i t j ,  l a  o r d e r  t o  t u e  TOTO 
profitably the labor that is now in exoess.^ It is noted, pareathetieallsr, 
that under owner-operatorship the liaitation to be la the use of 
eapital serriees only, while xuader partMSwoership the liaitations are in 
hoth land and capital serriees. However, it is eoneelvable that there is 
a hotter hatlanee in resouree orgsnisation under part-ownership. That is, 
the defieit in eapital serviees alone for owner-operators may supersede the 
defieit in bo& land and eapital services for part-owners. 
It is soasidiat aurprisiag that faras operated under part-ownership 
should be defieit in the aaounts of land and/or eapital. As ei^ieeted, the 
average fara sise in teras of land (value and aores) is larger than fbat of 
owner-operators (fahle 13); hut evidently not enoo^ for th» aaonat of laher 
^Of eeurse, the pattern of resouree produetivitiMs raggofts another 
l^jrpe of ad^taent: lahor eeald he eoatraoted to the point wbere the 
aarginal return to lahor is eqoal to |H0.00 per week. But the produs-
ti'H.ties of land and eapital and the Imel of produotion would be reduced. 
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(82.0 weeks) need la eosMaatioa vlth it. It i« poesilile ^t the hi«^ 
aaxgizial retain land ^presents a state of transition froa snaller to 
larger tmits. Zt was preTiously stated as an hypothesis that, fer a farm 
of a Kiven size, the marginal return to land should not reauiin suhstantially 
ahore the rental rate or the annual oost of land. Bi^ansion idll take 
plaee so long as there is a differential, as observed in iihiu study, and 
vill sore likely take plaee throu^ renting rather than owaing partly 
heeatUM of rii^ aversion and liadted capital. 80, the findings farther 
suggest that the sarginal return of 8.S per cent for land under part-
ownership Bay not he significantly di^erent froa the "rental rate*. 
Marginal returns uader livestock-share leasing 
^ilike tht infsrenees drawn for the two tenure types (ovMr-operators 
and part-owners), there is no evidence of resource excesses for livestock-
share renters. All the aarginal returns here are ahove the opportunity 
costs of resources. Zt mam that the use of all the resources sight he 
profitably extended. 
Bowev«r, it is noticeable (Table 16) that the return to land is 93*0 
per cent above the "cost" of land (the hii^st of the tenure end lease 
types listed) and substantially above that of per cent for labor and 
16.0 per cent for capital services. Oonse^ently, from tiie standpoint of 
increasing net returns (through increase in production) land is evidently 
the Bost "liaitational" of the three resource categories, rurther the 
aarginal return to land is significantly above its opportunity cost at a 
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probability IOTO I loss Uiaa 1.0 por eont. Tren tho staaj^olat of tli« 
firm the foaatity of land usod tuador liTSstookoiOiaro leasts i^ould he 
extended, provided that tiiie land ralties as ^ted hy tenants are not 
tmderestlmated. She relatively high marginal xetum to land oan he tied 
hadk to the "hi^* oapital/land ratio observed for livestook^shture 
renters.^ 
She marginal return to oapital servioes is what eould he logioall^ 
es^eeted: it is net signifioaatl^ above the opportunity cost of capital* 
The possible reasons for this relatively lower marginal return are as 
follows: (1) there is littls or no iaeentive present in livestoelB>8hare 
leasing throu^ liharing of costs or returns to eatme restrictions in the 
amounts of eapital servioes ei^loyed; (2) the effects of eapital rationing 
are minimized by the joint contribution of landlord and tenants to the total 
farm assets, eo^led with the (diaring of risks of largsr seal* of operations; 
and (3)* the presenee of the landlord in the fan operations dai^ens the 
possiljility of exogenous rationing of iapital that might operate adversely 
under other types of leasing. Although nothing has been said specifically 
of the marginal return to labor (^5^.79 per week) it is iiplied that 
fhere l« no sisourate measure of the rental rate en these farms idnoe 
landlord's returns are not "pore" rent. They include rewards to other 
oontributions made by the landlord. But it is noted, parenthetieall7« that 
the av«]«ge landlord's return amounts to 19.3 louad investasnt, 
a value that is significantly greater than tile marginal return to land of 
11.6 per cent, fhe diffennee is significant at a probability level less 
than 1.0 per cent, but this asstasss no errors in the cstiiate of landlords' 
returns. Zf the errors associated with the calculated value of 19.3 
cent (landlord returns) are considered the level of significanoe would be 
increased. But it can also 1M snggssted that the estimate of the average 
Isoadlord's return is biased iQ>w&rd because of possible undervaluation of 
the land by the tenant. 
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Sfttlottiiig of oipital affootg latbor prodootlTil^ ladireotly. Ibat it, at 
iadioatod ^tfort, %h» hi^r land/labor aaad eapltal/labor ratios rotalt 
ttt hlgjbor naz^siiud rottuna to labor, and the eost of predaiBtio& per tttit 
of la1>or Is redaoed. 
« 
Ma»giaal rettuas toider erm-share^osuih leasii« 
Oa furtlMr iai^eotioa of tbt aarglaal retarae (fable 1^}, it It 
i^areat that the patterae of resouree p:rodaotlTltlet aader Vh» two leate 
typ«B are qpiite analogous, and more la contrast with the productiTitlea 
asder ovaer<^peratoridilp and part-ovaershlp. At la the oate of llvettoofc-
share, aeither the luirglaal retaza to labor sot that to ee^ital serrioes 
for on^-i^hare-eash leases is sigaifioaatly differeat from l^e respeotlTO 
^portaaity eosts attaaed; oaly the aarglaal retajra to land it algaifleiatlsr 
g2«ater. Similar to liveatook-thare, the differeaoe it significant at a 
pxvhahilitT- level lets than 1.0 per oeat.^ 
Pottihly, the ooaeitteatly lower aarglaal returat (to all retoaroea) 
aader ert^-share-eath rertat li-vetteok-damre leatiag ooald he attrlhated 
to one or hoth of (1) laferlor aaaa^aeat and (2) differeat eeahlaatloa of 
eaterpriset for erop>thare->eath teaaate. Shete lafereaMt are hated oa the 
lar^r regrettioa ooattaat ohaerred for ll<rattoek»thaze reatera la n^ite of 
a aaaller aom of the elaatioitiea (7ahle 11). Put ia another vagr: the 
eatiaate of a aarglaal retara la alao depeodeat ti^a the poaitioa (lerel) 
in contrast to livestock-share renters, the caloulated aTeraea 
Isadlord't retara It oaly 10.8 per oeat ( 10.8 eeatt per dollar of IttsA) 
idiioh it aot tigaifloantljr difftreat froa the ettlaated mrglaal retara 
of 10.7 per oeat. 
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of B. aargtBAl pTOdiwtiTitjr etorvo, that it affootod Isjr a eonata&t. fho 
regrosfion eosotaat fonts a part of tho eonstaat of the aaxtgiiial prodoe* 
tivlty ottrre. Siffere&ees in ^e eisses of tho oonetants eould he due to 
differsncee in nanageaent or enterpriee coobination, ia tiev of the 
aaal^ieal iMNdel uiMid ia this stu^T-. 
fhe "lev" margiaal return to capital serrioes ef 10.8 per oeat does 
not coincide with what Is ea^eoted theoretically, fhe alleged non--optis«B 
sh&riag of ^sts Moed returae should reflect Sa a higher aargiaal return 
(relative to owner^operators) for capital serriees, heeaase of restrietl<ms 
ia these resource i^ts.^ But the marginal return to cag^ital is ia closer 
eorrei^esdezuse to tlM "optinn" thaa aay other tenure groc^ analysed. She 
data (fable l6) show idiere ^e aarginal return to capital is a zMgligihle 
1.0 per eeat ahove the opportuaitar eost of cii;>ital serriees. la effeet, it 
i^pears that the isgierfections under erop-share>oash leasing are on ^ 
average ne^^ted Isgr the sharing of uncertainties aad that ec^ital rationiag 
is daa^ned Iqr the jo tat eoatributioas ef landlords aad twawts to i^ie total 
fam assets. 
^o data are arailahle on the way oosta are shared ia relation to 
returas. Bovever, it is unlikely that the M^oritr of farm iacluded trader 
erop>idyare«>ejMilt loMiiag do share costs ia tto same prc^ortioa as produets 
froa different entesprises are shared. On tha other haad« iaeffj^ieaclea 
of individual fax«s nay ^ eouaterhalanced hy efficiencies of others. Tim 
latter stateaent, of couiree, applies to all tenure types» aad net 
particularly to crep->8hare-caah leasing. 
9  ^
Si^iaifleanM of Blff«MnMc Ttsors aad Lsm* f!srp** 
in Marginal Battcrnt 
Iterginal ratama aaing indiyidaal aatlaatiag •auationa 
Ai angi^atad prariousljr, diffaraneaa in Marginal ratums of aiailar 
raaoureac unAar &iffarant tanora and laaaa typaa ara asgpaetad uaing 
aapaTata (indivittial) astiaating aqoationa. Gbaarratioitf on thaaa 
diffaraneaa ara srara ia^ortant from tha staa^oint of traaafarring 
raaooreas from eaa far»>fizv to tlia othar, and laai ii^ortaat from tba 
atandpoint of eos^iaring intrafam ad^natmaata. fhat ia, giTan diffaraat 
aatimatiag aq[Qationa ("prodnotion Ametioaa") toa marginal ratuma vill 
diffar at tlia "optima" avan txudar tha aama sat of prieaa for prodneti-fa 
aarfieaa aa tha ehoioa oritarion. 
HonoTar, (turning to !M»1B 17), tha aignifioaat diffaranoaa ara fav 
aad ara ia (1) marginal raturna to land aad ia (2) tha marginal ratuzaa 
to eapital aarviea* for evnar-oparators varaua tha tvo laaaa Igrpaa.^ All 
tha othar diffaraneaa ara not algnifleant at «eoapta1»la lavala of pxeha-
hilitjr, arhitrarily ehoaan aa 10 par cant or la as. Of partienlar iaport: 
tha marginal ratum to oioiar-oparators' lalwr of oaly ^17*9^ ^ 
diffaraat from tha marginal ratura to la^r tuidar tha tvo laaaa typas at 
prohahilit^ lavals not naualljr aocaptad aa signifleant. Ihis statamaat 
^xoapt for tha tvo diffaraneaa obaarvad In tha margiaad ratuma to 
e«^ital sarrieas (hara in this study) similar findiags vara mada prarioualjr 
whara crop ftoietioas i«ara eonaidarad: only tha marginal raturas to laad 
vara sii^lfieaatljr diffaraat->tha marginal ratuma to labor aM eapital 
sarrieas vara not. Consult: Eaady. Marginal raaourea produetirity aad 
iaputation of diaraa on a seapla of rented farms, loe. eit. p. 503* 
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fable 17. TidtMt ef t for differenee betiMexi teatare ami lease typee 
in augrfisid »tiira.s of siidLlar reeooreee 
TalxMs of t for differenee* i& Baxelii&l rettonu 
femre mA lease e 1 
types ooi^ared X<aad Iiabor s^lMs 
Owi)8r»(^eraters « 
part«-oiin»rs l.Jg^ 0.^7 1,2^ 
OwserHi^raterB YS. . 
liTsstoek-sbare reaters 2.36* l.U^l 1.^7 
Onxser^operators T S .  D A  
erop-shs^e-eash renters 2.20* 1,2^ 2.^* 
Part-oimers vs. . 
liv«Btock~shar« renters 1.1^ 0.79 ^*^3. 
Part*o«atrs vs. . 
erep-share-oasb renters 0.8S> ^.€3 1*29 
XiiT8stoeb»iAiare vs. 
en»p«>sbare-eaih renters 0.3U 0.18 O.Sl 
^Igalfieant at probability level of 1 to § per eent. 
Sifaifi0ant at probability level of 5 10 per eent. 
^Signifioaat at probability level of 10 to 20 per eent. 
^ignifieaat at probability level of 2^ to 3^ per eent. 
Other valses (^ose not noted) are non-sieaifieaat at probabili^ 
levels of 3^^ P^3f eent and less. 
is partiottlarly relevant vith regard to the eoa^arison vith liveatoolc>tiutre 
renters showing auurgiaal return to labor of veek. One aij^t 
th«B eonelttde tlmt the differenoes anticipated in the patterns of resouree 
pz^duetivities under the different tenare elasMS are not deteeted. 
96 
It it litely Hiat ^ aimsigaifieaat diff«r«ao«g ax«, ia part, &»• 
te large variaaMi of tb» nargiaal ratwriM aad would 1>« diff«r«at if 
the %8»ie •Btifflatiag •qu&tions had correlation iadazcs larger than 
tlu^ ar«. On th« etlwr hand it i« prol»abl« tliat tl» fomgeiag difftxwneat 
o'bMrrad in the ttargisal returns to land aad capital would disappear with 
a si^erior sggre^p&tioa of raeouroe oategoriee. There are alio two aer« 
reasons to helieve that these differences aagr not really exist: (l) as 
discussed Ibefore, the coefficients of the ettlBatlng equation for owasr-
operators appear to be "hiased" in the direction to show the differences 
©"bserred and (2) the possible tendency of tenants to "underestiaate" land 
Talues (inputs) in their (footations can also affect the oos^arisons. That 
is, the estioated atean ralues of land for the two lease types mey he saaller 
than they really are in relation to that for the owner-operators, hence 
their (lease types') marginal returns to lend are "oTereatiaated". Since 
the marginal return to a resource is also dependent t^on the levels of 
other resource is^uts it is iieplied that the marginal rettums to coital 
(for the two lease types) are also not exactly coi^aralile to those for 
ovsor-^perfttore.^ 
Marginal returns a« affoetod ty the age factor 
The seening oeincidence of the relationship between age distribution 
(fig. l) and ^ pattern of marginal returns to labor (faftlo 15) should 
not go without so»e eoneat: the age distribution of owner-operators is 
course owner-operators for "erasire purposes" my also tend to 
m^rralv» the land they operato, but this tendency is oetait«rl»alans«d tqr 
the other owners ybx> Bay subject ire ly orerralue the land they own. 
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«er« MgatiTely «k«K«d (a greater proportion of older operators) with the 
Bargiaal retium of to labor lomr than any ottwr group of operators. 
Seeo&d, l&e age dlstrihation of part->omers Is closer to Borml distri-
'bntioa with a hli^r aargiBal retiarn to lahor of ^2$.f0. finally, with 
the a|ee distrllmtioas of the two loase types more positiTsSy- i^wed 
(greater proportioas of youag operators) the Btarsi&al returas are ^^*79 
aad re^E>eetiTely, for livestock-share aad er^-salare-«Mh renters, 
asd are higher ^haa the other grovpo. fhese ohserrations do aot gi-re 
ooi^mte eridesoet hat, ^e geaeral tendenoy for low lahor returns to 
follow segatively sloewed age distrihution is MBO isdicatioa that, on 
the average, labor ^foality—related to older age-~is of SOM iafXttsaae 
ia the pattome of aargiaal retoras. 
fhe figuros oa margiaal returns to labor f»r different age gro^s of 
operators (fsPble IS) are as escpeoted: for the yovmgtr owosr-oporatore, the 
Marginal return is $33*50, and for the older operators the aargiaal retura 
is 02.^. Se-vertheless, the differenee between these ralues is signifioaat 
only at ft ^ to 30 por cent prohabilil^ level. Althoui^ ^s differeaee is 
aot highly significant it does throw 90S» lii^t on the differentials in 
lahor produetivity due to age of operators, fba findings would suggest 
that in tlM eoaparisons of tb» patterns of resource prodaetivities hettfsen 
temire and lease typee the age factor diould he oonsidered further. 
Probably "aanagswnt* has dai^ened the real differenoe stesniag fron the 
9« 
fable 12. Marginal returns to roaooreoa at the geomtrio Mens 
of prodootioa and xvaoweo Si^ta for two ago 
of ownor'-oporator* 
Marginal rottunis to roootufeot 
Cfl^iital 
Itahor aorvleos 
Age gro^B of 
ow»ir*optrators 
m m 
Age, tador H5 year* 0.059 33.50 l.l|«0 
Age, over jreora 0.(^2 2.50 X.H30 
tpjoXi^ of labor.^ 
However, it is notioeahle that the yotmger owners' lerol of marginal 
rettum to labor i«, as eagpeoted, more ooiQiarable with those for the tesare 
elasses that are predoainantly ooaposed of jotrnger farmrs (the lease 
from previous dieeussions, it will be reealled that differences in 
iatereorrelatlon, a&A la resouree aad eatexprise ooablaatioas oaa also 
affeet the levels of resouree prodootiTlty estlaales. Bat, It Is doiditfal 
that (with l&ose data) resouree eoatbiaatioas seriousljr affset the iafereaoes 
drawa on possible differeaees arisiag frea labor fEuallty-. 7irst: the 
aTerags aaeuat of labor used by the younger age groiQ> is ^ater thaa that 
used by the older g^eovcp (91.O re reus 72.0 weeks—fable I3). Shis would 
sai^st a lower nargiaal retura for the youngsr operators, other things 
being eq(aal. Seeoad: the nargiaal return to lia>or for the older grot^ is 
«»ly (a Talus aot sigaifioaat^ diffsreat fto» If eirerythiag, 
ea^^t labor elastieity, is the sane as tltiee for the youagsr groap. 
It is suggested, further, that aore extreaw age grot^s would reveal 
dilfereaoss sharper thaa those of the preseat study. 
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typsf).^ That is, th« diff«rone«s th« marginal rettumi to labor 
for ovQor-oporators as a grocqp, and ths tevo loass typos, althoviih sot 
sigBlfieant, ars groatsr than the oorrtspondiag dlffsrsnoos in ths ostiaatos 
for ^ yotingsr ags groiq> of omers (fablss I7 and 19}. In addition, tlui 
difftrsneos vith ths other aarginal returns are liksvise satallsr. At 
suggested In a previous section, narginal returns can he affected Indirectly 
hy tl» age factor because of tbi quality of ths hoaan agent, cspital 
position and work preferences. Sierefore, the causes for differences 
'tetifeen temure classes need not he entirely tenore-oriented. 
With respect to the analysis of marginal returns u»ier owner* 
operatori^ip (as a grc^), it ms suggssted that owing to the significant 
2 difference between the aarginal return to lahor and the opportunity cost, 
lahor was in esecess. Eowsrer, the corresponding difference is reduced for 
the younger owners and is not significant.^ Of course, this reduction in 
the significance level does not substantially alter the inferences drawn 
previously on resourcs aalallocations under 'owner-cperatorshlp*; it does 
reducs the confidence one can place in statcMnts about the wccess of 
labor or rationing of other resources, fhe readJKxstaents needed in reeouree 
^0 test is Bade on the diffsrences between the aarginal returns to 
labor for ths older owners -rersus the other teasure and lease types. ^ 
inspection of ^ relative values for theM tenure classes the follow!^ 
observations can be aadci (1) the difference with part-owners sltould be 
eignificant at a probability level close to that obtained for young cwMrs 
versus old owners and (2) ths diffsrences with the two lease t^es would 




?8^1« 19. 7altuit of % for difforonoot b«ikw««n ownor-oporaton, 
nador and otlior tonoro grovgpo ia aargiaal 
rotttrat to rosoureos 
^aero groves 6oiq;>arod 
Taluaa of t for dlfforoaeaa 
la warglaal rataraa 
liaad Labor Capital 
aorrloaa 
Oiia»r-4^orei.tora, a^a uiidor va. 
ago oTor ^ yaara 
0.80 1.20^ 0.20 
Ownar-oparatora, aga aadar ^ va. 
part^viMra 0.70 0.12 1.02 
Owoar-^aratora, aga tmdar ^ ra. 
liwatoeiE-aharo roatora 1.31* 0.66 0.«5 
OwD»r-eparatora> aga tuodor va. 
Xi-vaatoeiE-ahaira raatara 1.13* 0.^ 1.50* 
^iigaifieaat at a probability lorol of 10 to 20 por eistt. 
V 
Sigaifieaat at a probability IOTOI of 20 to 3^ por e«at. 
Otitor valnos of t aro Boa»tig&lfleaat at probability lotols of 30 
por ooat or loot. 
two for oi^Bor-i^eratoro, ag* imier yoart, aro la tho taw dirootloa as 
thoRO for ot«aor>c^rators a« a grot^} but thoy would aot bo la tbo nam 
Bagaittutoa oiaeo tbo IOTOIS of marglaal roturjui aro difforoat. 
liarsiaal rotums ao affootod by reaouroo eoablaatloai 
Zt tfaa iadloatod prorioaaly tliat difforeneos la xtox^iaal roturaa dao 
to difforoacoa la rosoareo eomblaatloa ooold bo "vaabad-oat" by difforoaooa 
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Sa proftostloA Alaatioitlat. CoaMfw&tljr, figoret on aftrginwl r«tikn»» 
ol»taia«d vitk a eoBBoen M1> of eXattleitioi for tbo tvo loaoo tTpoo ar« 
«til»tlttad iMlow (faUe 20). 
Altlbrai^ th« absoluto difforeneof in tb* lorols of auffgixial roturna 
ehaa^e id3,«n •tmllar (eoaMoa) olastleitio* are tuiad, thoro ar« ao dfaiaacoa 
from tKa pattaraa of marglaal retnrat obtalaad hy using the laAlfldiaaX 
•lastloitlat. 9h» raturns traAar livatteelc-shara remain eoiuilstentlsr abof 
tJxoee lander orop-iduire-oaeh leases. Renoe the differences in resoaree 
eoaitinatlen (resonree ratios) are not great enough to eaajw different 
patterns of marginal returns. As stMggested in a preTiotut analysis, tlw 
consistently Ixii^r levels of returns U3»der liveetoek-sbare are doe to 
etbsr faotors, prssumaSily (l) manaieement, (2) produot osmlainatioa or (3) 
'both. 
> 
^ foreeoiai; inferenees are dravn althou^ tbe aarglaal returns to 
lasd are signifieantljr different (faille ^), whereas the differeaoe Hetveen 
the estimates using the indiridaal elastieities was not. Only a part of 
the difference oan he attributed to differences in resource eembia&tions. 
On tbe one part, the hi^^r land/lahor ratio of liTesto<^sharv||l596*0/ 
\ 
week -versus J^S^.O/veek) suggeets a lower margimtl return to land for 
livestoek-share renters; vliile on the other part, tixe lover laad/oc^ital 
rati« for liTeetook-share ()^.8/dollar -rersus jlS.H/dollar) saggssts a 
hi^r layod return. Thus, the difference in these resotaree (i^mhiaatieai} 
/ 
operate forees going in opposite direotions. In the final analysis, it 
may be eonolude4 that capital reetrietion on the erop<-ibare-eash farms 
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9iAl« 20. Marginal rsttiras losiag ooanoa pro&aetioa 
for two leas® types at their own geoaetrlo Mass, and 
-values of t for their difforemes 
2«ase typs LalK>r Q^ital 
serrioes 
Marginal returns using eoasnoa 
elastieities 
m $1^ m 
Xiivestook^share maters 0.135 1.205 
0rop>«hare«>eash renters 0.099 V^.32 1.165 
Marginal returns using individual 
elMtioitiee 
livestoeb-i^aare renters 0.116 5U.79 i.2r« 
Orcp-share^owi^ renters O.IOT ^.9i i.io« 
Item 7aluos of t for difftrenoes ia yotunui 
Miu^iaal rettums using 
««anioa elastieitUs 1.90® 0.96^ 0.22® 
Marginal retw&s using 
Individual elastieities 0.3^® o.i«® 0.61® 
^igaifloaat at proliability lerel of 5 to 10 per Mat. 
^Sigaifii^t only at pro1»at>ility level of 50 to Ho per eeat. 
%oa-8i£aifioaiit at pro1»a1>ilit7 levels lees t&aa ^ per eeat. 
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(liightr ImaA/oiE^ital or lov«r esgpltal/laad ratio) is tlis aor« desinaat 
foree iaflueaeing tbs diffsrsaos ia margiaal rettims to land, fhat is, 
tho groator aaenat of capital usod 1);^ livestoelc-shars renters aeootmts 
for bilker aargiaal Talue pmduot of land. 
^e ^rpotbesis that capital ratioaing or imperfections in leasing 
anwageaiats cause restrictions in the tue of ciqpital serriiaHi would he 
ccnfiraed "by the foregoing conclusion. But that coaclusion is sahject 
to a djualifieatlont product comhination and aaaagenent asgr also 
influenced the differences ia aargiaal retuziis. When the effect of the 
regressioa constant (intercept) is removed, the narginal return to land 
for liTestock-share leases reduces to 11.1 per cent as collared to 13.5 
per cent (fedile 20). If tiie 11.1 per cent is coii^ared vith the siarginal 
return of 9*9 ^^t fto crop-share>caSh tiie differeace is it9t 
•igaificaat at prohahility levels less than 30 per cent. Turther, since 
the differences in aargiaal returns to lahor and capital are not sig­
nificant (either vith or without the effect of the regression constant 
re!m>ved) it is doubtful that the patterns of marginal rettems are affected 
hjr differences in resource coahination under the two lease tTpes. 
lOU 
XS1I7Z0X2KGZSS GBSmTSD IS fSIH$ Of tSmUtlGSS fBQIf 
QPflKOM HBSOI710S OOMBXSASZOirS 
flM pr«e«diiig aoaly'sit en narginsl rsfturas vas oonMrntd priaarily 
viih dtpartun* ftm Um op%imm of rooottreot that «o«ld 'b* 
asaeeiatod with iaeroaios or dooroaaos la th« lovolt of prodtiotloa. Ia 
othor words, dopartaros froa the eoadltloa iA»r» aargiaal retoras woald 
•<|aal (or a^proaeh) the ^tportaaltsr eosts of the reepeetlve reeoarees, 
were aaal7»>^ foalltatlveljr. for reaeoas already stated, ao ladleatioa 
was gliraa of the ({aaatltles of resouroe exeessea or deficit a to aehleTe 
Vbe ^tlans level of prodoctloa. fboa efforts are directed toward 
fEiaatltatlte eptlsBn aolutloae where prodoctloa la held fixed at the 
geoaetrlo aeaas of prodaetloa for each teaure aad leaae 
la thla aaalysls, predaetloa Is held flomd aad resoarees are 
st&etltnted aatll the xmtlos of aarglaal retaxa to the ej^ortaalty oost 
of the reapectltre resource are e^pcial>-eo8ts of prodaotloa are aooordlaip^ 
alaial«id. She ^tlsnm resmrce coBblaatioas (or alalann cost coahlaatloa) 
are detemlaed aader the '^coet" aesuB^tloas as before t 6.0 per ceat for 
lead, fll^.OO per week for lahor aad 10.0 ceat for ce^ltal aerrlMe.^ 
fhas, the caleolated reeoarce ^(jtuaitltlea at the cptlaaa cooiblaatloaa are, 
posalhle llaltatloa la the solatloa la that all the reaouroes are 
not aeaeured siallarly. Urns, while ^0.06 is actually used for land in 
the calculatloas, the e«caat of ^1.10 Is, used for capital serrloee. fhe 
extra (l) dollar for capital senrices represeats the resource aerrlces 
''used while laad reaalas tor future uses. 
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mr«t atteorftttly, tHuAi the maa mtoure* la^t* thetdA lucrt bma ia ordtr 
to achiare tbs sdniBRua eoit attalnabl* at tha maa raluas of prodaotion, 
granting th« batio Mtlaating •guatlons used and th« "ooit" lUi•tuitions. 
In dateradnlng th« optlnn rotourco combination own«r-op«rator•, at 
a ttSioIo, aro dareppod for two roaaom: (l) ao aotod boforo, titioro aro, 
•iQ^pooodljr, Boro biasos ia tlio prodaetioa olaftleitloo for thit toaaro 
elM« and (S) tlw ^pporttmity eoat aiwn^tioa of ^^.00 por vtole for looker 
it logloallar iaiqpplieable. Siaso thio ero«3> is ooaotitutod of a hXi^ 
proportion of older operators the opportunity cost would be, Bost likely, 
lower than jJHO.OO, if the as solution of j^^.OO for the otbor groups has 
any validity. Con*eq[Qently, only the younger age group of owner-operators 
is eonsidored in this section of the analysis. 
Deriations from OptiBoa He source Combinations by foaxuro 
and Xoaso f||rpo 
From the findings (Table 21), the younger ovner«^erators are the 
most efficient, idten oos^ared with the other tenure and lease types—the 
avorago dovlatjtoa froa wialaBM ooot boiag jt325 or 2.^ por eoat. On tho 
other extreme, crop~share->oa8h renters are shown to bo the least efficient 
with the corresponding dOTiatlon amounting to or k,J por cent. Of 
course, while crop-share-cash renters show the greatest deriation from 
eost percentagewise, part-owners show the greatest deviation in 
absolute terms of As might hare been expected, 1 ire stock-share 
renters are more similar to owner-operators; their average deviation is 
or 3.3 per eoat. It is doubtful, however, that the seeming 
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falil* 21. "OptInn" Mwvro* eoift>iiiatioB, and dariatiea* of actual 
r»«ourc« ooBblaatloa froa th» "optiBoa" at the geoawtrlc 
BOaaa of production for oaoh toaaro and loaoo type 
Xto» 




Arera^ derlatlon of astaal 
fTOa "optlaoa" eoablaatloa 
iaooat Per eeat 
X««a& (jt) 
liabor (lA;) 
Capital •ezTleea (jf) 






Owaer-oporatom afo aaAor ^5 













Ciqpltal aenrleea {$) 




















Gi^ital flerrleee (jl) 




















*Land tarrlcet are rained ao U^.5 P«3f oeat of the total aarkot raliM 
of laai eod la^r •orri.ooo at ^M).00 per week. 
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knragit dttiatioa of afitaaX 
from '(qstianas" ooii^lBalloa 
iJBOVali Per eoat 
laad {^) 
ILaHbov (Hie) 
Oi^ital ••rrieof (^) 



















diffoToaeot la atarago dOTlatloas or lovsls of offloloacQr aro clfialfieaat la 
a pro'baltlll%7 foaao.^ Mom proaooMod dlfftroasof aro o^forrod lajr •xaal'* 
aatloa of tk« dOTlatloas laqpoot to Qwelfie rotoasrao eatogerioi. 
IN>vlatloiMi •aadar owwy^oparaioythip 
for oimerH>p«7a%on (yoimgor ago grocp) tbe ladloatleaa aro daflelt 
la ea^ltal sorrleot aad oxBoasas la both laad aad laltoz'. It la tba oalj 
groi^ tliat alkoiia aa axoaaa of }i^,658 la tte qfoaatlty of laad aaadad to 
^latarpratod la a dlffaraat vajr: enaar-oparatora, a^ tmdar H^5 jroara, 
am 97.H pa* oaat a^Tlolaatt llvaatocflc-al^jpa roatara f6.7 eaati part-
owaara 95.7 par eaat; aad orofKaharaHUMdx raatara 95.3 par eaat, fha 
dlffaraaoaa iMtnaaa tbaaa "afflelaaiar ladleaa" ara aoat lUoaly aoa. 
al^lfleaat. Tha taamii aad laaaa tjrpoa ax* "afoallT" laafflelaat. 
2X)g 
tin optlMw eoaliiaatloa. At th« MM TIM, %h» gfoap •ho^ aa 
«XM»8 Of la^or of nooks. ISms, ia ovdsr to iiqsroTO rosovroo 
alloeatioB, load teeA lalsor i^tO-A INI sulistitatod with oaqpital soirrioos 
of ^1»005 <10.3 por eoat) tho iproatost dofieit ia eapital of aXl the 
toaoro gxm^»» 
As oatliaed la the theoretioal analysis, oas oaa eipeet owaer-
operators, oa the average to 1»o liaited ia lead, capital serrioes or hoth 
ia relatioa to lfli»or due to ois^ital ratioaiag. So, prior oonitMats ia 
laud parohases have presoaahly caused a rostriotioa ia the aaooat of 
capital needed to opexate the givea guaatitj of lahor (aot aeeessariljf 
land) nore effioieatljr. fhs excess lead of is oaljr fl^roxiaately 
^ i^ree. therefore, the greatest substitutioa tmder oirasr-operatership 
is dii^laoeiaeat of la3>or per ceat.^ Vhilo the excess Isfttor aad 
eapital deficit aagr he crucial, the excess of 2U acres is iataitiTslj aot 
so, siiMse the nalad^aatMat ia acres espied could he ia part teapora]7. 
Deyiatioas uader part'»ow»ership 
Xa the previous aaalysis oa SArgiaal returas (as related to optinm 
productioa XeveXs) uader part-ownership, it was suegested that Xaad ms 
aore Xiaitatioaal thaa capitaX serrices. Ooiacideat with that sugesstioa 
are ohsenratioas idsero product ioa is held fi»)d asod the resou^roe sorrices 
hb» excess lahor for owaer>operators (aad part-owners) caa he 
idMtified, perhai>s, with the geaeral belief that "there ie too wmSk 
Xahor ia agricultura*. So it shoulA he aoted that, oa the average, 
hetweea 20 aad 2$ per oeat of the total labor reported is froa the 
^>erator' s faailgr. Heace oaljr a part of ia>e excesses ohserved oouXd 
really- lie attributed "uaderea^loTaeat". 
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eX9 stxbatitut^d: to achieve a wcqjerior resource ooabloatloa, aa iiusrease 
la land of I6.7 per Mat (^9,l66 or H5 aer«t} it ladieatcd as a«aiatt aa 
t^raase la es^ltal •arrleaa of oaly h»k par eaat (^361). Both laad aad 
Capital serrlcei are euhstituted for labor, resuitlag ia 33 weeks of 
"dltplaoadi' labor, aa aaoaat that is 66 par eaat fraatar th&a the eptlna 
foaatity rsfalrad for tiia ohaerrad prodoetlon. 
OaBAralisfttloas on the raasoaa for the dSTlatloas froa optiaum aadar 
piart-^vaarship are aad« dlfflealt slaea part>oi«B6rs as a gmxp eoastltata 
aa adadxtura of taaora arraaeowats. Bat, the pattara of rasoarea 
ori^lz&tloa is aost likely iafluaaoad a»re ^ the tsanre ral&tloashlps 
that are aora "pradealaaat" vlthia the gr^ap. So, slaea 80.0 par eaat of 
the part<^>«Bars aaalyMd are uadar share eoatraets ndiHa oa]y ^.0 par eaat 
h&va tai^ laasas, thsra are reasoas to hallSTa that share laaslag halag 
pradoadiaaat has axartad aore lafloaBea. Ia addltloa, the ^trt*o«aars 
aaalyzad ara mere Ilka fall ovasr-eperaters thaa thay are fall taaaat* 
operators.^ fbarafera, to the axtrat that eapltal ratleaias is oparatlfa, 
ownorahlp it is eTidenced hy restrictions placed oa the capital services 
la relation to labor, slallar to ovnar-^raters, age aa&ar years, la 
spite of the lialtatloas la tryiae to gaaaralise oa part'-oioars as a taaora 
^Of the 76 part«eiimers aaalysad, Ul (or ^ par eaat) ova aost of 
land operated (i.e., eaeh o«ns aore thaa ^ per o«at); idbiile 3I (er Hi per 
eaat) rent B»st of ^ laad operated (i.e., eaeh reats aore thaa 50 per 
Mat). (!£he ot^r k part-^wisrs or 3 per eeat 01m aad reat eecoal ^paaatitiee 
of land). fhos, uslag the proportion of laad ovaed aad rented as a 
erlterioa, the aajori^ of part-ovaers (Hi) are aore like "fall ewMrs" 
(ewaiag oa the averafe 69 P*' *M&t of the laad operated aad a aiaerlty (31) 
are sore like "full tenants" (renting on the average 6H per cent of the 
laad operated). 
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d«fieits la oe^ital and land v»rt not «xp«oted slae* part-
owMrs AT* iuraall7 ]W|^urd»d a* balng saosfi tha Iwttar oaaa^rs, aad la 
a mn favorable Oapital position with erodit available. 3hit afiaia* a 
part of the oalalloeatioas eoald he tei^rasy. 
Peviattens tader livestoelp»share leasing 
Mveetooloshare renters like part<-ovnBrs are also dwrt oa laad. But 
the defieit of ^19*35^ (7^ aores) or 2^.7 per oent is greater. Xa farther 
eoatrast to part-owners (aad oimers also), llvestoek-share reaters shov aa 
ex»eas of eapital servlees—lZ.O per eeat of the optima gnaatity. Eense, 
aost of the read^taeat of resources that is suggested for livestoek-share 
leases is suhstitutloa of laad la favor of si^ital services, fhis is so 
siaee the iefieit of 1 wsek lahor xaay he i^ored. la sluirt, t&ese 
ohservatioas indicate that for the given level of prodaetioa under 
livestock-share leasing aore lai^ aad less ci^ital should he twed to 
a£^ev« aa optlmm. It is likely that "uadervalaatlohi" of laad prodactlvi^ 
(due to "ia^rfect kaowledge") could have caosed reetrictions la the use of 
laad, thus resultiag la the •ohstltutioa of capital services for laad. l«tl 
as suggested before, the restriction observed here in the aaouat of laad 
eould also he related to the "loiH* estimates given (hjr the teaaats) for 
the values of the laad li^uts. 
Xf the aalallocatioas observed were ia teras of land-labor or labor* 
Ce^ital substitutioas aore plausible esqplaaatioas eould be advaaced. for 
ezai^le, if the recrgaaizatloa needed iiere laad for labor servioee, the 
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Infcrencs eotald 'bo drawn that landlords are In a bettor bargain lag position 
tfeim tonaati.^ fhat is, loadlordt would ^ naxlaizia^ tbo aargiaal rotanw 
to laM and aiaialKing tho aargiaal roturai to tenants* contribution in 
labor. But, siaeo aore laad sad la1»or (to a saall dsgroo) aad less 
eapital serrioes should Itsvo l>eea used suoh aa l^otliesis woold "be deialed. 
fbea too, "both laadlords and toaaats (uadsr livostoeto-share leases) aaloe 
eoatrilmtioBs to ths qaaati^ of capital serrioes used. Iberefore, the 
laadlord would defeating Ms personal ends by aafcing ooatributions ia 
Capital to the extent that the aargiaal return to labor is not aiaiBixed 
2 
and that capital is excessive. 
Beviatioas under erop-sharo'^oash leasing 
fhe deriatioas froa "optima" resouroe eoabinatioa under or<9-^imre-
eash leasing are siailar to t&ose under liTOStoek-share leasing, with a 
ainor exertion: orop-share-oash renters re<juire an additioaal 1 week (or 
1.3 por oent) of labor while lirestook-share renters eu^t to haw* used 1 
Also, if aost of tho substitution had taken plaoe 1^ labor ia favor 
of os^ital serrioes, the eonelusion oould be that & preaiioi is placed on 
ndniatzing irksom fara operations or leisure tiae. 
liqrpethesis probably oould be tested also by holding oapital fixsd 
at the ipoaetrie aeaa and thea observe ths pattern of needed read^tasate. 
froa inspection of the aarginal return-opportunity cost ratios (fable 1^) 
it i^pears &at laaad would be sabstituted for labor: aarginal returns 
to land are $^,0 per oent above the opportunity oost aad that for labor only 
36.0 per cent. 7e obtain e^iiality of these percentages land would have to 
be eshstituted for labor. But as discussed before, the hi|^ aargiaal 
retwn to laad is due in part to the os^pital/land ratio ("low" land/ 
capital). laadlords* contributions also aeoount for the sise of this ratio. 
But the ratio oan also be affected by the walue plaoed on the land ia^t. 
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w«ek Xsfs. Ac rasfiaBtAd in th» analysis en liT«ttoek-ahaM matars, this 
diff«reae« a vssk (plus or aisoji} Is nsglisiltlo. SSBM, the asedtd 
reorganisation of resources, as in livestock-share, is predoaiaantly land 
in faror of capital services. The quantity of land used should he ^17,869 
(7^ acres) TO re—a deviation froa optiama of .30.1 per cent vhile capital 
senrices should he increased by $1,2J2 or 2H.3 per cent. 
fhe inferences drawn on the possible canses for deviations under 
livestock-share leases are ee(aally as applicable to orop-ehare~o«8h, 
since the pattern of deviations is similar. However, further to that 
analysis (on livestock-share), one could have predicted that capital 
services would he lisited in relation to land on the premise that 
"is5)erfections'' in cost sharing and exogenous rationing faced hy crop-
share-cash renters should cause restrictions in the amount of capital used. 
The Jj^roveaents in resource use (toward the optlsous) would then he in favor 
of capital services instead of land. Therefore the findings would lead one 
to suspect that exogenous rationing of capital and leasing iaperfections 
are relatively unia^ortant for reasons advanced before—the joint contri­
bution of landlords and tenants to the total farm assets daa^ns the 
adverse effects of leasing "ii^erfections". But no definite conclusion 
can be drawn on the effects of imperfections in the sharing of costs 
between landlords and tenants! (l) the kind of restrictions in resource 
use that are likely to emerge are In connection with more specific capital 
items that are covered up in the aggregation of capital services and (2) 
the reorganiaation suggested by the findings may be biased due to the value 
placed on land. 
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Signiflcaac* of Dlffereno«8 ia Dsriations and Marginal 
BBtoraa at th« OptiBft 
At th« pr«fs«at tlm ao dlraet tast for the differeacHit iMitiMta t^aar* 
aad l«aM typ** ia areraise dsviatioa* tro» alaiawai eotta is aTailable. At 
aa altaraative to a diroet teat of gigaifieaaoo, the "eoaaletea^ of the 
diffareaee ia deTiatieat ie teeted for two leaee typee oaly.^ More 
precisely, the deviatioas froat optiann reeoorce ooaibiaatioaB are ealealated 
for llveatoek-iihare aad er^>-ahare->ei^h reatera uslag the ooeffieieata of 
the pooled regreaaioa. fhea the reeultiag eatixatea are ooapared with 
those using the iadiTldval eoeffioieata. 
Sarpriaiagly, with a sli^t (non-signifioant) change in the estimating 
eqaatio&B, the net derlation (average redaetloa ia costs) tinder crop-share-
cash leasing la 2.U per eeat and aaaller thaa that for llveatock-ahare of 
6.1 per eeat (Tahle 22). With aaoh a shift ia the devlatioa ^laea 
ohtalaed, it ia douhtfal that the dlffereaoe k.f (ll-veetoolc-ahare} veraaa 
3.3 per cent (crop-share-cash) obtained preylously by aaiag IMividtial 
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ooeffieieata ia aigaifioaat. "3^ i^plloatioas, the other differeaeea ia 
the deviatioaa are likeviae preaased to he aoa^aigaifieaat, ia a prob»-
billty sense, since a slight ehaage la the egoat ion aegr reverse the 
poaitioas of the temre aad leaae types ia term of relative effioieae^r. 
"eoaaiateaey" ia a»aat: whether the differei»ea ia average 
deviatioaa tem Biaiawn eoata remia ia the aam relatioa (algehraieally), 
mSL not neeeaaarily ia the aam aagaltade. 
^ile the dlreetloaa (or patteraa) of aahatltutioa with reapeot to 
the iadlvldaal reaoaroe eategoriea reaaia the aam, it ia aotieeahle 
(7s^le 21 aad ?ahle 22} that the nagaitadea of the ohEuoflsa differ. 
Ilk 
fable 22. "Optifflcutt" rtsouroe ooaliination and deTl&tlons of aotual 
resourco oonbiaatloti from tbo "optlnraa* at the gooaotrlo 
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*2«a& MTVloaa ara Talaad at H.5 par eaat of tha total aaxkat Talaa of 
laaA oad IsJoor aarrieaa at ^.00 par waak. 
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To gain worn idea of the signifieanoc of the deriatione of the actual 
resonroe lapitt (geometric aeane) from their optlxoB qtumtities, aarglBal 
rettime at the optino* combination are con^ared with urgtnal returne 
oheerved at the geoaetrlo aeane. It it asstiaed that if the difference in 
Bsarginal returne of at least one reeource it signifieant, then the deri-
atioas are sigaiflea&t. 
"She results (Table 23) re-real that the Bore significant differencee 
are in the margixial returns to land for the two lease types. Again one 
cotdd be raspieious of the -valtie reported by the tenants for the land 
ii^ts. Alth&agh resotiree deficits and ezoetset are ohstrved for dwatr-
operators and part-owners, at probability lerele lees than yo per cent of 
the differences in the leyels of marginal returns are not significant, fhe 
low significance levels for owner-operators probably coincide with the 
obserration that owner-operators are the least inefficient of the tenure 
grot^qjs. But the significance of the differences for part-owners is 
pex^iaps in conflict with the obsenrations on the magnitudes of the dSTi-
at ions. The test of significance s^plied would stiggest that part-owners 
on balance are closer to the optima than livestock-share renters althou^ 
their reduction in costs is greater. But as pointed out before, the 
differences in reduction la costs are most probably not significant. 
As obserired, the extent of resource reallocation under each tenure 
class is evidently unia^ortant—it is not "substantially* different from 
•ero. In the first place, the average reductions in cost especially 
percentagewise are "small". In the second place, marginal returns at 
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faSile 23 • ifvtglkaal V9twr&* at tba eptiana :ro«oux«t oott'biaatioas 
aai valiMt of t for tha AlffaraaMs with warglnal 
rotanui at th« geeaotrio mtoM 




rataxM at Iba ^tiana 
^ / « f c  $/$ 
Ovsar-oparatora! aga aadar 0»0T2 H6.22 1.329 
Fart-ewMrs 0.073 1.350 
Lit^atoelc-abara matars o.on 5^.29 
8rop»a(liLara«^aA. vaatara 0.0T5 H9.63 1.377 
Taliaaa of t tmr Aiffazwaeaa nith 
tba aHvegiBal ratunui at tha 
gaeiMtaric Mas* 
0«Bar««paratortt ag* 'oadar >4^ 0.33* 0.6^^ 0.92® 
PartHBuaart 0.9«® o.if o.)^^3^ 
Miwtttoolc-aliara yaatars i,wf 0.0^ 1.2«^ 
eropHihara*«ia)[Ai vaatara l.«2* 0.03^ 
'^ll^ifteaat at a pxe^al^lllty Xorol of 5 10 p«r ea&t. 
^Siipalfieaat at a probability loval of 10 to ptr east. 
^Sigaifieaat at a probabilitr larel of 50 to ^ por eaat. 
^oo^liptif ioaat at probability IotoIa loaa tbaa 90 p«r eaat. 
UT 
opttM. V a&& lares, m% aignlfleaaliljr dlffarenifc txo* tboM 
d'bMrptd. fhia «lt«atioa tlMa raise* the q|Q0*tio&; that eltfasr no 
real aeoaoaie pro'bless exist for the hron& tonore elaaeot or the netlbods 
asd data usad are i&ada^ta for dotaetiac tba iBaffioianaiaa prasaat. 
AM ai^^haaisad 1»afora, there are emditiaa ia the aaalTtiaal Bodala uaad 
aad thaa rooa for iiBi^roTaMats. Oa the othar hsaaid, wilihia tiia 'broad taanra 
olaaaaa the beterogenelty of tenure oharaetariatiea eould hare eancelled 
the iaeffieieaelaa (If any) preeent. Bjowerer, the diffareaeaa in the 
pattaraa of dariatioaa (V teaora olaaaaa) la taraa of resoaree aseaaaaa 
and deficits should iaply that the hro&d tenure elassas represent different 
SproMaa sittutioaa" for fatara ixujalxgr. 
lis 
smmsx ASS gosovisjgss 
Th» pin»>l«Bis d«lisit«d for tiilt studjr larolv* offoett of tii* 
i9mx9 stat^ of farm eporator* vpon offieionti roooureo alleeatloii within, 
aa agrieulteral fira. Tb» offoota «or« oxsailiMid vaMr oii&«r-<^0rator*, 
part-omaro and fall toaaatt as toaare ^oa, and undor Ittcttoek-aham 
aad er^-diar«-eaida reatars aa !«&•• typaa. 
Witli tto of 19^ dftta oibtaiaod fxoa a sample of faxwi» 
iaasMidialo oltijoetlToa of th« study wsro twofold: (1) to fturthor aiploro 
singl® ofoatloa aodalt as aaaus for estiaatiog and collar log sffioioxkcgr 
in rssouroe urn within farms ops rated under different temure elassifi-
eations; aad conjointly, (2) to gain farther insights into the relation­
ships between the tenure status of farm operators aad the use and 
prodaetiTities of resoureas eB^loyad la Iowa aad aorthan Illiaola, tha 
luma froB idiieh data vara o1»taiaed. 
HSn^thaaas Taatad aad to he fastad I'orthar 
It was posed a» a central hypothesis that if production decisions are 
eoaditloaad to aay sigaifloaat aztaat hy taxnura elaasaa aaalysad thaa 
fbara idiould he diffamaeas hetwaan thase elassas (as popalatiotts) ia tha 
pattaras of zaseuzea alloeatioa. Move spaoifieally, thzwa aajor opar-
atioaal hypotbsaas wan uaad to dlraet the avpirieal phaaaa of tha iKraatl-
gatioa. Briafly, tha hypothaaas foraolatad ii»»a thase t 
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1. Oalpnt-li^ut faaetioas SVOM prod«etloa %o groat 
rotoweo Mxrieot wliMa a produetioa yoar aart 
affoetod iQr toanwi atatat, tboirafora they Aoald diffor Twtwaoa 
{MSaPiealttural flraw aeoordiag to %h» tasare of the oparator. 
2. If rtaouireo orgaaiaatloa la eoaditloaiad V tha %mmx9 atatua of 
fam 4^x>aton, tharo idtould Im diffaroaeoa rofXaoiad ia thiO 
pattoraa of aaxglaal rataraa to roaooreoa oa^l^d. 
3. fomro status tluioratiealljr i%«dfts tte a^ovoaaat optiorun 
Toaooyeo allooatloa: hextes, it eaa ho prodioted that thoro are 
donroapoaiias difforaaooa la dorlatloaa of aetnal rosoaroo 
eoa&taatioa, wlthla tho farm, froa optima eodilaatloa ef 
rosotiress for giren lerels of production. 
Uo tost tho foregoing hypotheses, oatiaatlag ofnatloaa wore derired 
fmm the data for eaeh teaaro sod leaae tjrpe veli^ted leaat aijaasea. 
9a first Iqrpetheala was teated thmaeh a aliq^le regreaaioa nodel, 
T » 4> pX 4> c , «here T Mfora to the gntu prodoetiea la 4U>llara, and X 
rofera to gross raaeittreo aorrleea, aXao la dollars, fha aeeoad and third 
hypotheses «re tested through a aaltlple regression so del, log T « log |i. 
4* > log X. 4> leg c , jrleldlag faaetloaa of the Gehh-j&oaglaa ^e. 
TO * * 
fhe three reaoioroe oategerlea (X^) were laad la dollars, lahor la weelca 
aad e(ii>ltal aerrloes la dollars. As la 1^ ala^le regreaaloa sodel, T 
deaotet gross prodaetiea la dollars. 
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of hypothtsls So. 1, about gyrmgi ggo^t output'-togittfc ylfttlomridgi 
I 
Wvm tbMi aaaljrvio doali&e with tMi bgpi>otl«»fi«, it v»f obtoartod that 
tboM aro ao ileaifleaat difforonsof ia tbo ootinatod groot «f«ra«o o«li|mt-
ii^t (rtgrootion) eooffieiont for tho tomuro 4grp«t~oimir-oporatort, part* 
omaom led foil toaaato. fbt diffOMaoo botwooa tbo tvo lo«ura tTpoo-livo-
•to^ abaro aad er^abaro-oadi roat«ra—i« tigaifieaat bat tbo x«l«tioB>» 
idiipa app*ax to bo imatablo. It ims la a toaoo •uzprioiag to oboonro tb«l 
liTO«toeh>-du»e bad aa ou^^t-lapat eooffleioat (of \<,2Zyi) i&ieh 1« 
•Bailor than that of orop-tharo-caah rontora (of 1.4^1); bat oao pootlblo 
oa^laMtioa aay bo fotmd in the larger avorago soale of oporationt tmdor 
livoitock aharo laaalog. 
loaolta igiow, fortlMr, that at tw difforoat lorola of jgproas rotooreo 
laipiati ovaor-opomtors (tbo loaat offleloat) avo 91.1 aad $1.8 por ooat ai 
offleloat 9M fall toaaato lAo aro the awat offioioat. Bat agaia, nboa tbo 
"iadleoa of eoq^aratlvo offioiwutgr" aM toatod, tholr difforoaoot aro aot 
il^ifloaat at probability lovolo ordlaarilsr eoaoidorod ao aioeopta^lo. 
fho fladiago pooo tbo fbHowiag barpotboooo for fortkor tostiags (1) 
that ia outpat-lspat rolatloaoblpa thoro aro groator iatra/^toaaro elaso 
Tarlatloas tbaa thoro aro botwooa tbo toaaro olaiaoo aaal^atd} (2) that 
•tx«tiflOatioa of the obaorvatioae by aa appropriate orltorioa of ooala 
^ratloaa nboald yield aero aoaaiagfal rooolts. HioweTor, it la roeogaioed 
that, aaoagot other faetora, the aggrogatioa prodootioa ao veil at tbe 
Talttatioa of reooBroe oorviooo ooold have affected the eo^[>arablllty of 
121 
fonfitieiu obtalxkNl. 
g»«t ef hypothsBsig So. 2, ahoat patf iras of atfglnal twfoxm 
analjrBlt with rospoet to this li^^thoalf was priaarlly eoi&e«ni»d 
with examination of tha lovola of marginal rotuma and thair eoa^aritons 
with tha oi^rtnnity eo»t of %Tm raspaotlT* ZNiaonreas a* eluoB to 
iiMffielont raaonrea naa. Qia aaRnsMd opporttmltsr ooata of 6.0 par oant 
for land, par waak for lahor and 10.0 par eant for ea|>ital aarrieaa 
Mt the llaita to iMeh raaoaroaa should ha axtan&ad (or oontraetad) to 
obtain optiseai lavala of prodnotion. 
In relatjU>n to tha opportunity eosts aesnaad, the sarginal retnm 
lahor per wiek) is low, and tha laargittal return to o«|)ital serrioea 
(70.6 per eent) is high for the owner-operators. The aargiftal Talua prodnot 
ef laad (H.9 per eent) ie not aigaifieantlsr helov tha oi^rtunltsr coats. 
fSto fiadini^ weiiM sopport the hjrpotheais that rationing of oa^ital, on the 
average, eauaes resooroe aalalloeation uadar o«ner<-operatorahip. Sfans, 
raeource allocation could he iaproTOd with the use of mora capital sarricas. 
Aoeordiagljr, ttm produetiTities of hoth lend and lahor nould 1m iaereased. 
Iswnrer, other findlnga enggest that part of the lover prodaetivity ef laiher 
toider owner-operaton^ip ai^^t he attributed to the inferior faality of 
la}»r, to tha extant that age is aagativaly eorralated with li^r faali^: 
Touni^r owner-operatora ahow a Marginal return to lahor of {^33* 50 p«r week 
as eoB^arad to per weak for older ow&era. But tha a-rideiwe obtained 
is not eoneluslTe sinee the diffOrenoe is not significant aid other factors 
can confound laia analysis. 
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With re«p«ct to part-own«r8, only tha aarglnal r^tttrn to labor (jS29.70 
p«r wttok) Is r«latiT«ly low, luggosting exo««8 labor as In th« eas« of 
owner-operators. But, unllks tb« rstum for ownor-opsrators, th« l«v*l 
of marginal return for part-owners is not signifioantly below the oppor­
tunity ooBt assuaed. Howerer, to absorb the exeess labor either land or 
eepital serrioes (or both) could be extended in use, with priority glren 
to land. But, aay suggestions attei^tlng to explain the pattern of aarglnal 
returns under part-owaershlp would be hazardous, since the gronp constitutes 
a eongloaeration of tenure arrangaaents. 
Unlike the Inferences drawn for owner-operators and part-owners, no 
eridenoe of resource excesses is given froa the lerel of aarglnal returns 
for llTestook-share renters. All resources here say be profitably extended 
In use. But, neither the narginal return to labor (^5^.79 per week) nor the 
aarglnal return to capital eerrices (27.8 per oent) is signifioantly abore 
the as suaed resource "prices". Only the marginal return to land (11.6 per 
oent) i« si^ifieaatly different. The foregoing resource prodaotlTity 
estimates under llTestock-share leases eould be reasonably expected. Ihe 
greater quantity of capital serrioes employed results in a "low" aarglnal 
return to capital. Turther, the higher aarglnal return to both land and 
labor eould be due to the high land/capital and labor/capital ratios 
observed for thie lease type. But it ie suspected that the estiaates for 
livestock-share as well as crop-share-oash renters are not ooaparable with 
those of the tenore types because of "errors" possible in aeasureaent of 
the land inputs. 
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Uid»v ih« patt«r& of r«c<mxe« prod^tlTitiAS 
i« m9% aaftlogtmB to that naisr liv0«toel&.shaxw lAaMs. Ihat Is, only tte 
Barglaal rsturn to land (10.7 per cent) Is relatirelcr But the levels 
of a*rginftl retoma for crop-share-cash leases are consistently lower than 
those tmder livestoek-share. It is proposed as a forthsr hypothesis, that 
this consistent differential stems fro® one or a eosbiaation of (1) 
inferior oana^aent end (2) different ooabination of enterprises (prodoots) 
for erep«>^«re>eRSh renters. 
On the other hand, the aarginal returns to lahor (jSUg.98 p«r wsek) and 
to eapital serrioes (lO.S per cent) for crop-share-cash renters are in 
oloser eorrespendsncs with the opportunity costs assooed than are the 
estimates of any other tenure classes. One sight then pose the hypothesis 
that the "is^jerfections" generated ^ leasing arran^ieusntB are, on ths 
ayerage, negated hy the sharing of uncertainties, and that capital rationing 
is oireuBTented "by %lm Joint contribution of landlords axiA tenants to the 
total fars asBets. 
Contrary to expectations, the significant differences between tenure 
and lease types in the levels of aargiiusd Talue products are few. These 
are In (l) the aarginal returns to land and (2) the marginal returns to 
capital serrices for owner-operators rereus the two lease types. But, 
for one or aore reasons, one would suspect that there are "blMes" in the 
coefficients of the baslo estinating equation for owoer-operators end the 
Taluation of resources. If these biases are reduced, the differences 
obserred would probably disappear. As deduoed under the previous hypothesis 
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(le.l} &oa«-aigaifiea&t difftrene** eould 'be doe to too groat a Tariatlon 
in rotooroe use within the tenure Glasses. 
Beat of hypothoolt Ho. 3t aboat aoytatloa* fvem optiaBUi rotoropoo eoi^laatloaMi 
la %h» aaalyals gaidod this ]^n>otho«ls« sa atto^pt wao aiado to 
estimate the degree to idilch optlasua resource ooBhlnation was atiiieTed 
hy each tenure class at its own aean value of production, SeTiations froa 
the optima (alalwuB-eoet eoahinations) were obtaiuBd for eaoh tenure and 
lease type under the sane cost assuaptions as in hypothesis Bo. 2. 
Consecjuently, owner-operators as a whole were dropped, partly 1>ecease the 
opportunity cost of jtUo.OO per week was considered inexplicable. Instead, 
only the youn^r age grotqp of owner-operators was analyzed. 
According to the findings, the younger owners are the loost efficient 
^en eoB^ared with the other texcare classes—t}»i arera^ deriatloa froa 
wialanw cost being or 2.5 per cent. On the other SKtreme, crop-share-
oash renters are shown to be the least efficient with the correspondlag 
dariatioa aaounting to ^50® or h,1 par coat. As It alght hare b«aa es^aeted 
lifestook-share renters are HOre siailar to owner-operators: their arerage 
deri&tlon is ^7^ or 3.3 per cent. It is doubtful, howerer, that the differ­
ences in deriations—levels of efficiency—are significant. Again, the 
findings invite doubts that the traditional classifieatien of tenure groups 
by owner-operatorshlp and methods of rental payment, are different (in the 
afigregata) ia aie&iavias agricultural efficiency. 
With regard to deviations from the optlaa in the (juantltles of 
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Msoture*, oaly Him ewa«r--opormtor elauii It in. txettt of land. At ea^etod 
from tle» analyals ta»&«r itypothotit lo. 2, hoth part-otiatrt and o«n»r> 
ep<n«tort to h&rm mtod lots l^or and noro ei^ltal to aekitTO 
optiana ^^aaatltlot, (hmor-^ratort thov tho groatott dtfieit of all 
tcmxro elattot in. ei^ltal torrieot aad this fortbor tiq^rtt to aa oztttit, 
tht l^pothBtit oa ea3>ltal rottrletioat tmdtr oimor-oporatoribiii. fbo tvo 
loato typot are tho nost offleient In tho uto of labor sorrloet, bat aro 
excess lye in capital senrlces. Although it it recognized that &eso 
•stiaatot eonild havo hooa effected 1iqr the values used for the lead laimts, 
the fiadlags uader the two leate typos oast forthor doohts that leatlog 
"ia^oirfoetloat", oa tho average, oauso restrictloas la the ate of ot^tital 
sorriees. 
Svaluatloa of the Analytical Modols and Sata liTtod 
Admittedly, both the analytical aodels aad the data used in this 
9isv&y have woahaottos aad coald ho nore reflaod. Mr oxa:BQ>le, soparato 
faaotloas for crops aad llvottock vould prohahly yield noro fraltfol 
results. Also, the resource categories could be expanded since laaplag 
of Capital sorrlcos eeaooalt the tmy la uhloh nore spoolfle ospltal Itoat 
are uted. Shoa, too, labor sorvlcet n&ould he aore aoooratoly atatorod 
la torsi of tmokt of aaa o^iaitalwrili aad land la tomt of "hoaogtaooai" 
aorot. Turl&er, for tho tiagtlo regression medol, ttratlfleatloa of 
farmi hy aa s^roprlate erltorioa oa tealo of oporatloat M vtll at 
an improved raluatloa of resource serrices wuld fulte likely reduce tbs 
126 
tuutable eharoAttr of th« rvlatloBshipB o'bsexred la tlila ttwljr. Flaally, 
the data ms«d do aot roproM&t a tra« randoa saa^ le of fanui withia tho 
8«l«et«d toimm elas»««. a^o el&saea ere alao "groi^ a of faraa* ttiat 
follow goograiMe eluatora. Thaa traaaitoxgr pliOBoaaaa sash aa waatbar 
aad laitial ooaaarratioa dooiaioaa that aro lilcaly to iatorforo with tha 
oatlmatoa sight have distorted the true eoapaxi-tonm. Ia essence, a aero 
hoaoeoaooaa aroa of aaalyala ia aooeaaary ia ordor to aS&IMio tlas poaaihlo 
offoota of the forogeiag faotora. 
Beoognlsis^  possible errors ia the specification of the aodels and 
data aaod, OTidoaeoa froa the throe Ijgn^ othoaoa toatod atill anfigaat tliat, 
ia toraa of roaoturao aao, the iatra-teaaro claaa •ariatioaa are prohahly 
greater than those •ariatioaa between classes. Ivoa with rofiaoaoata of 
the aodola and the data, aa aoiigeatod, it ia aaapootod that farther 
analysis of the traditional tenare classes tmold not show signifieaat 
difforoaoea ia reaoarce aae. Ia additioa» the aaall Talaos (aot "aig-
aifieaatS^ r" difforoat froa zero) ohtaiaed for VbM doriatioaa froa optiaaa 
roaoaroo eoabiaatioaa, av^ ggoat that the iMffieioaeioa aro prohahlgr vaahod 
out vithia the broad toaore elaasoa. a^o ooaelaaioaa are aot «Broa«»ui%lo 
la light of the heterogeneity of tenure charaoterlsties and arraageaoats 
vithia a toaoro els«a that oea affoot predaetioa ^ eiaioaa ia difforoat 
ways. Such a situation points towards orienting aaaXytloal aodels designed 
to iMlate the apoeiflo oharaotoristioa aad arrajageaeata of teoore that aro 
eoad-uaive to or ia^ iodo effioioaey ia reaoaroo allooatioa. 
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Sluplt regg»»«lon •eAtl and the data 
fha recolta frea tMa aodal appaar to T>e mraliaSila. But, part of 
th» nealaxaaaaa eeuld poaaibly 'ba raoo-vad if ^ c«ggaatioaa ngA» praricmaly 
ara fellowad. If tlia raa«lta ol>taiiiad froa atteh fmiBtioaa are plsnallila, 
the regression lines oould be assnaed to represent "noraal" returns for 
each teimre grotip. Further, individual residual obserrations (eases), aagr 
around mm raluea of production end resouree serriees, oould 1»e 
eaeaainad to ebaarre if speoifio teaure (^araeteriatioa (or arraageaents) 
oould account for any part of the deviations froa normal returns. These 
aegfttive iadividml otiservatioas oould thea 'b* reproeraaaad^iaprore 
rasouree or^pmisation. 
fhe a^vs exteasioa of the aodel would require a hoaoesaeous type of 
faradag area, fhen, too, as suggestsd before, stratification of obssr-
vatioas oa the hasia of aise of Easiness with iadiridoal e<|Batioas for eaoh 
stsiitm shoaaa iaprove the estinates. It is reoogaised that oos^arisoM of 
gross average output-iaiput coeffioieate aad the iadioes of eoqparative 
effieieac^ are roo^ iadioators of relative effioieaagr. But with exteasioa 
of the aodel, incorporating the case study approach, the aodel aight serve 
in detecting t entire-oriented reasons (if any) for deviations froa aaxiaaa 
produotioa for gXron levels of gross rasouree iuimts. 
ttttltiple regression aodel aad the data 
la spite of the weaknasMs of this aodel it is prestaMd that its use 
eaa he extended sahjeet to refiaeaanta Ilka those already aentioned. 
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iTidAEUMi points tovaxd tho aoed for rowiriag tho offoets of factors 
that are not associated with tennre per so. fheoretioalljr fastors saeh 
as laJior ^ality, aeaagerial ability, capital position of tibe fim aad 
work prefsrenoes affeet resonrce use and prodnotlTity estimates and are 
isiportant to the extent that thejr are fonetionalljr related idth the age 
of fara operators. Althon^ net oonorete, the findiags indioate that 
ad^stmnts for "a|pi effeote" asre ia|)ortant. In this eonneetien a 
mltiple eoTarianee nodel wonld ^te liksljr 1>e fittiag for the analysis. 
Or an analysis of variance aodel using a two criteria elasaification (age 
and tenore) eonld 1»e explored to detect ame and teanre effeeta on the 
pattern of aargiaal returns. 
Bat still, it is not apparent that the effeeta of q^cifie teanre 
c^bajra^teristics can he isolated thnmgh the foMgoing oodels, since wii^ln 
each tenare«aga grotip different tenure arz«»geMnta say at ill generate 
forces going in opposite directions, for ezaaple, the incentiTOs of on 
eneoBbered oiaier-operator need not he the ease as those of an wencuaibered. 
Also the effects of non-optianui coat-aharing arrangenenta nay he offset hy 
the ahariag of nnoertaintiea nnder i^hare contracts. Thos ths results a«y 
still he eonfmuided. Xt is then suggested that further analyais attea^ting 
to Isolate th» effects of tesore arrangeaents should focus attention on 
spec if io texmrs arrangeaents and Oharacteristics thenselves, using the 
conTontional tenor® olaesifieation only as an initial derioe. If 
estinatiag options are used for thie pozpose, it vonld of aeceesity 
entail a relatirely large san^le of a teaure or lease type that could he 
broken down into "cells" of ade^coate si sea, based tqpon the tenare 
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iltharaeterlBtie* or arr&Bgesoatfl to 1>9 ooatrollod. 
In aaktag cttBh aBalydOS, attoatloa gliould !>• feemMd alto oa tho 
•ffoets of ««a33re arjnuigoiatatt v^a (1) rotouret een'blBati<mt sad iatoaillgr 
of rteewreo um, aaA (2) eoaMaatloa of oatorpritot or prodsott. It aatt 
IMI rtoognieod, howrrer, that the effect• of resource oombioatlon oa the 
Xofolt of awrgiaal roiorat eaanot aaalymd tpooifloallj wllh thla ao&ol^ 
the Oohh-Douglaa typ® ftmotlon utiag separate estinatlng e^tloat for each 
tenare oXa«t»-«al«it the oooffieieatt aro identical. Marginal rolnuaa are 
affected not only hy resource eoiabiaatioat (ratios) Trat also Tegr the hatie 
estimating equations used, further, it is doubtful that the effects of 
teasre arrangeaents on produet combination can he treated adecjuately with 
the Cohh-Douglas function.^ A certain level of aggregation of production 
it »ie«ttAX7. 
SvidoatXy, a rii^rout aaaXytit of fara teimre offieioa^ It he set 
with maegr unsolved difficulties. In addition to the abore aentloned 
analytical problems, a (joettioa to be resolved concerns the identification 
of the tenure-oriented part of the deviations froa optlana even under more 
"well defined" tenure classes. Besource readjustnents do not aictually take 
place in continwms changes, Imt instead by lua^jy as step-l^y-step changes. 
Therefore, part of the resource excesses and deficits ohtorvod la this 
st-udy could have been "transitory*. Coupled with this tjaestion are the 
^ottil^ly "1»al^tiag'' of toae fona woold !>• more eppz^riato, roeog-
aiztag that as a sodel it does not estloate existing relationships (os^Xaiat 
or predicts); it is a planning device, for the usefulness of linear pro­
graming, see: W. B. foiassaiat. Two erapirleal teelaai^t appXl6a3»lt to 
land tenure research: linear prograoaing and single eqpation aodels. Jour, 
fasna Seoa. 37»135?^13^3. »#«. 1955; Kottks, op. cit. 
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aspaots of Int^rteagporal meturc* allooation (ev«r two or sore prodaotlos 
year8 or Intenrali) that wore i&dieated in the th«or«tloal axsalysls Imt 
z*estain to Tw iiiT«itigat«d farther. 
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Prlo«s Used and the Weighting of Hegreteions 
Prteee ufd 
ill fiftltuia ««r« o1»%aiii«d dlreotly froo the reqpoBd«sti •xo«pt for erep 
produetlon eji4 llTestook iav»atox7. fhe prioet used to eetinate tbt valtM 
of the pligrsieal ^foaatltiee r^rtod are glTOn l^lov. 
Prleee ueod to valu* erop prodoiotlon^ 
Xtott trait Prices 
lOWfc Illinois 
"1 
Cera 1ms. 1.32 1.3« 
Oats n O.fe 0.67 
SejrIMaas n 2.% 2.57 
Wbeat n i.oe 1.10 
Sarli^ N 1.00 1.05 
Ba0ki^at a o.go o.€o 
flax N 3.10 3.10 
Gom silags toas 11.00 11.50 
Com lu»g(pBd %as. 1.00 1.00 
Eiqr toas 11.00 16.00 
flmotfar M*d Ills. o.ao 0.22 
Olorer and alfalfa seeds H 0.50 0.^ 
Br(a» SAsd 9 0.25 0.26 
Olover « 0.57 0.9^ 
^Soturee: Caloulated fvea data la U. S. B^t. A«r. 4griealttural 
Kazlcetiag Serrioe. i^icmltvufal priees. 19^ and 1995* PMSIS. 
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Pyjew ua»d to ralv» llv«gtook layeatorle*^ 
Eoge 
Oowi, 2 TOoTf gad eror 













Welgfetiag of yt^roMioae 
Slae« the data used are from ol^terratlone stratified "bj "farm sise^-^ 
elaeses 1, 2» aad 3'^vith different sttsplSag proportioas I/8, l/U rad 1, 
reapeetiTsljr, q^lied to eaeh class, to olitaia ual^iased estimates of ^ 
regression constants and ooeffieieats the momsnts used are Minted. 
fto M»mts of variatioa aood eorariatien (eorreeted sums of scfaares 
and cross products of the varialsles) are calculated separately for the 3 
ELASMS of faras around tli» iadiridual class BSSAS. Qiese ralues are thea 
follows! class 1 farms - •> 8/13, class 2 farms — Wg • U/13 and class 
1 fams •> 1/13. Qiat is, denoting as the weS^t for the h-th 
class, !ai M 1, 2, aad 3, the wiights are such that 
h » 1 
love-ver, to six^lify the cesinitatioas, i.e., to avoid veiefhtiag 
(Baltiplyiae) hgr fsractioas the plain intereers of 8, k and 1 are used 
as weij^ts to arrive at the same solution, Ems, 
^Source: tT. S. Dept. Age. Agrieoltural IferkAtiag Serrlee. ]:>i-««ato<^ 
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3 
1 - 1  
\ ^ *ih 
(2) tho mXigBAoA eorroetoA maw of eroof preftoets 
3 \ 
" ZH *1» 2Z^Vj^li • 
h » 1 i - 1 
(3) th« wtiijhtod awano of tho rariaibloo 
3 3 
> \ > *lh 
h « 1 1 » 1 
« M II- .11 II III! I .11 .1 I.I II • I I 
3 
ZZ"h»h 
h « 1 
la offoet, ifbo giwa of t^ittaros aad produets are nei^ted to naki tlM 
data represeatatiTe of the popnlatloa. fhat is, if the sample were 
Ms^letely xwadoai, there vonld h«re heea 8 tines as aaay elass 1 ohser-
•atioas aad H tims as aaaar elaas 2 ohserratlona ia relatioa to the ma^r 
of ohMrratioas oa elass 3 fams. 
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AEPSroiX B 
Marginal 7alu« Product Iqoation and Solution TTtod 
for Optifflo* R«»oure# CoaMs&tion 
PorlvatloB of aaagtaal valuo pgodoct •qfaatlom 
(HT«n the basie ••ttBatlag ofOAtioa 
the marginal return to reaoxirce X^, for instanoe, is ofoal to 
•ST/ ^ ^ ^  *3 ' 
*1 *2 
"A ^ *3 
— 
StdMitltutis^ •(fOAtion (1) lato (2) 
A 
SOB0O the £OB«ral oiiaatioa for aargiaal ralue prodoot ^oeoaes 
Xa ^ pfttMat •ioM all tha aaz^lljaal xelmRui ara aatlmtad 
• m 
at tha eaoMtrlo aa8&a> T • Y and tlia Tha.% la, at tha 
geometric mm* 
tDT/ ax. • b, 1-
I 
i k )  
Selutlen uaaA fey optiw reaourea eoaflbtnatton 
9o oMaia tlw eptimn eoaibiaatio& of raaotureaa for oaeh taanra olasa 
the goal ia to e^laTa tha a^^^aalitjrt 
vliara prod-oetioa. la bald fixed at tha gaeaatrie aaaa. fShat ia, tha aarglBal 
•alu* prodaet (ratora)—^ortmi^ oeat ratio* ara aada a^aal for tha 
raaoureaa—laad (d), la3)or (l) and capital aarrieaa (c). Xa tha ooa^ju-
t at ions, tha actaal Taluaa used for the "opportunity costs* ara « }k).06, 
P^ • jl^.OO aad P^ •* ^1.10. (aa iadieatad ia ^ taxt tha 'aztra* 1 dollar 
for the 'opportuaitjr eoata" of oe^ital rapraaaata rasotireaa "tisad of 
aaiOc). 




%h» •fEUklity to iM aohiovod. In othor torw, ii 
h t / h x  
-?I ^ Tj 
0k 
idioro T « 7. Or, frea tho proeodlag o^uatioa (H) asd tbe as>a»»d rosonroo 
•prleoa", 
»2T/IJ VJT/X, _ 
^' ' ' • " ••' • " '* ft"' '*' • X J (2) 
n ^2 ^3 
th« tKBleaoifao iMiag the ralmoB to ho determined for that rtprocoat the 
"fl^t^Unoi* ^foaatitio* 
Trea •^(Wtioa (2),  doritv ^Xj'QX^ • !•»#• 
SV^h - - § *1 " ^ - 4 • "» »»> 
5xj/3ij  .  Pj/Pg -  ^  ij .  ij -  i j  (3*) 
Satetitntiim ogoatioas (5a} aad (51>) Into a^caatioa (l), iMldiag I at 7* 
fti^rotsas the Vatie •stiaatlaig oqcoatloa la torot of X^. Riat It, 
T -
aad soIto for (the optinw q^uuatity) la logarlthM at 
lig . las - Tigla(P^/Pg * - V^la(P^/y^ » <5) 
1 + ^2 + 
SiiA»titai« iato ih« liatle •q^tlon (T • T) aa& it eaa 1m •«•& tliat 
Xg . (f/ajJ ^) 2 2 (6) 
L.t (f/tS^ \ m It 
/, XBK« « {l/T»2)<laT. laa) - (7) 
From (6) etxA tlie respect ire opporttmlty eettt attsatd: 
-(W^j, + X) 
m -yitgnx^ 3 » Pj/Pg 
©y la « 1/(1 + la<^^ K«) . taA (8) 
la Xj • la X« - la (9) 
%e eoiqpiutatieBAl prooedore iaTelves ^e iite of tfoatioat (5)« (7)* (8) 
and (9) la teqaenee. Sue deriatlons from the optimua reeonree foaatltiet 
are X^ . , " ^ Marginal rettira-epportimlty eottt ratio, at tlie 
optimii, eoiretpoitdB to the ooastant, E, iadleated ia e^tloa (2). Sht 
^Beeall that tisoe la T - laa » the CH»qpnpitatioat are 
8li#.tl7 redueed givea the latter. 
1U3 
oei^iatldiui tow aoeerdlagly, and alto lijr ntbciltatiae t&» 
"optlBsm" Taluj»» T>*ok into th« original •<{aation to obtain T. 
HfSKSlX 0 
Statistles 9«*d for ftstlBg Sif^rAiuMif 
E«tlaat»« frea th» tlapl* rtgwulon aod»l 
3^tt for dtff»yno(i« in r»gr»»8ioa coafflcAeatt. fte ua«d 
if 
t . !ll2i£ . 
\ 
^of thi sii^Mripts j a&d k d«aot« th« two tesnra classes ooapared. Tbs 
stasodazd ovror of the difference, si^ , is eijaal to 
•p Vv^ 
. . L Z/ J. i&ere e^ « -x , a pooled 
y 
'7~ » » - 6 *  
t « 1 
standard error of the regression estimate. In the efoatioa, f » the 
imsber of teaore classes ooa^ared (pooled), « the BuAer of o^mnv 
•atimis in tho t-th tenore elass, * the BBUstber of rarialtles tiaes 
the aoBher of fans classes (i.e., 2 x 3). fhe valtuss for f (faotor) axe 
xH5 
9l>taia»& ftt 
fsotor It eale«l&t«d for taoh ttsort elatt. ffat Tultuit art 
8, 14- and 1 for the three classes (aiitt) of faras and represents the 
txQjaber ef ohterratloat ia thie h»th fara elatt. 
for dlfftrtnott in tht ^iadloet of eoagaratly tffleitnoy." Simi» 
larly, the ttailtlie uted it 
A A 
ulttre the tiAteripte i aad k are at t>efore>*th« teanre clatttt. fha 
ttaxidard trror it 
"V'>A" ' 
iA»r®, t^ /J « t^ (| + ^ J 2^ ). M»4 
J ® 4 2.*^ 
3 
f « » 13 
"~T~" T 
fhe ralue for it the gross reso-oroe input frc» vhioh predictions 
are aade. As ladloated in the text, the tenor# data with the largest 
A 
predicted ralus of production (T^^) that wae ftJll teaa&ts la thle 
aiaaljrel*! it atttaed to he *100 per oeat* effieleat. 
Bitljaatei fre» the «ltiple regrettloa aodel 
feet for dlffereaeet la »igrettloa ooeffteieats. At ia the tiayple 
aodel, 
" ^ ik 
except that repreteatt the estiaated eoeffioleat of the 1-th retoaroe 
Category. The ttaa^Urd error of the dlffereaoe It efoal to 
IFI? + •? 
^14 ^Ik 
2 
^ estlaatee ef the InAlrldaal Tarlaaeet, «r , reaala taae M la a 
1 i 
oojiqpletelj raadMi tai^ple , except that 3 tlaet ^e araher of degreet of 
freedea are lost dm to the "ttratlfleatloa" (late tiatt of farat}. 
l^it for dlffeg^aeet la aarglaal valae pred»ictt. At before, 
t . 
*"l4" "ik 
Bmt aoVf M repreteatt the eetlaated aarglaal ralue prodaet or retnra aad 
t • \|t^ + t® 
»ij-"lk "ik 
^oiuralt Oetle, op. eftt», p. 2l6. 
lUj 
'k " T) ' (•• I 
fbB footer J? » 2.302 is the aAJustaeat for legsrltlnie taken to the 
2 t>ate 34). the standard error of the estiaate, the assooiated 
regression eeitffleient and denotes the related diafoaal elMsent of 
the Yarianse-eorarianee aatrix, [oj . T and X are i^oaetrle aeaas. 
fest for differences hetwen resonree aarginal retTarns and the 
reiqg>eetlye 'egoporttinity eests*. the statistics used, as in the preYioos 
tests, are 
"i 
*here Mj, is the estisated marginal return (at the geonstrio aeans) and 
the opportmity eost assuasd for the related resonroe. fhe estiaate, 
, is sfoare root of the varianee (a. v obtained ^e forsnla Just 
indicated. 
Test for differenoes hetneen resource aarglnal returns at the 
gewwtyic aeaas and at the "optlisoa* resoaree ceaibination. She proeedare 
used is ttoalofsus to the iansdiateljr preceding teet, «xei^t that 
, . - "Kopt) 
^Obtained torn 1. 0. Carter aad 1. 0. Hartley. A Yarianae fomula for 
aaipginal produfitiYity estSbnates using tibe 0oVb«4>ouglas fbtnetion. 
(lSap«Lblii^ed aaaoserlpt). iaes, Xoita, Iowa State College. 1955* 
tftiere atargiaal r«tura at the eeosetrie Maa and. 
tb« nargiaal wttom at the ealoulatad optimal, s ia tiia ataadavA anor 
•i 
of Bargia&l iratara at th« gaoaatvie naa&^tlia sana m ia t!ia pmrioaa 
teat. Baaaatially, thaaa laat tvo taata ara "baaad tq^a tha mil hj^othai^a, 
- Pj, » 0 aa& - *i(opt) ^ ®* 
